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There is growing awareness of the link between climate change and security. Most of the 
climate security debate has focused on the ways that climate change exacerbates geopolitical 
and state security matters through ‘threat multipliers’, especially in terms of intra-state, 
inter-group and sub-national conflicts. At the same time, 64 per cent of climate finance was 
allocated to mitigation and 25 per cent to adaptation between 2013 and 2019 (OECD 2020; 
OECD 2021). Despite this, the dynamics between climate change mitigation and security 
remains a less-explored topic. As climate security attracts increasing attention in research 
and policy, our entry point into reviewing the links between climate change mitigation and 
security is rooted in studies of conflict and peace in environmental governance.
Because forests are a global focus of climate change mitigation, we focus our review on 
initiatives that directly affect, or are implemented in, forest areas in low- and middle-
income countries. Forests have complex governance contexts and are prone to conflict due 
to histories of colonization and ongoing resource extraction that lead to disputes over who 
has authority to make decisions, how different actors are compensated, and whose priorities 
and claims dictate actions in forest areas. CCMIs related to forests are often inserted into these 
long-standing conflicts. Many of these tensions over rights and resources are located in fragile 
states and some in armed conflict and post-conflict contexts. Conflict and weak institutional 
governance are often associated with deforestation but have also been shown to protect forest 
resources when insurgent forces are compelled to do so.
The two guiding questions of the review are: 
1. What are the ways in which CCMIs and peace/conflict influence one another? 
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We also explore CGIAR’s contribution to the literature on peace/conflict and climate change 
mitigation in forests, and what the future research opportunities might be for CGIAR. The 
framework we developed for this review considers various types of CCMIs and influences of 
peace/conflict. We began by defining variables and search parameters from the literature, and 
followed the contours of an integrative literature review that aims to study complex relations. 
We reviewed 1,147 publications that addressed climate change mitigation and peace/conflict. 
The geographic scope spanned Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Then, using filtering protocols, 
we selected 42 that robustly addressed the relationships between the two. We focused on 18 
key case studies and three literature reviews that addressed the focus of the review most and 
used additional literature as needed. Our key case studies focus mostly on a particular set of 
programmatic interventions that include payments for ecosystem services (PES) like Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+) and 
Nature-Based Solutions. We also briefly touch on renewable energy initiatives that have 
implications for forests. 
Our review reveals four main dynamics through which CCMIs interact with peace/conflict. 
The first dynamic relates to access and tenure rights and how these influence the peace/
conflict outcomes of the introduction of CCMIs. There is evidence that well-functioning 
carbon markets require secure land tenure. As a result, the growing interest in CCMIs, especially 
REDD+, helped civil society forums to recognize land rights specifically for Indigenous peoples 
and other local communities. However, many of our case studies show the ways in which the 
application (and sometimes design) of CCMIs leads to dispossessory and exclusionary effects 
for marginalized people due to the loss of tenure rights and access, violations of customary 
land claims, and other disempowerment of customary authorities over forest land and 
management practices. Some literature suggests that increased tenure security will be a co-
benefit of CCMIs; others argue that risks will be reduced only when tenure security precedes 
their implementation. Further, evidence suggests that collective tenure has a stronger effect 
on meeting objectives of deforestation initiatives and enhances security by alleviating conflict.
The second dynamic captures how the distribution of benefits and burdens associated 
with CCMIs has implications for peace/conflict and highlights the importance of equity. 
Carbon emission reduction projects that burden people living in and near forests often 
promise compensation with new sources of finance and other benefits. However, there are 
also arguments to say that these mechanisms have failed to overcome the legacy of colonial 
power dynamics and, in many cases, have reinforced them. Our case studies identify that 
although there are some cases of CCMIs improving livelihoods, benefit sharing often triggers 
conflict. The quantity of benefits has been limited, and failing to deliver on anticipated benefits 
heightens existing tensions or creates new ones. Lack of accountability is a key factor that 
leads to unfulfilled, reduced, or delayed commitments, exacerbated by high transaction costs 
and low carbon prices. Some case studies suggest that the type of benefits from a CCMI also 
matters. Not all communities are incentivized by financial rewards. Many instead prefer tenure 
security, management rights, and access to forests. Initiatives to protect forests by restricting 
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local people’s access are shown to create new food security concerns that lead to conflict. 
Loss of livelihoods resulting from changes in access and management rights to forests and 
changes to land use also create conflict and instability. Costs and benefits accrue differently in 
time (when and how payments materialize), space (which locations are selected for benefits), 
and scale (often accruing among international actors or national institutions). Community 
conflicts over benefit sharing related to inequitable distribution of benefits (especially for 
marginalized groups, Indigenous peoples, and women) are shown to lead to instability. The 
uncertain nature of the markets and unstable market relations also present significant risks 
of uncertainty for CCMI proponents.
The third dynamic captures the ways in which new agendas and interests are reshaping 
forms of governance by introducing external objectives to local levels that involve a new 
constellation of powerful actors. Implications for peace and conflict centre around clashes 
between notions of a global public good and local objectives related to livelihoods. In several 
cases, new agendas and interests resulted in assemblages that undermined Indigenous 
peoples’ rights and wider human rights. International attention was shown to support local 
agendas, but it also presents increased vulnerability and exposure for actors who attract 
international attention that challenges powerful interest groups. Market-based mechanisms 
for carbon trade, for example, have been closely linked to deepening neo-colonial relations, 
due to the logics premised on lack of local tenure recognition, inattention to legacies of 
global inequity, and development systems that favour elites. While international actors gain 
influence over national and subnational forest-related activities through CCMIs, the power 
of the central state in forests is often consolidated, leaving less influence for marginalized 
people. These power shifts have implications for security at national and local levels, driven 
by international requirements for coherence and upward accountability. An increase in 
the level of state centralization and involvement is shown in the literature to bring the 
benefits of subsidization and increased input of capacity, but can also lead to conflict due 
to the undermining of local autonomy and community institutions. In post-conflict settings, 
some CCMIs are associated with increased military presence, and elsewhere facilitate ‘land 
grabbing’. Together, these dynamics are linked with the notion of carbon violence. Some 
case studies suggest that the need for centralization can also be used as a rationale for, 
and a means of, strengthening state control and/or other political agendas. Militarization of 
forest areas is manifested locally but is often related to national and international security 
agendas. Some cases suggest that conflicts are rooted in the ways in which the objectives 
of climate change mitigation are being used to further other (non-environmental) agendas, 
such as militarization and strengthening of the state. Actions in the name of climate change 
mitigation are shown to be used by political actors to grab power over large swathes of forest 
land, involving dispossession and the capture of greater benefits. Reforestation initiatives 
are claiming strengthened state authority, especially when contrasted with blame directed at 
shifting cultivators through local-scale logging initiatives and fire bans.
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The fourth dynamic explores how the lack of attention to existing and potential new 
conflicts accentuates the security context of CCMIs. Cases highlight the lack of attention to 
conflict mitigation mechanisms in CCMIs. Without ways to deal with conflict, key opportunities 
are missed to address pre-existing tensions, prevent conflicts, or resolve conflicts. The 
literature suggests that conflict resolution has traditionally focused on the endpoint rather 
than on addressing the elements that create the conflict. However, more current approaches 
to peace have shifted to looking more at the root causes of, and different responses to, conflict. 
Modes of conflict resolution and peace-building provide opportunities to deepen this type 
of engagement, whether related to human rights, governance, or targeted socio-economic 
interventions. Indeed, the environmental peace-building literature has introduced a distinct 
lens for exploring ways to build common ground and identify areas of collaboration to address 
complex environmental challenges. More normative, planning and practice-based traditions 
have also innovated approaches to building local partnerships such as adaptive collaborative 
management, multi-stakeholder process, and participatory action research. Some authors 
suggest that peace-building efforts have helped to create conditions favourable to the 
implementation of CCMIs in conflict-affected areas. Attention to mitigating conflict has taken 
the form of the development of ‘safeguards’. Strengthening stakeholder engagement, dialogue 
and inclusive processes were often highlighted in the literature as key elements of peace-
building processes. Our findings show that participation was often tokenistic and exclusionary, 
resulting in further entrenched elite control of natural resources and forest land. The strong 
critiques of participation and other forms of ‘safeguards’ illustrate the varied ways in which 
conflict mitigation is considered by different practitioners, policy-makers and scholars. 
Commodification of nature emerged as a central theme for understanding the linkages 
between peace/conflict and CCMIs across the case studies. With the onset of external 
actors attracted to economic benefits from forests, tensions emerge among those with 
different perspectives on who has the right to benefit from forests and forestlands. New 
market opportunities have sometimes been shown to offer financial benefits, but much of 
the literature highlights adverse effects on livelihoods for marginalized people, Indigenous 
peoples and women. In most cases we reviewed, external market-based interventions tend 
to magnify power imbalances. Based on our literature review, we found three perspectives on 
commodification of forests. The first is based in neoliberal logics and assumes conservation can 
potentially be more profitable than deforestation. A second perspective suggests a more ‘civic’ 
approach emphasising the need for safeguards for marginalized people. A third perspective 
is more radical and critical, indicating that interventions deepen neo-colonial relations and 
facilitate dispossession. The core of this latter critique questions whether green markets can 
solve a problem that is premised on operating within and expanding capitalist relations in 
ways that misrepresent local values of the forest.
Another theme emerging from the cases in fragile or (post-)conflict contexts is how the 
design of CCMIs is, in many cases, inappropriate for these contexts. Different forms of 
fragile states have different security issues and require different responses. Introducing ‘rule 
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of law’ based initiatives in contexts where implementation of the law is weak is challenging, 
and there are hazards of assuming law will be implemented in fragile state contexts. 
The report presents recommendations synthesized from the literature and based on our 
own analysis. Recommendations from the literature we reviewed can be summarized into 
the following key areas: 
1. Integrate a conflict-sensitive approach into CCMIs
2. Design CCMIs for the local context 
3. Design CCMIs to be pro-poor and inclusive and to promote the key role of Indigenous 
peoples
4. Integrate land tenure, access and management rights for marginalized and Indigenous 
peoples into CCMIs
5. Strengthen existing effective, legitimate, and accountable institutions to better address 
peace/conflict 
6. Enhance governance systems and benefit-sharing schemata toward greater equity, and 
strengthen transparency and accountability of CCMIs
7. Explicitly integrate gender equity into CCMIs to reduce inequality gaps leading to instability 
through differential power relations
8. Propose alternatives to neoliberal climate change mitigation solutions
9. Encourage more research on the linkages between climate change mitigation and security.
Following more critical perspectives, several authors suggest that mitigation might be better 
focused on other sectors as CCMIs in forest areas are so problematic, despite their critical role 
in achieving climate goals. Some view problems associated with CCMIs as solvable, placing 
high importance on the role of safeguards. Others take a more political ecology approach, 
suggesting that technical solutions do not always work in the politicized context of forest 
governance and power dynamics need to be addressed. Lessons can be gleaned from 
these contradictory perspectives, pointing to the need to address political dynamics to allow 
a more nuanced exploration of the complexities of CCMIs. Understanding more about the 
complexity of the interest groups involved can lead to a questioning of the theory of change 
behind PES and other market-based CCMIs and the tendency within CCMIs to assume that 
financial incentives can fully and equitably compensate stakeholders for what are often non-
financial ‘costs’. Our review suggests a complex relationship between financial rewards and 
technical solutions which, in many cases, do not directly address the underlying drivers and 
power dynamics that create insecurity and drive many of the conflicts analysed in this report. 
A shift towards understanding some of the core issues in relation to the dynamics between 
peace/conflict and climate change responses could make the importance of conflict-sensitive 
approaches to climate change more apparent to policy-makers and implementers, leading to 
reduced instability and increased security at international, national and subnational levels. 
The rise of interests, studies and policy initiatives aimed at articulating and framing climate 
security raises concerns that, without careful consideration of these dynamics, they could 
potentially exacerbate conflict dynamics.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CCMI Climate change mitigation initiative
CIFOR Center for International Forestry Research
ES Ecosystem services
EU European Union
FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FPIC Free, Informed, Prior Consent
ITP Industrial tree plantation
LMIC Low and middle income countries
MRV Measurement, Reporting and Verification
NEPA National Environmental Protection Act
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NbS Nature-based Solutions
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PES Payment of Environmental Services
REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in  
Developing Countries 
UNDRIP UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
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Climate change is widely recognized as a global threat to security (Rüttinger et al. 2015), 
with ‘security’ defined as the state of being free from danger or threat. Security depends 
on a wide range of highly dynamic social, cultural, economic, environmental and political 
factors, and may be experienced differently by different actors (Adger et al. 2014; Ide 2017). 
The exacerbating effect of climate change and associated climate variability on insecurity is 
increasingly recognized in academia, policy and development circles (Peters, Mayhew, et al. 
2020). However, a common understanding of mechanisms and impact dynamics between 
climate change and security or insecurity is still lacking (Ide 2017; Mirumachi et al. 2020). This 
review focuses on responses to climate change, and, in particular, on mitigation initiatives in 
forest areas. We explore linkages and dynamics between climate change mitigation initiatives 
(CCMIs), peace, conflict and security, by examining types of mitigation in forest areas and 
different forms of security in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). This review examines 
both how CCMIs might exacerbate, reshape, or resolve security issues, and how the security 
context affects CCMIs in forests. 
Set within a wider debate on climate security, this review defines, approaches, and explores 
‘security’ specifically in terms of conflict and peace. Furthermore, by drawing on lessons 
from peacebuilding and conflict resolution literature, the review also identifies ways in 
which safeguards can be formulated to address conflict and facilitate peace-positive and 
responsive CCMIs. 
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The two guiding questions of the review are: (1) What are the ways in which CCMIs and security 
influence one another? (2) How do different dynamics result in different impacts for people 
and forests? We also aimed to explore CGIAR’s contribution to the literature on security and 
climate change mitigation in forests, and what the opportunities for CGIAR might be for 
future research directions. Therefore, the three main concepts that ground this review are: (1) 
security related to (2) climate change mitigation interventions in (3) LMIC forest areas. In 
the following sections, we explore these concepts to clarify the boundaries and objectives of 
the review. We start by introducing the concept of climate security and then elaborate on why 
we focus on peace and conflict in order to conceptualize ‘security’.
Before exploring these concepts, we acknowledge that there are many technical and 
institutional definitions of what a forest area is (see Chazdon et al. 2016 for a summary of these 
notions) for the purposes of this review, when a literature item refers to forests, we accept it 
as a forest. This includes references to natural and planted forests, and agroforestry in forest 
areas. The only distinction we will make is that the forest, however it is defined or used in the 
literature, is terrestrial or mangrove forests rather than a kelp forest.
1.1. CLIMATE SECURITY: a focus on conflict and peace
The term ‘climate security’ is broadly applied in the literature and corresponding policy 
perspectives. While the term has been used since the 1990s, it gained political momentum in 
2007 and has been used increasingly since then (Campbell et al. 2007; Dalby 2013). In general, 
the term is taken to refer to the risks induced, directly or indirectly, by changes in climate 
patterns and climate change overall (Dellmuth et al. 2018). The phrase has traditionally 
been dominated by issues of nation-state and international security related to diplomacy 
(e.g. McDonald 2013; Burke et al. 2015; Busby 2021). Our formulation aligns with discussions 
around environmental conflict concerned with the relationship between security (e.g. armed 
conflict, grievances and tensions, protests) and the natural environment (Barnett 2003; Dalby 
2013; e.g. McDonald 2018; Schilling et al. 2020). Others have explored debates around human 
security with a focus on risk, vulnerability, and resilience (Adger et al. 2014; e.g. Mach et al. 
2020; Schilling et al. 2020) with more emphasis on sustainable development and the ‘plight 
of the most disadvantaged’ (Floyd 2008). Many authors also note the way in which ‘climate 
security’ itself is a politicized term (Deudney 1990; Selby and Hoffmann 2014; Dellmuth et al. 
2018). On a policy level, the UN Security Council is beginning to stake out a position on the role 
of the climate crisis, integrating language and policy into its deliberations complementary to 
the UNFCCC, calling for greater understanding of the links between climate and security and 
noting the threat-multiplier dimensions of climate change (Security Council Report 2021).
In this review, we focus on an underdeveloped area of analysis in the climate security debate: 
the linkages between one set of responses to climate change – that of CCMIs in forest areas– and 
the insecurities that may occur on a number of levels (individual, civil war, interstate following 
Mach et al. 2020). To better understand the implications of security however, we focus on long-
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standing concepts and debates around conflict and peace as our specific interests in CCMIs in 
LMIC forest areas. Although this may have created limitations on the extent to which we could 
explore the security literature, insights into the very limitations of framing climate problems 
and solutions in terms of security become more apparent. Our approach draws on a range of 
literature from political ecology and environmental justice as well as national security and 
international relations; human security, risk, vulnerability, and resilience; and a variety of 
more normative literature on conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the context of climate 
change mitigation.
Linkages between climate security and peace/conflict are underexplored in the literature 
(Mirumachi et al. 2020). For the purposes of this review, we conceptualize ‘security’ from the 
perspectives of peace and conflict. According to Galtung (1976), peace is, at its simplest, 
the absence of (non-normal) violence (see below for more on normal violence), but can be 
nuanced to include agreed-upon and sometimes complex social goals. Galtung (2009) defines 
conflict as “actors in pursuit of incompatible goals” (Galtung 2009: 23). According to Patel et 
al. (2013: 345), a “conflict situation is one in which the impairing behaviour from one actor is 
experienced by another, while factors or conditions that drive such are considered the sources 
of impairment.” We consider conflict to include both violence (Scheffran et al. 2012) and 
non-physical (symbolic) violent perpetuation of inequalities (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). 
We recognize non-violent conflict as “normal and healthy in a pluralistic society. But without 
mechanisms to resolve conflict, it can easily lead to violence” (DFID 2010: 15; see also Work 
et al. 2019; and as in Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020). In their study of climate change and violence, 
Scheffran et al. (2012) categorized definitions of violence as linked to intentional killings of 
people or destruction of property. While many studies of violence focus on direct physical 
violence against people or property, violence is also understood more broadly, as per Galtung’s 
triangle of violence: physical, psychological, and cultural (Galtung 1990), as well as explorations 
of the multi-dimensional nature of violence (Navas et al. 2018) and the intersectional nature 
of violence as experienced by marginalized populations (Menton et al. 2021). In our definition 
of conflict, we include conflicts that “are usually violent in nature (although they need not be 
in all cases); they may involve individuals or groups; they may be organized or disorganized; 
and they may be personally, politically, or otherwise motivated” (Burke et al. 2015: 579). Using 
this definition, conflict may therefore include overt acts of large-scale violence such as war, as 
well as smaller-scale tensions that manifest in physical violence or forcible dispossession, 
inequalities or other violation of rights (see Mirumachi et al. 2020). 
There are two broad perspectives on violence. The first aligns with the World Health 
Organization definition as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or 
actual, against oneself, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high 
likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation“ 
(WHO global consultation on violence and health, 1996 in WHO 2014: 2). The second is aligned 
with the notions of violence developed by Galtung (1969) and others, in which violence is 
considered as a violation of rights and therefore is “any avoidable action that constitutes a 
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violation of a human right, in its widest meaning, or which prevents the fulfilment of a basic 
human need” (Salmi 1993 p 7 in Bufacchi 2005: 197). An OECD publication builds on these 
definitions to consider both political and social violence. The former is concerned with physical 
force toward a political end and includes state military, rebel activity and terrorist acts. The 
latter is a broader manifestation of grievances, criminality and interpersonal violence (OECD 
2016). We favour this broader perspective of violence as it enables a more comprehensive 
understanding of violence that may not always be evident in acts of brute force. We consider 
both acts and threats of violence in our review. We also acknowledge that violence is sometimes 
a mechanism of dispute resolution when all other forms of resolution have been exhausted 
(Yasmi et al. 2009).
In armed conflict contexts (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Myanmar) 
‘militarization’ is an emerging theme. Militarization is a process in which the legitimacy 
of phenomena is derived from association with objectives of armed forces, and, in so doing, 
that object of militarization increases in value (Enloe 2004; see also Gilbert 2012). While some 
work has been done on linkages between climate change and militarization, much less has 
been done on climate change mitigation and militarization in conflict areas (see also Duffy 
2001; Mirumachi et al. 2020). Militaries have a high degree of interest in addressing climate 
change, especially in terms of protecting natural resources against degradation, as it may 
help to galvanize public support for military actions or reinforce nationalist integrity (Gilbert 
2012). Environmentalists have expressed concerns over the militarization of the climate 
change agenda for at least the last 20 years (see Dabelko et al. 1999). Importantly, as Gilbert 
(2012) emphasizes, militaries tend to have a narrow perspective on security that relates to 
the extent to which natural resource extraction could contribute to the fragility of states. 
Further, she makes the point that military approaches to climate change mitigation tend to 
eschew systemic causes of climate change such as fossil fuel extraction and colonialism, and 
increasing inequality between the rich and poor.
Militarization is often justified under the auspices of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding, 
conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict stability have common origins (De 
Coning 2008; Matthew 2014). There are some broad characteristics across these terms (De 
Coning 2008: 51). Many of these perspectives are geared to situations driven by intrastate 
interests among external actors such as UN agencies, humanitarian organizations and foreign 
governments, often connected to engagements with national-level liaising actors in formal 
institutions. To date, there are many examples of peacebuilding efforts, which have also 
afforded two overarching critiques, namely around the availability of resources to achieve 
goals and the dependence on foreign institutions. A growing call to link peacebuilding with 
climate change is often framed around the risks of climate change likely to exacerbate conflicts, 
such as limitation of water resources, droughts, flooding, and other forms of climate-induced 
vulnerabilities or displacement (Conca et al. 2017; Conca 2019; Maertens 2019). Concerted 
efforts are linking climate change and human security, with implications for the structure 
of international governance regimes. This aims to bring groups together in more proactive 
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ways between climate and peacebuilding, through programmatic and funding alignments 
involving climate mitigation and adaptation (See Box 1 for an explanation of environmental 
peacebuilding). Nevertheless, opportunities for integration are hampered by the contexts and 
timescales of peacebuilding relative to the imminent threats of violence versus the longer-
term timescales of climate initiatives. This has resulted in scepticism towards the integration 
of climate and peacebuilding institutions and initiatives.
1.2. CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
Climate change mitigation includes introducing technologies for energy efficiency and 
emissions reductions, reducing deforestation, and reducing consumption (Nielsen et al. 2020). 
For the purposes of this review, we define climate change mitigation initiatives (CCMIs) as 
“human actions that [explicitly state an intent to] reduce greenhouse gas emissions and/
or sequester carbon emissions” (IPCC 2007; see also Millar et al. 2007). We add ‘explicitly 
state an intent to’ to specify that we have not focused on activities that may have some links 
to carbon emission reduction, but it is not a core justification for the initiative. For example, 
we do not focus on the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) or logging 
bans since they are primarily focused on reducing the trade of illegally harvested timber or 
trade of logs. Similarly, although there are clear links with sustainability certification, the 
objectives are not always explicitly the mitigation of climate change. We focus on CCMIs as 
specific actions that directly affect, or are implemented in, forest areas in LMICs, since we 
understand this as a knowledge gap with direct and practical relevance to reversing climate 
change. This means that we also limit our study to initiatives applied in forest areas; initiatives 
such as carbon taxes and other policy instruments are not our core focus. We introduce some 
Box 1. Environmental peacebuilding
‘Environmental peacebuilding’ is a specific term emerging as a concept in the late 1990s 
in direct critique to environmental conflict and environmental security discourses 
(Conca 2002; Dresse et al. 2019; Ide et al. 2021). Proponents reframed environmental 
challenges around cooperation by examining avenues for building synergies, realizing 
new institutional forms, and shifting from the triggers of conflict to the “cooperative 
triggers of peace that shared environmental problems might make available” (Conca 
2002: 5) . Peacebuilding initiatives around the environment and natural resources 
have been focused at a local scale and draw heavily on studies and practice on conflict 
resolution (Bingham 1987; Fisher and Sablan 2018; see also Herbert 2019) such as 
mediation (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987), multi-stakeholder processes or collaborative 
governance (Emerson and Nabatchi 2014), and adaptive collaborative management 
(Colfer et al. 2022). However, environmental peacebuilding is still emerging as a concept 
and has several shortcomings in implementation, sometimes leading to societal and 
environmental destabilization (Ide 2020).
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of these other initiatives to recognize that proponents justify them as relating to the reduction 
of carbon emissions in this section, but focus on initiatives fitting our definition. We recognize 
that CCMIs can play both productive and counterproductive roles in advancing peace/conflict 
(see Brock et al. 2020).
Mitigation strategies in the forest sector can be further categorized into those which (1) 
increase forested land area through afforestation or reforestation; (2) increase the carbon 
density of existing forests at both stand and landscape scales; (3) expand the use of forest 
products that sustainably replace fossil-fuel CO2 emissions; and (4) reduce emissions from 
deforestation and degradation (Canadell and Raupach 2008). We add (5), reduce carbon 
emissions through non-forest strategies that compete with forest land uses (see Box 2 below). 
Each of these strategies involves a range of interventions. In this section, we outline some of 
the forms that contemporary CCMIs take, starting with REDD+ and moving on to nature-based 
solutions, zero-deforestation commitments, standards and verification of products, and other 
market and policy mechanisms.
Reducing Emissions from forest Degradation and Deforestation in Developing Countries 
(REDD+) is “a framework created by the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) to guide 
activities in the forest sector that reduces emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, 
as well as the sustainable management of forests and the conservation and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks in developing countries” (UNFCCC). It was envisioned as a ‘quick’ and 
‘cheap’ way of mitigating climate change in the absence of an international agreement to 
address it (Angelsen et al. 2012). REDD+ evolved from predecessors such as Clean Development 
Mechanism and Integrated Conservation and Development Projects, which failed to reach 
the scale of REDD+. It offered what proponents framed as an innovative way for high-income 
countries to internalize some of their climate change externalities and for people in low- and 
middle-income countries to benefit from new markets (Corbera and Friedli 2012; Karsenty 
and Ongolo 2012; Lund et al. 2017). In many ways, REDD+ is an extension of Payment of 
Environmental Services (PES) approaches, in which people receive payment for providing 
an ‘environmental service’ (Mahanty et al. 2013). Although REDD+ has dominated the CCMI 
landscape for the past 15 years, other forms of CCMIs are now emerging, discussed next. 
Interest in Nature-based Solutions (NbS) has rapidly increased in both the private and the 
public sector over the past five years, with a dominant interest in forests (Seddon et al. 2019; 
Lang 2020 Oct 28; Cousins 2021). NbSs are defined by the IUCN as “actions to protect, sustainably 
manage and restore natural or modified ecosystems, which address societal challenges (e.g. 
climate change, food and water security or natural disasters) effectively and adaptively, while 
simultaneously providing human well-being and biodiversity benefits” (Cohen-Shacham et 
al. 2016: xii). Broad in scope, NbSs include mainstreaming nature into governance policy and 
instruments; regional and international cooperation; valuing nature through governance and 
finance; and mitigating, adapting and building resilience to climate change (Nature-Based 
Solutions (NBS) Facilitation Team of the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit 2019). NbSs are 
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often contrasted with technical solutions that provide only one benefit as providing multiple 
benefits that can be sustained over time (Dasgupta 2021). NbSs are also dominated by market 
forces and the commodification of nature and are closely linked to PES approaches (Boyle and 
Kuhl 2021; Cousins 2021).
The private sector has embraced NbSs as a mechanism that both contributes to climate, 
biodiversity and deforestation issues and brings financial benefits through carbon 
farming, and the increased value from certified commodities, green bonds, forest 
insurance and carbon off-taker guarantees (Vivid Economics 2020a; see also Seddon et 
al. 2021). Both the aforementioned report and another commissioned by the UN’s Principles 
for Responsible Investment frame natural forest restoration as an ‘easy’ and ‘low-cost’ 
opportunity for investors, projecting annual revenues of up to US$190 billion by 2050. Another 
expected growth area in these reports is Avoided Deforestation, which is projected to generate 
annual revenues of up to US$610 billion by 2050 (Vivid Economics 2020b). Its advocates argue 
that rewilding and reforesting are the most effective ways of restoring carbon and protecting 
biodiversity (Lewis et al. 2019; Perino et al. 2019). 
Current trends toward nature-based solutions, within which tree planting is a 
dominant strategy, are critiqued in the literature as a perpetuation of notions of the 
commodification of nature. “Both in design and implementation, tree-planting programs 
have been guided by forest rent distribution practices of state forestry bureaucracies and by 
corporate accumulation strategies linked to increasingly globalized commodity chains” (Barr 
and Sayer 2012: 9). Concerns over NbSs related to reliability and cost-effectiveness have been 
raised as well as tendencies within the approach to reward initiatives that ignore biodiversity 
value through mono-culture afforestation and overlook the interests of local communities 
(see also Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011 on the cost-effectiveness of PES approaches; 
Seddon et al. 2019; Seddon et al. 2021). Further, like other CCMIs, NbSs have been critiqued 
as distracting policy-makers from systematic changes such as decarbonization by phasing out 
fossil fuels (Seddon et al. 2021). At the heart of the issue that places NbSs at risk of repeating 
the mistakes of the past that trigger conflict, Welden et al. (2021) suggest that the perpetuation 
of a dichotomy between people and nature needs to be reconsidered in the framing of NbSs 
toward better inclusivity and collaboration among actors with different perspectives, policy 
objectives and practices.
There are a host of market and policy-oriented approaches to mitigate against climate 
change on which we focus less in this review. Since the boundaries of this review are those of 
the forests, we recognize other initiatives such as certification, the EU Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT), sustainability certification, and zero deforestation, and the 
ways in which proponents are increasingly understanding them as climate change mitigation. 
Other policy-oriented approaches such as carbon taxation (Metcalf and Weisbach 2009) 
may be equally important to mitigating against climate change; however, since they are 
not implemented directly in forest areas, we do not focus on them in this review. We are 
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also careful to avoid assumptions that all forest conservation is a CCMI. We discuss forest 
conservation CCMIs in our findings but pay attention to the way in which the initiatives are 
framed, recognizing that project proponents may shift perspectives toward or away from 
climate change mitigation (see Abbott 2012 on forum shopping in transnational regimes for 
climate change).
Not all CCMIs in forests are concerned with protecting them. Renewable energy CCMIs 
also put direct and indirect pressure on forests and the people who depend on them 
(Daioglou et al. 2019). A recent case in India highlighted conflicts among local communities, 
environmentalists and implementers of a wind energy project, in which forestlands were 
cleared for the project (see also Searchinger et al. 2018 for the case of European forests and 
renewable energy initiatives related to bioenergy; Gupta 2021 Aug 7). Similar pressures on 
forest cover and land use are resulting from the expansion of rare earth products needed for 
Box 2. Green technologies and cobalt extraction in the forests of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo
Conservation and carbon capture are not the only drivers of forest land-use change 
related to mitigation that lead to conflicts. The United Nations Environment Programme 
places “new technologies and renewable energies'' and “making older equipment more 
energy efficient” at the centre of its conceptualization of climate change mitigation 
(UNEP 2017 Sep 14). Renewable energy technologies play a prominent role in CCMIs, 
most of which require storage of power (Gielen et al. 2019). Currently, the leading storage 
solutions involve lithium-ion batteries, which use lithium and a cathode material, and 
most of which include cobalt (Schmidt et al. 2016; Standage 2021 Aug 3). Cobalt markets 
are increasingly reliant on the end-use of lithium-ion batteries (Campbell 2020). Congo 
(Kinshasa) supplies 70 percent of cobalt mine production in the world. As a fragile state, 
and having 198 Mha of natural forest comprising 85 per cent of its land area (WRI 2020), 
there is a direct link between renewable energy and forest areas in the country. Cobalt 
extraction engages international actors such as the World Bank and multinational 
companies. It is often violent, featuring human rights abuses, unsafe working conditions, 
forced labour and conflicts with forest users over land and environmental degradation 
(Turner 2007; Sovacool 2019). Sovacool (2019) aims to humanize the conflicts by showing 
how mining corporations evict artisanal miners using private security forces, followed 
by protests involving the destruction of company property. These conflicts are at times 
extremely violent, leading to killings. Corporate interests are backed by patronage and 
are able to eschew legal scrutiny. The background of these conflicts is often in forest 
areas, which Sovacool shows have been decimated by blasting and waste tailings. 
While on one hand DRC is an international focus for carbon sequestration in forests, on 
the other hand, international actors require cobalt for the production of green energy 
storage, the production of which contributes to instability. 
17Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
green technologies (see Box 2 on cobalt). Corbera et al. (2017) analyse Lamb and Dao (2017) to 
emphasize how concerns that Chinese investments in large-scale hydropower plants in forest 
areas in Myanmar and Vietnam would mean less attention to local issues and the effects of 
local people than domestic or OECD-based companies would. Lamb and Dao (2017) argue that 
there was little evidence to support this, and that critiques tended to lack appreciation of the 
cultural and political histories among the countries.
Not only could CCMIs deepen conflict, but they could also intensify existing power 
struggles that may result in more intense violence (Nightingale 2017; Froese and Schilling 
2019; Mirumachi et al. 2020). While violent conflicts that occur against groups are more 
easily contemplated as having political drivers, violence against individuals based on race or 
gender is often spatially and temporally diffuse and therefore more difficult to understand 
within a broader context (Brison 2013). Further, actions that result in protest or conflict and 
that are based on policies of oppression or subjugation are also considered acts of violence 
even though they manifest themselves at micro levels, such as dispossession of land or other 
property, forced exclusions from forests, or the forced restrictions on livelihoods in contrast 
with customary practices (Hall et al. 2011; see also Zimmerer 2014; Myers and Muhajir 2015; 
Lund 2021).
1.3. FORESTS AND PEACE/CONFLICT
Forests have complex governance and are prone to conflict. Forest areas are host to many 
of the world’s conflicts (Donovan et al. 2007; Harwell 2011; Harwell et al. 2011; Castro-Nuñez, 
Mertz, Buritica, et al. 2017). Forests are notoriously challenging to govern, especially in the 
tropics where forestlands can be vast and law enforcement remains weak and, in many cases, 
corrupt (Colchester 2006; Agrawal et al. 2008; Harwell 2011). Lying at the edge of agricultural 
frontier expansion, they have long histories of colonial intervention aiming to control forest 
resources (Le Billon 2002; Corbera et al. 2011; see also Peluso and Lund 2011). ‘Resource curse’ 
theory suggests that large injections of finance associated with CCMIs can, in itself, become 
a source of conflict. In scenarios where financial flows associated with CCMIs might reach 
significant volumes concentrated in particular areas, there is the potential for conflict and other 
hazards due to the potential for corruption associated with the lack of institutional capacity 
to absorb such revenues. The resource curse phenomenon is commonly associated with 
extractive industries in fragile states (Ross 1999) but lessons from this sector can be applied to 
the design of benefit-sharing mechanisms for successful CCMIs (Luttrell and Betteridge 2017). 
Featuring complex governance structures, the state tends to be weak in forest areas, leading 
to disputes over land rights and high-value natural resources that can finance or exacerbate 
conflict (see also Auty 1995 on the resource curse; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Rustad et al. 2008; 
Castro-Nuñez 2018). This renders forests vulnerable to illicit resource extraction (Harwell 
2011).
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CCMIs in forest areas are often inserted into contexts of existing conflict and tensions 
(Karsenty and Ongolo 2012). Due to the need for additionality, many CCMIs are located in 
areas with high deforestation threats. Forests with high carbon content overlap geographically 
with areas of higher conflict. Drivers of deforestation in these areas are often linked to tension 
or political complexities, which may include broader political and economic interests (Reed 
2011; Naughton-Treves and Wendland 2014; Asiyanbi 2016). Nations affected by conflict hold 
40 per cent of the world’s tropical forests (Donovan et al. 2007). At the level of the nation-state, 
forest areas that are the target of CCMIs tend to be located in fragile states (see Figure 1 for a 
map of the main case countries). Harwell (2011) uses OECD data to conclude that more than 
half of the states implementing REDD+ are classified as ‘fragile’. Castro-Nuñez et al. claim that 
no fewer than 25 of 64 countries with REDD+ initiatives are experiencing or emerging from 
Box 3. Political forests
‘Political forest’ is a term coined by Peluso and Vandergeest (2001). In later works, they 
link the political ecology of forests and the geographies of war (Peluso and Vandergeest 
2011a). They focus on the way in which forests were reconceptualized during the 
Cold War period in response to insurgencies and violence. War was depicted as being 
staged from forested territories, thus helping to establish forests as components of the 
modern nation-state. The crisis rhetoric of environmental security around ‘jungles’ as 
‘dangerous’ spaces near international borders led to the emergence of national security 
and conservation initiatives (Peluso and Vandergeest 2011b; Devine and Baca 2020). 
This literature highlights the processes that led to a particular location becoming a 
forest, whether due to interests of conservation, resource extraction, or protection of 
a species and, more recently, climate change policies (Peluso and Vandergeest 2011b; 
Devine and Baca 2020).
Box 4. Fragile states
Fragile states experience conditions of weak governance, corruption, tenuous security, 
factionalized elites, group grievances, poverty, inequality, weak human rights, weak 
legitimacy of the state, limited public services, weak rule of law, and social pressures 
including demographic and international displacement issues (Zoellick 2008; Fund for 
Peace 2017). An OECD (2007: 2) publication defines fragile states as those that “lack 
political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, 
development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations”. 
While alleviating many of these issues might be included in the design of CCMIs, the 
combination of CCMIs and fragile state structures presents both opportunities for peace-
building and challenges at several levels. 
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armed conflict (Castro-Nuñez, Mertz, and Sosa 2017; UN-REDD 2017). Although these data 
cannot imply causality, forests and conflict at least correlate at the nation-state level (but 
Gritten et al. 2013 mention are not always at the local level) and are therefore likely to share 
some governance challenges and solutions.
Conflict can lead to deforestation. In times of peace, strong and well-organized institutions 
tend to have a favourable effect on deforestation (Obydenkova et al. 2016; Cary and Bekun 
2021) and, conversely, conflict and associated weak institutional governance can lead to 
deforestation. Studies have suggested that forest loss advances more rapidly post-conflict. 
In the five years after the end of the conflict in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Ivory Coast and Peru, annual 
forest loss showed a 68 per cent increase (Grima and Singh 2019). Other studies in Colombia 
also found that deforestation increased during times of armed conflict (Landholm et al. 2019; 
Negret et al. 2019). Conflict-linked deforestation also occurs in protected areas (Darbyshire 
2021 Apr 22). Forests serve as refuges both for insurgents and for those hiding from conflict 
(Harwell 2011; Peluso and Vandergeest 2011b; Ladan 2014; Tar and Safana 2021). For example, 
during the conflict period (1986–2003) in Rwanda, 96 per cent of the deforestation occurred in 
protected areas to which displaced communities had fled for safety (Ordway 2015). Conflict 
has been shown to lead to migration into forested areas in some cases (e.g. the Shining Path 
led to migration from the Andean highlands into lowland Amazonian forests) and away from 
them in others (e.g. the FARC activity in Colombia led to migration out of the forest). Baumann 
and Kuemmerle (2016) show that the ways in which armed conflict affects land use, especially 
in rural areas, are highly variable and can have a long-term effect. 
Conflict can also reduce deforestation. The impact of conflict on forests can vary depending 
on the scale of analysis and the local context (McDermott et al. 2019). Studies show that in 
some areas of conflict, deforestation has decreased (Le Billon 2000; Baumann and Kuemmerle 
2016). Studies in Colombia showed evidence of reduced deforestation in conflict areas due to 
(1) ‘gunpoint conservation’, whereby guerilla activity in forested areas curtailed deforestation 
(Dávalos 2001) and (2) active conservation of canopy cover as a strategy to avoid surveillance 
(McNeely 2003a). Another study in Colombia showed how local people conserve forests in 
conflict areas to ensure they are protected from aggressors (Castro-Nuñez et al. 2016).
Forests can contribute to peace. Beevers (2015; 2016) argues that forests can act as ‘peace 
resources’ that support economic and social development. He uses the case of Liberia, 
where proceeds from timber helped to finance insurgence during times of conflict, but forest 
governance became a cornerstone of the peace-building process. Further, peace agreements 
do not necessarily lead to reduced deforestation due to historical legacies. For example, 
the power vacuum left by the FARC retreat in post-conflict Colombia presented challenges 
for REDD+, where rates of deforestation had increased as a result of unclear institutional 
arrangements, land grabbing, and colonial agricultural expansion (Landholm et al. 2019; Clerici 
et al. 2020; Mendoza 2020; Prem et al. 2020; Van Dexter and Visseren-Hamakers 2020; Liévano-
Latorre et al. 2021; Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al. 2021). Similarly, the concept of ‘peace parks’ 
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gained popularity in the 1990s and 2000s, promising benefits to both biodiversity conservation 
and peace/conflict (Hanks 1997; McNeely 2003b). But some of these initiatives have tended to 
reproduce and amplify existing inequalities, as well as recentralize power in the hands of elites 
(Duffy 2001).
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE REVIEW
In the next section, we outline the methods used in our review, noting that a full methods 
document provides further detail (see Myers et al. 2021). We elaborate the ways in which we 
conducted the literature review and introduce the main cases that resulted from the review 
process. Then, we introduce our analytical framework and elaborate the main variables 
that we explore. Next, in section 3, we present our findings. Finally, in section 4, we present 
recommendations drawn from both the literature reviewed and from our analysis of the 
literature. 
21Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
The aim of the review was to explore linkages between forest-related climate change mitigation 
initiatives (CCMIs) and peace/conflict. This was achieved by examining a range of mitigation 
efforts in forest areas and different forms of security. Two guiding questions of the review 
are: (1) What are the ways in which CCMIs and peace/conflict influence one another? (2) How 
do different dynamics result in different impacts for people and forests? We also aimed to 
explore CGIAR’s contribution to the literature on peace/conflict and climate change mitigation 
in forests, and what the opportunities for CGIAR might be for future research directions.
We used methods developed for integrative literature reviews (Whittemore and Knafl 2005; 
see Neuman 2011) to generate new knowledge on, or conceptualization of, a topic through a 
process of review, critique, and synthesis of the literature. We took an inductive approach to 
the review. Firstly, we developed an analytical framework (Myers et al. 2021) to lay out some of 
the categories that we expected to find in the literature. This framework was based on types of 
CCMIs related to forest (Agrawal et al. 2014) and causes of peace/conflict (adapted from Patel 
et al. 2013), and in the review questions we defined our variables and search parameters to 
help identify key literature. We drew on (1) empirical evidence from specific cases studies of 
forest mitigation, and (2) more theoretical literature exploring the perspectives around CCMIs 
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1. Purposive snowballing based on relevant literature to find prior and derivative works
2. Broad search using Google Scholar (because we also wanted to capture the grey literature, 
and its search parameters were better suited to our study than Web of Science) was 
conducted on publicly available documents (including those behind academic paywalls) 
using keywords (see Myers et al. 2021). 
3. Search of publications in the CGIAR Gardian database
4. Search of publications in the CGIAR Climate Security database filtered by CGIAR drivers of 
conflict, country and region. 
From these four methods, a total of 1,147 publications were assessed for inclusion. From 
them, we selected 153 items that made the link between security, conflict and/or peace and 
CCMIs. These items were then ranked on a 1-5 scale for how closely the linkages between the 
concepts were made. The 42 publications with the highest ranking (5) were annotated and 
coded according to our analytical framework (see Figure 2 and Myers et al. 2021 for details). 
The core analysis focused primarily on 18 case studies and three literature reviews (see Figure 
1, Table 1 and Annex 3 for details). As we progressed, we augmented this with a review of wider 
theoretical literature. We then categorized and constructed the four key themes regarding the 
interaction and dynamics between CCMIs and peace/conflict. 
Our research design for literature selection resulted in several limitations which have 
implications for the results (laid out in more detailed in Annex 1) :
● First, although the design of the study was to address security, we found that the literature 
on security specifically pertaining to CCMis in forests in LMICs was too limited. We therefore 
focused on concepts of peace and conflict from which lessons for security could be drawn. 
Because in the literature conflict is more easily observed than peace, our search terms 
included more strings related to conflict and violence than peace. Also,when looking for 
case studies of insecurity, we intentionally focused on visible expressions of conflict and 
violence. This means that while this review is useful for deriving lessons on the dynamics 
around the types of security found in the specific case studies, we cannot make overall 
judgements such as whether or not CCMIs lead to security. 
● Second, we analysed peace/conflict in relation to CCMIs; however, counterfactuals were 
not possible within the scope of this review. Therefore, if a CCMI has been shown in the 
literature to lead to conflict, this review does not assume that another type of land-use 
change would not. 
● Third, a significant portion of the literature focused on REDD+. Of the 42 works rated as 
having a level five intensity ranking, 19 explicitly concern REDD+. 
● Fourth, we faced the challenge of attributing outcomes to the CCMI rather than pre-existing 
conflict in that forest area or other intervention of which the CCMI was part. Not all the case 
studies included the details or captured the complexity of local context needed to make a 
judgement on that attribution. 
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● Fifth, we relied on academic literature and grey literature that was publicly available and 
searchable using the online search tools. This may have resulted in a focus on local level 
case studies and less on policy and landscape-level mitigation initiatives, which are a more 
recent phenomenon and may therefore be better covered in grey or policy literature. 
18.2 113.2
Fragile State Index Rating 2007-2001
CCMI Type Security Condition
Figure 1. Main cases referred to in the literature review.
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2.1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we lay out the variables used to categorize and analyse our case studies (see 
Figure 2) and the results of that categorization. These variables include:
● type of CCMI
● influences on peace/conflict
● security/fragility feature
● ideological perspective taken by the case study
Below, we briefly discuss how the case studies relate to each of these variables. The next 
subsections elaborate Figure 2, and more details about the definitions we used for each 
variable can be found in Myers et al. (2021). The CCMI-security dynamic comprises our core 
findings, which are elaborated in Section 3.
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Table 1 shows a summary of the cases that we analysed in depth, showing the number of 
publications that can be attributed to each CCMI type and influence on peace/conflict. We 
included both the main case studies and the multi-case studies as shown in Annex 3.
2.2. TYPES OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION INITIATIVES
The 18 in-depth case studies covered CCMI types that include PES, tree planting, logging bans, 
industrial tree plantation (ITP), ‘flex crop’ production (crops that can be used for food, feed, 
fuel or other purposes) and clean energy. The four papers with multiple case studies discussed 
a range of PES under REDD+. Most of the in-depth case studies we reviewed also discuss REDD+, 
both the preparation stages and the possible implications of upcoming implementation. 
The case studies selected covered a wide range of geographical areas from Asia, Africa and 
the Americas, as shown in Figure1. PES approaches to mitigation (some of which include or 
overlap with protected areas, tree planting and logging bans) were looked at in every region, 
while cases with industrial tree plantation schemes were located in Uganda and Cambodia. 
Flex crop production is discussed by cases in Cambodia and Myanmar, and clean energy in 
Cambodia and Mexico. Papers by Work (2015) in Cambodia, and Woods(2015) in Myanmar, 
used a landscape approach in their studies, and these covered multiple schemes. In Uganda, 
ITP’s mitigation objectives were identified as having significant peace/conflict issues, which 
resulted in research attention (Lyons et al. 2014; Nel 2015a; Blum in Alusiola et al. 2021). In 
Mexico, wind farms were studied as a CCMI that had implications for conflict (Gay-Antaki 2016; 
Dunlap and Arce 2021). Figure 2 lays out the various types of CCMIs covered and, for each, lists 
the main conflict influences identified in that case study. We used this as the first level data 
collation on which to base our further thematic analysis.












Clean Energy 4 0 2 2 0 2 0 10
Community 
Forestry
3 0 2 2 0 0 0 7
Conservation 13 8 7 0 1 2 1 32
Biofuel / Flex 
Crops
4 0 4 0 0 0 0 8
PES 14 5 10 5 2 2 5 43
REDD+ / CDM 22 12 21 12 1 5 10 83
Tree Planting 2 2 3 1 0 3 2 13
Total 62 27 49 22 4 14 18 -
Table 1. Summary of main case publications by CCMI type and peace/conflict
26 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Security/fragility 
feature 
Features of this context Example of case studies where the 
‘security context’ influences (in) 
security outcomes 
Contexts of armed conflict Weak institutions, social networks and 
negative loops of poverty, violence 
and resource degradation; low state 
legitimacy and high repression 
Post conflict context leading to a vacuum 
of authority and higher deforestation 
(Colombia) (Rodríguez-de-Francisco et 
al. 2021)
Forest as sites of armed conflict and 




Often authoritarian; elite interest 
in resource rents; power through 
patronage; low accountability of state 
to citizens, low state legitimacy, low 
rule of law; high levels of corruption
State using militaristic conservation 
to further statebuilding interests 
(Nigeria) (Asiyanbi 2016); quelling ethnic 
insurgency (Myanmar) (Woods and 
Naimark 2020); border security (Laos) 
(Dwyer et al. 2016)
Absent state / low 
capacity institutions 
Weak state; unable to control some 
areas; absent or weak government 
presence; often areas far from capital 
or on borders, ethnic or religious 
polarization; can lead to rogue private 
and non-state actors
Private companies unregulated by the 
state leading to forced evictions from 
ITPs (Uganda) (Lyons et al. 2014; Nel 
2015b)
Adapted from Call and Cousens (2008) and Harwell (2011)
2.3. PEACE/CONFLICT
In order to examine peace/conflict features, we first used Patel et al.’s (2013) framing of ‘sources 
of impairment’ to REDD+ projects and equated them with influences on peace/conflict. As 
shown in Figure 2, these influences include access use and restriction, benefit distribution, 
competing demands on forest resources, conflict management capacity, leadership, legal 
and policy frameworks, participation and information, quality of resources, and land tenure 
security, including principles of equity toward pro-poor access to, and ownership of, land for 
marginalized groups, women and youth. Each variable is placed within the context(s) of peace/
conflict, as shown in Table 2 below. In Figure 1, we show the main case studies reviewed on 
a geopolitical map that aggregates data from the Fragile State Index. Although these data are 
not chronologically aligned with the cases, the level of fragility can be used as a broad proxy 
for insecurity. Figure 1 also shows that the cases we selected (because they were the most 
explicit about CCMIs and peace/conflict issues) were not located in the most or least fragile 
states. Costa Rica and Panama are examples of some of the least fragile states within which 
our cases are located, and Myanmar and Uganda are among the most fragile. In our findings, 
we also pay attention to the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is both highly fragile and 
a significant focus of REDD+ initiatives; however, literature items on REDD+ in DRC did not 
feature in our highest-ranked documents.
Table 2. A categorization of the ‘fragile’ security contexts in which the CCMIs case studies are 
located
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2.4. IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES AROUND COMMODIFICATION 
Across the range of case studies, we identified a number of contrasting ideological 
perspectives. These perspectives specifically reflect the conflictual nature of the debate around 
climate change mitigation in forests (see Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Sconfienza 2017).
A key overarching theme relevant to all the dynamics is the marketization or commodification 
of nature bolstered by the emergence of carbon markets related to demands for mitigation. 
We understand ‘commodification’ as the process of transforming something from a non-
tradable to a tradable good or service that can be owned and controlled. With the arrival of 
CCMIs driven by external actors that promise economic benefits, local means of production, 
accumulation and distribution also change. In the cases of CCMIs, commodification processes 
include valuing carbon sequestered for sale in carbon markets and certifying land from which 
carbon credits can be legally bought or sold. The term ‘marketization’ refers specifically 
to “the expansion of the market into the lifeworld and the commodification of the natural 
environment and social context in order to achieve the need for growth and profit demanded 
by financial markets and investors” (see also Dunlap and Fairhead 2014; Tadajewski 2020: 3). 
Commodification and marketization of land and carbon contribute to conditions of peace/
conflict in different ways, which we explore in the subsequent sections of our findings.
The first perspective assumes that engaging in markets can help conservation to become 
more profitable than deforestation. A central perspective promoting forest-related climate 
mitigation is that it is one of the most efficient and cost-effective ways to address carbon 
emissions associated with the climate problem (Repetto 2001; McDermott et al. 2011; 
Angelsen and McNeil 2012; Di Gregorio et al. 2017), and at the same time affords co-benefits of 
sustainable forest management, biodiversity protection, poverty reduction, and local socio-
economic development in LMICs (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006). Some perspectives view 
the commodification in CCMIs as a ‘good thing’ as it bestows financial value on a previously 
financially unvalued asset. Newell and Paterson (2010) argue that carbon markets signal a 
transformation of capitalist models toward more environmental consciousness. 
Second, we see papers based on a more ‘civic’ perspective that embrace the benefits of 
such initiatives but argue that CCMI benefits bring trade-offs between economic, ecological, 
and social dimensions (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Dankelman 2010; 2012; Brugnach et 
al. 2017; Di Gregorio et al. 2017; Ramos-Castillo et al. 2017). They emphasize that market-based 
mechanisms may have differential effects on the rights and livelihoods of local communities, 
particularly on vulnerable groups such as women and Indigenous populations living in and 
near forests (Dankelman 2010; Brugnach et al. 2017; Ramos-Castillo et al. 2017), and have 
the potential to exacerbate social tensions(Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020).This raises a need for 
safeguards such as mechanisms for the redistribution of costs and benefits, secure property 
rights, and public oversight and participation to minimize negative outcomes and insecurity. 
Associated with this perspective are concerns about the impact that projects may have on 
tropical biodiversity and ecosystem protection. 
Third, many papers were based on more critical perspectives that question the association 
of mitigation with the offsetting of carbon emissions in some areas, with carbon sequestration 
in others. Authors argue that forest-based climate change mitigation weakens the focus on 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by industrialized countries and is predominantly in the 
interests of high-emitting countries (Dunlap and Fairhead 2014; Lyons and Westoby 2014a; 
Nielsen 2014; Leach and Scoones 2015; see also No REDD in Africa Network as an example 
of some of these perspectives). This body of work views these approaches as extensions of 
colonial legacy manifested in sometimes racialized exploitation and commodification of 
nature (Birrell et al. 2012; Cabello and Gilbertson 2012; Collins 2019; Ramcilovik-Suominen 
2019). Böhm et al.(2012) suggest carbon markets exemplify ecological commodification and 
expropriation indicative of uneven development (see also Asiyanbi and Lund 2020). Similarly, 
Lund et al.(2017) show that REDD+ resembles well-entrenched dynamics in the conservation 
and development industries that involve the commodification of nature leading to increased 
global inequities (see also Fairhead et al. 2012; Fletcher et al. 2016; Asiyanbi and Lund 2020). 
Market-based perspectives of commodification often conflict with local understandings 
of forests (Reed 2011; Mickels-Kokwe and Kokwe 2015; Neimark and Wilson 2015; Work 2015; 
Sconfienza 2017; Müller 2020) and can, therefore, be seen as an indirect form of violence. 
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Based on the case studies laid out above and combined with wider theoretical literature, we 
categorize four key ‘dynamics’ by which CCMIs and peace/conflict influence one another:
1. Tenure and access rights 
2. Distribution of costs and benefits 
3. New emerging forms of governance—new actors, agendas and accountabilities 
4. Conflict resolution/peacebuilding and engagement
Table 3 synthesizes the key outcomes emerging under each of these categories on which 
we expand in the subsections to follow. We then examine possible trajectories of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding/peacemaking. This understanding of dynamics seeks to 
influence programmatic approaches, design, safeguards, and overall engagement in ways 
more attuned to dimensions of peace/conflict. Finally, we examine the contributions of and 
gaps in CGIAR to this literature. 
In the discussion of each dynamic, we highlight the extent to which literature identifies different 
experiences for women, Indigenous People, visible minorities, and other minorities. Across 
the entire body of works we reviewed, many publications call for increased participation of 
these groups in CCMIs, with some referring to conflicts that emerge from exclusion. However, 
there is limited literature on the differential impacts and how security or insecurity on and 
conflict stemming from CCMIs affects these groups differently.


















management, and tenure 
rights 
● Tightening access in areas of contested rights lead to exclusion
● Technical requirements incompatible with traditions, culture and contexts
● Re-emergence of ‘fortress conservation’ approaches
● Violent evictions and enforcement of externally imposed rules
● Uncertainty that carbon rights do not automatically follow land, tree, and other 
forms of resource tenure
Benefit distribution ● Overall benefit flow is limited and unevenly distributed
● Uncertainty and changing terms over promises and expectations create tension
● Finance is not always a key motivating factor 
● Loss of livelihoods
● Costs accrue disproportionately among marginalized groups
● Elite capture of benefits
● Exclusionary effects emerge from technical requirements
● Corruption with high levels of finance influxes (resource curse) 
New actors, agendas and 
accountabilities
● New range of non-state actors involved in implementation and oversight
● Overcoming context of colonial dynamics by paying for a global good vs imposing 
new forms of global exploitation 
● International focus can help highlight rights issues but can also lead to 
vulnerability for local communities 
● State centralization needed for coherence and coordination, which can clash with 
efforts to empower local rights and authority





● Lack of attention to conflict in the design of climate change mitigation initiative 
● Lack of attention to root causes of conflict
● A shift from conflict resolution to peacebuilding 
● The crucial need for meaningful implementation of safeguards 
● Climate change mitigation initiatives can provide avenues to assist in 
peacebuilding
● Limited influence of women, Indigenous peoples and minorities in addressing 
conflicts
● Poor participation leads to conflict 
Table 3. A categorization of the ‘fragile’ security contexts in which the CCMIs case studies are 
located
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3.1. LAND TENURE AND ACCESS RIGHTS 
Land tenure and access rights to forest resources is a crucial theme consistently running 
through the CCMI case studies. The commodification of resources associated with mitigation 
has implications for addressing or exacerbating existing forest- and land-tenure-related 
insecurities depending on the perspective taken. On one hand, well-functioning carbon 
markets are said to require secure tenure (Sunderlin et al. 2018), and many projects and 
communities have perceived REDD+ as a chance to secure tenure rights (Dorr et al. 2013). This 
has been a key motivation for community involvement. In Indonesia, high-level government 
interest in REDD+ led to enhanced forums for establishing the regulatory environment, 
mechanisms, and means for securing land tenure for Indigenous peoples (Afiff 2016). On the 
other hand, many of the case studies reviewed show that CCMIs have increased the value of 
land and forest and, in many cases, led to the exclusion of local people. In this section, we 
discuss the ways in which resource tenure and peace/conflict are linked. Even in cases where 
policies in support of establishing CCMIs helped to raise the profile of rights and tenure for 
Indigenous peoples and local communities across Indonesia, securing such rights is by no 
means automatic (van der Muur et al. 2019; Fisher and van der Muur 2020). Indeed, in one 
case in Indonesia, land rights recognition for Indigenous peoples constituted its own process 
of green grabbing: some Indigenous activists aligned their land claims with ‘green economic’ 
state and private interests while simultaneously excluding other local actors depending on 
their ethnicity, class or gender (Astuti and McGregor 2016). In this discussion, we distinguish 
between the (1) underlying contexts of tenurial complexity in forests into which CCMIs are 
inserted and exacerbate existing conflict; (2) new tenurial-related realities and conflicts created 
by CCMIs; and (3) complexities emerging which are specifically related to carbon tenure (as 
distinct to that associated with land).
  Pre-existing tenurial tensions affect the way CCMIs lead to peace/conflict  
As laid out in our introduction, many forest areas are sites of preexisting complexities and 
tenurial uncertainty with a high potential for conflict. Most countries have unresolved disputes 
between the state and local community groups over tenure regimes, and it is into these 
contested landscapes that CCMIs are inserted. Many papers raise concerns about the 
planned implementation of PES/protected area initiatives due to the pre-existing insecurity of 
land tenure and/or the possible responses of the community towards the initiatives (see Reed 
2011; Beymer-Farris and Bassett 2012; Dorr et al. 2013; Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2019). 
This is of concern especially in areas where there are pre-existing significant land disputes or 
in (post-)conflict contexts (Castro-Nuñez, Mertz, Buritica, et al. 2017; Setyowati 2020; Galudra; 
Holmes in Alusiola et al. 2021; Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al. 2021), where existing governance 
structures may not be equipped to minimize conflicts (Gilmore and Buhaug 2021).
A common characteristic across the case studies is that the introduction of CCMIs is associated 
with increasing restrictions of access rights in forest areas (see Lyons and Westoby 2014a; 
Woods 2015; Work 2015; Kijazi 2015; Asiyanbi 2016). Many of the cases describe actors who 
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do not have formal titles being excluded from both the benefits of the CCMI and from 
accessing and using land and forest resources in other ways. Many of the cases document 
exclusion based on the lack of recognition of customary land rights and the way this loss 
of customary rights often outweighs other benefits associated with the CCMI. For example, 
Kane et al. (2018) show that REDD+ activities in Viet Nam’s Lam Ha district brought benefits to 
local community members such as jobs and payments for ecosystem services, but, despite the 
benefits, the restrictions on access to land for some groups remained a significant contention. 
Similarly in K’ho territory in Viet Nam, the REDD+ project was built on previous PES work but 
enforced with tighter restrictions on land use. Customary land claims were re-interpreted 
as invalid, and related customary activity was considered illegal by the state. K’ho people 
considered the project contrary to custom and its proponents oblivious to the norms of 
social equity (Hoang et al. 2019; and as in Alusiola et al. 2021). In West Kalimantan, Indonesia, 
Eilenberg (2015) shows that historical tensions over land and pressure from conservationists 
was intensified by REDD+. Indigenous communities were excluded from decision-making and 
elites were positioned to benefit. He argues that the amplified exclusions were a result of a 
lack of attention to the historical and political contexts and imposition of foreign concepts that 
contrasted with customary understandings of nature. 
In West Kalimantan, Indonesia, unclear land tenure enabled a ‘grey area’ in which local elites 
were able to include some people and exclude others from REDD+ benefits. This fomented 
conflict. Claims for certificates of land were stimulated by the opportunity to benefit from 
REDD+, even before benefits were distributed. The distribution of the certificates was highly 
disputed by local community members, with claims that the issuance was inconsistent with 
customary claims and in favour of local elites and along lines of patronage. The grey areas 
were perpetuated by conflicting land allocation policies and lobbying efforts to convert land 
allocated for REDD+ projects to oil palm developments (Eilenberg 2015). Work (2015) describes 
the dramatic changes in the Prey Lang Forest in Cambodia, where shifting agricultural 
practices were made illegal by the state, and the customary rotation of tree felling was 
also halted by a series of sub-decrees related to the formalization of a protected forest and 
biodiversity conservation area related to CCMIs.
We also find a number of cases of physical evictions were justified by the lack of land and 
access rights (see also Brockington 2002; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014; Kijazi 2015; Nel 
2017; Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018; Massarella et al. 2021). Howson (2018) discusses the 
case of Sungai Lamandau in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia, where only landholders with 
formal title were allowed to enter the forestlands used for a REDD+ project. Local forest users 
entered their customary land in the project area by stealth at night as project proponents 
labelled them as illegal forest users who were undermining the conservation project. Violent 
conflict erupted between those with customary claimants and the proponents of the REDD+ 
project. Forest users without legal land rights—primarily Indigenous people—suffered more 
violence than farmers with land—primarily migrants. 
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Many of the cases of evictions associated with CCMIs follow the traditions of protected 
areas before them. For example, both Neumann (1998) in the case of Arusha National Park in 
Tanzania, and Li (2007) in the case of Lore Lindu National Park in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, 
describe similar patterns of forced evictions under the auspices of environmental protection. 
These patterns are evident in the literature on CCMI implementation. In some places, the 
communities observed that with the arrival of CCMIs, exclusion is more severe than with any 
other interventions that they have experienced. In the case of Ecuador, the tensions agitated 
by REDD+ were based on long-standing tensions. Indigenous peoples’ activities had been 
organizing against their exclusion from forests in a movement joined by urban leftists and 
landless peasants (Reed 2011). Reed (2011: 256) shows that despite REDD+ showing promise 
of departing from command-and-control approaches to protecting forest, it carries risks of 
agitating long-standing disputes: “If Indigenous communities do decide to enter into REDD+ 
projects, it must not be forgotten that they, once more, enter a realm of modernity where new 
money and institutional agreements can once again alter their natural environments and ways 
of life in ways never seen before.”
Asiyanbi (2016) warns against the oversimplification of addressing land tenure alone. He 
explores how conflicts in Nigeria are linked to the way REDD+ is positioned in technical terms 
and is external to the political nature of tenure (see also Nel 2017). REDD+ proponents tried 
to find ways of ‘solving’ tenure rather than acknowledging that climate change mitigation is 
a power dynamic in itself. The failure to recognize these dynamics led directly to conflict, and 
indirectly created an environment conducive to the emergence of future conflicts through 
strengthening already inequitable power structures. Within communities, even well-designed 
CCMIs struggle to realize equity in implementation, which leads to discontent among those 
whose voice is not heard, or who fail to receive what they understand to be their ‘fair share’ of 
benefits. Chomba et al. (2016) explore the design and implementation of REDD+ in the cases 
of Kasigau in Kenya. They note that the REDD+ project designs took account of equity and 
reduction of elite capture, but because the programme was built on pre-existing structures 
stemming from colonial times, existing power dynamics were only reinforced by the project. 
This resulted in increased marginalization of people based on gender, class and ethnicity 
leading to increasingly severe social conflicts. The authors conclude that “[d]isguised as 
agrarian reform and formalization of tenure, these processes lead to benefits for the minority 
at the expense of the majority in the society, as demonstrated here in the context of REDD+” 
(Chomba et al. 2016: 211).
  New tenurial tensions directly related to CCMIs  
One issue raised in several cases is the incompatibility of CCMI design requirements (such 
as the need for clear fixed boundaries) with traditional or customary uses of land, which 
tend to cover larger territories and are used in different ways. Woods and Neimark (2020) 
highlight how the confirmation of park boundaries led to exclusions, and Asiyanbi (2016) also 
documents conflict caused by the mapping of boundaries.
Some literature we reviewed views conflicts in CCMIs through the lens of ‘land grabbing’ 
(Lyons and Westoby 2014a; Woods 2015; Work 2015; Scheidel and Work 2018). Land grabbing is 
defined as “the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources 
through a variety of mechanisms and forms that involve large-scale capital that often shifts 
resource use orientation into extractive character” (Borras et al. 2012: 851). Lyons and 
Westoby (2014a) argue that the scale of initiatives and the ways in which they attract a range 
of powerful actors with new interests in forest resources has led to various forms of ‘carbon 
violence’. Nel (2017) shows that a coalition of agribusiness companies and big banks propelled 
carbon investment forward in Uganda by developing large-scale industrial tree plantations. 
He observes that the voices of local forest users were ignored and that “[a]cknowledging the 
multiple actors in the emergence of the current carbon forestry dispensation, there is a clear 
bias towards foreign investors, NGOs and carbon developers” (page 148). 
Li (2011) suggests that the structural requirements for carbon accounting have led to a 
technical approach which disregards other values of a forest landscape (Nel 2017). This 
is exacerbated by the need for additionality. We can see the illustration of this in Lyons et al. 
(2014), where an industrial tree plantation company who joined the voluntary carbon initiatives 
was required to tighten its borders and not allow any settlement or community farms within 
its concession areas to avoid leakages in their carbon accounting. The requirement to ensure 
carbon sequestrations are verifiable and tradeable can lead to exclusions (Brockington et 
al. 2008). We see this across a number of our cases; for example, the case of REDD+ in Sungai 
Lamandau, Indonesia (Howson 2017), and the CDM project in industrial tree plantation case in 
Uganda (Lyons et al. 2014). In the Cross River State, Nigeria, a logging ban that included NTFPs 
was imposed as a military task force was set up for the purpose of establishing the area as a 
REDD+ pilot (Asiyanbi 2016). In the Aural Landscape and Prey Lang Forest, Cambodia, evictions 
and loss of access were the result of various PES projects such as CDM and REDD+ (Work 2015).
CCMIs have rekindled ‘fortress conservation’, limiting access in forest areas in the name 
of conservation (see Brockington 2002; Lyons et al. 2014; Kijazi 2015; Nel 2015b; Howson 
2018). Dunlap and Fairhead (2014) frame this activity as a form of land grabbing in the name 
of climate change mitigation, and as an expression of the violence and history of political 
forests. Dunlap and Fairhead (2014) distinguish between ‘hard counterinsurgency’ in the 
form of conservation practices that translate into a fortress conservation model and ‘soft’ 
counterinsurgency methods through participatory or community-based conservation (we 
return to this issue in a later section). The ‘fortress conservation’ model posits that protected 
areas prioritize the protection of nature above the needs or rights of local communities 
(Brockington 2002; Siurua 2006). Based on this assumption, this conservation model tries to 
eliminate any human disturbances in the ecosystem of a defined protected area. Local people 
dependent on the natural resources of the area are barred from accessing the area and the 
resources, and park rangers guarding the boundaries often enforce this (Neumann 1998; 
Brockington et al. 2008). In the case of Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, climate change concerns 
prompted an expansion of the national park that took over the forest previously designated 
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for the community’s subsistence use, leaving communities without resources (Kijazi 2015). In 
the case of Uganda’s industrial tree plantation, a system where communities were initially 
allowed to grow their crops in between the company’s trees was then phased out because of a 
carbon certification requirement (Lyons et al. 2014). 
Fortress conservation is, in some ways, an extension of colonial and neo-colonial 
understanding of the state’s domination over natural resources and forests (Hulme 
and Murphree 1999; Bluwstein 2018; Domínguez and Luoma 2020). Some of the examples of 
‘fortress conservation’ employed military or armed protection. For example, preparations for 
a state-led REDD project in Cambodia were accompanied by increased military presence and 
the erection of concrete poles around a cardamom buffer zone to protect the forest area. The 
officiation of the project included heavily armed military police and other shows of power 
(Milne 2012).
Some CCMIs have led to changes in land-use dynamics linked to violence (Froese and 
Schilling 2019) and, in some cases, to killings (see Milne 2012 Apr 30 for the Pataxo carbon 
offset plantation case). Other case studies describe industrial tree plantation (ITPs) or flex 
crop production, where a company or corporation takes over the land entirely and changes 
the landscape and biomass into monoculture plantation (Lyons et al. 2014; Woods 2015; Work 
2015; Nel 2015a; Blum in Alusiola et al. 2021). This suggests that these forms of mitigation 
are particularly associated with local populations being violently evicted, in what Lyons and 
Westoby (2014a) have termed ‘carbon violence’. Dunlap and Fairhead (2014) argue that ITPs 
are associated with high levels of conflict (and killings) associated with land grabs, and Woods 
and Naimark (2020) analyze conservation as a counterinsurgency in Myanmar. 
The outcome of exclusions associated with CCMIs falls disproportionately on more 
marginalized groups. Kane et al. (2018) show that restrictions placed on customary land 
included in the Forest Carbon Trust Fund projects (in Chitwa, Ghorka, and Dolaka districts 
in Nepal) excluded those without a formal title. This affected women more than men by 
restricting NTFP and firewood collection, increasing travel times and investment to meet 
daily needs. Higher-caste groups were also said to be affected less than lower castes, and 
ethnic minority groups, who had less formalized privatized land, were severely impacted. The 
authors showed that higher castes with privatized land actively lobbied against distribution of 
land to those without formal land rights, causing conflict along ethnic lines. Sarmiento Barletti 
and Larson (2019) argue that Indigenous communities are susceptible to greater injustice than 
other groups. 
Local communities excluded from accessing forest resources or ancestral lands, or those 
suffering from the loss of livelihoods, express discontent and show resistance in the form 
of protest, strikes, road blockage, violence against the police/military, and so on. For others, 
the response takes the form of ‘everyday forms of resistance’, such as continuing customary 
practice covertly (despite activities being made illegal) and small acts of defiance towards 
access restrictions that undermine the objectives of the CCMI (see Scott 1987; Hoang et al. 
2019; and as in Alusiola et al. 2021).
We see some overt and violent forms of protest. For example, in the case of Cambodia, 
participatory maps determining village boundaries and limiting agricultural expansion near 
forest areas were violently protested by local elites. This delayed the process for two years 
and resulted in the redrafting of the maps to focus only on a 600ha block of cardamom forests 
(Milne 2012). In other cases, resistance rarely succeeded in bringing back their access rights 
or land rights. At the very most, the communities were given compensation for their loss 
of rights. There are also a myriad of reasons why local communities might not resist or 
might consent to their own exclusion. They may be powerless to resist, fear repercussions for 
resistance, believe promises of compensation or agree with arguments that exclusions will 
be the best thing for their communities (Scott 1987; Sunderlin et al. 2009; Myers and Muhajir 
2015; Martin et al. 2018).
  Carbon rights and peace/conflict  
Our analysis also suggests the value of analytically separating an understanding of 
commodification of carbon from the commodification of the land and forest resources, 
due to the specific tenure issues that carbon markets bring. Under CCMIs, carbon credits have 
become a new commodity with a vacuum of legal clarity over their tenure. Meanwhile, literature 
on community-based resource management has long made the argument—and increasingly 
so in recent political efforts to recognize Indigenous peoples and local communities as inherent 
protectors of natural resources—that much of the continued protection of carbon resources 
has taken place over many generations among locally rooted environmental stewards. There 
are increasing efforts to quantify the role that Indigenous peoples play in protecting carbon, 
embodied through statements like this: “Indigenous justice and climate change are closely 
tied together. Indeed, it is estimated that around 24% of above-ground stored carbon, or 
54.5 gigatonnes of carbon, is stored in tropical forests held by communities and Indigenous 
peoples” (Ospina 2018: 1).
On the one hand, the commodification of carbon emission reductions has rendered certain 
types of land ‘investable’ once carbon credits gain value. On the other hand, this raises the 
potential for tension and conflict as new claims are made (Asiyanbi 2016) in a context of unclear 
legal frameworks and questions such as who owns the carbon, what its value is and who has 
the right to make money from it, questions for which there is often a legal vacuum (Martínez-
Alier 2002; Kravchenko 2007; Karsenty et al. 2014; Gilmore and Buhaug 2021). Asiyanbi (2016) 
highlights the way in which claims, counterclaims and legal ambiguity about carbon rights can 
further complicate power dynamics.
Rights to benefit from carbon do not automatically follow the rights to land or forest 
resources (Luttrell et al. 2014). In many countries, the decision over whether carbon rights 
37Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
accrue to local communities or are classed as a state asset (in the way that mineral resources 
usually are) has not been clarified and depends on whether carbon credits are defined as a 
national public good and therefore the nation should benefit accordingly. To date, much of 
the debate about benefit-sharing from REDD+ has assumed local people have the ‘rights’ 
to benefits (Loft et al. 2017). This relates to tensions in many countries over who owns the 
land and who owns forests, which has implications for benefit-sharing (see also Luttrell and 
Betteridge 2017).
Loft et al. (2015: 1033) argue that clarity over tenure and resource rights in tandem with 
the carbon asset is critical to prevent disruptive conflicts between competing actors 
within REDD+ countries. They continue to say that “such conflicts will propagate uncertainties 
and further complicate transactions between sellers (‘providers’) and buyers (‘beneficiaries’) 
of carbon ecosystem services (ES) provided by forests.” They highlight that investors are 
reluctant to commit to CCMIs in contexts where lack of clarity may compromise not only the 
success of the CCMI but also peace/conflict more broadly.
 Addressing land tenure for peacebuilding  
Many authors advocate for the recognition of local land claims and/or the use of tenure 
solutions to address peacebuilding and for CCMIs to be successful (Patel et al. 2013; Rodríguez 
de Francisco et al. 2013; Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2017; Castro-Nuñez 2018; Peters, 
Dupar, et al. 2020). Many CCMI proponents hope that tenure security will be a co-benefit 
of REDD+ (Sunderlin et al. 2018) and that by bringing attention to the issue, REDD+ would 
be a way to resolve land tenure issues. For example, groups in Indonesia have used climate 
change mitigation (especially REDD+) to bring international attention to land rights (Afiff 2016; 
Sunderlin et al. 2018). REDD+ has been promoted by some NGOs as a means of strengthening 
the rights of local communities, and this represents an example of mitigation being used to 
enhance security. However, Indigenous peoples’ rights groups specifically have been cautious 
about promoting REDD+ as a vehicle towards increased rights, using the mantra ‘No rights, no 
REDD’ to show that rights must come before REDD+, rather than after or in tandem (Gomez et 
al. 2010; Howell 2014; see also Sikor et al. 2017). 
However, conflict issues are associated with the clarification of land tenure. In the uplands 
of Cambodia, the commodification of land through individual titling led to internal processes 
of dispossession, violent forms of exclusion of the Indigenous Bunong people and instability 
caused by the erosion of communal (non-tradable) land tenure (Milne 2013). Similarly, in 
Lao PDR, a coordinated effort among international donors, NGOs, and different levels of 
government aimed to strengthen land tenure security within the context of REDD+ in order 
to minimize conflict and maximize the chances of success of the projects. However, “plural, 
contradictory regulations and policies, combined with existing power inequalities result in 
a ‘filter mechanism’ that reduces the practical impact of legal instruments and safeguards 
aimed at strengthening the least powerful actors’ rights” (Broegaard et al. 2017: 170).
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Addressing land tenure in (post-)conflict contexts is particularly challenging due to 
a lack of capacity in government institutions and civil society (Blair 2007; Unruh 2010). 
Dunlap and Fairhead (2014) suggest that (post-)conflict areas have a history of CCMIs taking 
advantage of weak institutions to obtain the security of land rights. Several studies have shown 
that collective tenure has a stronger effect on meeting the objectives of deforestation 
initiatives and may lead to less conflict by providing conflict resolution mechanisms better 
suited to the context than individual titles in communities of Indigenous peoples (Larson et al. 
2008; Cronkleton and Larson 2015; Saito-Jensen et al. 2015). Thus Reed (2011) suggests that 
confirmed Indigenous peoples’ territories are likely to be the best place for CCMIs as land is 
secure. Dabelko et al. (2013) and Sawas et al. (2018) suggested that REDD+ can go further than 
this by strengthening land tenure security through confirming customary lands.
3.2. BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION AND COST-SHARING 
As land tenure and access to forest and carbon resources shift, questions of benefit distribution 
and cost-sharing emerge. The concept of ‘net zero’ in the design of some CCMIs is based on the 
notion that the costs of producing carbon emission reductions will be compensated by new 
sources of finance (and related benefits) for forest-based people and others incurring ‘costs’ in 
reducing carbon emissions from forests (see Stark et al. 2019 as an example). As well as being 
solutions to climate change, global carbon markets are championed as drivers of positive 
development outcomes for local communities because they provide revenue to advance 
socio-economic development (Dabelko et al. 2013; Tänzler 2013). While there are examples 
of CCMIs improving livelihoods and wellbeing, in some of our cases, benefit-sharing caused 
conflict.
In case studies where the benefits flowing to local communities were discussed as a factor 
related to peace/conflict, the benefits have not been significant (Work 2015; Howson 2018) 
or have been overshadowed by the costs incurred (see Mahanty et al. 2013). Some suggest 
that the undelivered promises and expectations of benefits from REDD+ have caused new 
tensions and conflict (Scheba 2014; Eilenberg 2015; Nel 2017; Alusiola et al. 2021) or have 
accentuated existing ones (Dorr et al. 2013). CCMIs present opportunities for wrongdoing 
resulting from a lack of accountability around delivering the benefits. In some cases, key 
proponents have downplayed monetary benefits from CCMIs in order to frame a CCMI as 
‘successful’ (Lund et al. 2017; Rutt et al. 2018; Setyowati 2020). Further, the price of carbon 
remains low at around USD 5 per tonne. This affects the viability of CCMIs. The low level of 
financial return can lead to conflict due to high upfront costs which may not be compensated 
as expected. Many CCMIs remain financially dependent on ODA and public finance. 
The type of benefit matters. Finance is not always the key motivating factor for local 
communities. The concept of PES is based on the premise that actors are incentivized by 
financial rewards. Overall, the heavy focus in our case studies on the importance of gaining 
access rights to land and forest resources (as the section above on tenure discusses) suggests 
that this premise may be too simplistic and that actors may be more heavily motivated by other 
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‘benefits’, such as tenure security and access to land. The case study from Aceh (Setyowati 
2020) highlights the way in which support for REDD+ was based primarily on the assumption 
they would be able to derive benefits from it, both directly and indirectly, by gaining access 
to resources that would contribute toward personal benefits (e.g. access to forest land for 
cultivation). 
Livelihoods are affected by changes in land use. As discussed above, livelihoods have been 
lost as the result of changes in access rights to forest areas and in changes to land use (Kijazi 
2015; Asiyanbi 2016; Scheidel and Work 2018). Some CCMIs compete with agricultural land, 
which may put pressure on food prices (Daioglou et al. 2019; Gilmore and Buhaug 2021; Sen 
and Dabi 2021). Lyons and Westoby (2014b) frame these scenarios as forms of violence that 
are manifested in the destruction of food systems, denials of rights and livelihoods, denial 
of access to sites of cultural importance, and reduced availability of ecosystem services for 
local forest users. A case in Indonesia shows that bureaucratic delays in a national REDD+ 
demonstration were halting payments to community members, creating tensions among 
communities and the state. The state expressed commitment to the long-term support of local 
communities but had to work with local NGOs in the short term to overcome internal obstacles. 
This suggests that CCMIs need to consider long-term commitments to the well-being and 
livelihoods of local communities (see also Agrawal 2005 on the role of intermediaries in land-
use governance; Indriatmoko et al. 2014). Gilmore and Buhaug (2021) discuss how climate 
change mitigation policy can significantly affect economic growth and unequal distribution 
of burdens and benefits. They identify that CCMIs may reduce overall economic performance 
through diversions of funds designated for other purposes in LMICs and, in so doing, create 
conflict. For example, policies designed to reduce emissions from transportation could lead to 
economic hardships.
One overall feature of CCMIs is that costs and benefits accrue in different temporal or 
geographical spaces. In the cases we reviewed, the conflict has been caused by inequity 
in the way in which benefits and costs are distributed—whether it is between local and 
international levels, between countries, within a local landscape or within a community. The 
concerns of equity were more related to conflict than concerns over ‘wanting more benefits’. 
PES schemes focus primarily on economic efficiency, and this undermines attention to notions 
of equity (Pascual et al. 2014), which can lead to conflict. The potential for benefits to accrue 
differently to different groups can cause complex power relations and create the potential for 
conflict. Conflict is caused by seeing misallocation of costs and costs being incurred on the 
ground, and the way in which many of the people who bear the costs are not the people who 
receive the benefits (see Poudyal et al. 2016).
Many of the studies we reviewed show that these costs are accruing disproportionately in 
marginalized parts of society, and this is leading to insecurities (see Mahanty et al. 2013 
as an example). Case studies from carbon forestry reforestation projects in Mexico show the 
labour burden which has fallen primarily on women, where those involved are not receiving 
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financial compensation on a par with the labour expended (Gay-Antaki 2016) or are working 
under disenfranchising labour arrangements (Otto 2014). This issue is also tightly connected 
to the issue of access to forest and land tenure. Eilenberg (2015) shows how local elite actors 
make land claims (legal and illegal) to ensure they are included in the benefits and that this 
creates tension in the community as well as further marginalization of the community’s 
poorest members. In some cases, CCMIs have exacerbated gender inequalities and the 
exclusion of women; for example, where engagement (and potential benefits) were routed 
through farmer associations and co-operatives—groups comprised mostly or exclusively of 
men (see also Elmhirst 2011 in the context of a political forest in Indonesia; Howson 2018). 
Many authors raise the elite capture of benefits as a significant issue (Dorr et al. 2013; 
Kijazi 2015; Nel 2017; Sovacool 2019; Alusiola et al. 2021). This is particularly the case in (post-)
conflict contexts (see Box 5 on Aceh). Elite members of the community who are less dependent 
on forests are able to be included in the benefit distribution system, while more marginalized 
ones who are more dependent on forests are not. People who have the resources and ability 
to claim benefits are not the ones who suffer the most from the loss of access to forest land. 
The people whose livelihoods are dependent on forest land are sometimes the ones who are 
unable to claim benefits from PES (Eilenberg 2015; Howson 2017). 
The technicalities of CCMIs, combined with the uncertain nature of the markets and 
unstable market relations, present significant risks for CCMI proponents (Nel 2017). In 
addition to the technical requirements, smaller players are further excluded by not having 
access to market information on which to base informed decisions. The resulting need for 
intermediaries to navigate the complexity further increases potential points of tension (Nel 
2017), such as the uncertainty and short time scales associated with many NGO engagements 
(as shown in Indriatmoko et al. (2014). On the other hand, in their analysis of the Katingan 
Project in Central Kalimantan, Indriatmoko et al. (2014), show how the flexibility of working 
through NGO networks can help overcome the often onerous implementation arrangements 
around CCMIs that lead to confusion over the laborious bureaucratic processes that impeded 
the engagement of surrounding villages in local livelihood initiatives. 
Many of the debates around REDD+ benefit-sharing assumes that a significant proportion of 
any revenue raised would accrue to the locality or community reducing emissions. However, 
experience from the extractive resource sectors suggests that if financial flows become 
significant, this distributive rationale may be problematic and can lead to conflict. If 
the emission reduction is classified as a national good (or incurring a national cost), benefits 
should arguably accrue to the nation for wider development purposes. Decisions on this 
depend clarifying who the ‘rightful beneficiaries’ are (see section above on carbon rights), and 
are also related to the benefits of ensuring some subsidiarity (the principle that matters ought 
to be handled, and decisions taken, by the smallest, lowest or least centralized competent 
authority) (Le Billon 2001; Ross 2003), as well as the need to minimize rewards for poor 
performers (Mejía Acosta 2015). Although rewarding regional efforts to generate their own 
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Box 5. The challenges of inserting mitigation initiatives into the complexity of 
(post-)conflict contexts 
In post-conflict Aceh, Indonesia, Setyowati (2020) shows how 2,300 forest rangers were 
hired by REDD+ project proponents to protect Ulu Masen forestlands. Community 
members were recruited as community rangers to collaborate with state agents for 
policing forest areas. Most forest and community rangers were former GAM (Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka – Free Aceh Movement) combatants, illegal loggers, and poachers. The 
project proponents assumed that involving the former combatants in REDD+ would 
reduce the likelihood of their return to the conflict and would prevent them from turning 
to illegal logging activities, hence fostering successful reconciliation processes in the 
region. Support for REDD+ was based on the assumption they would be able to derive 
benefits from it, both directly and indirectly, by gaining access to resources that would 
contribute toward personal benefits (e.g. access to forest land for cultivation). 
However, many GAM ex-combatants proved to have intricate network ties with logging 
business actors who often supplied logistical support to GAM, creating inequalities in 
access to the forest depending on how strong linkages were with GAM actors. Rampant 
illegal logging agitated relations between project proponents and communities, which 
was deeply entrenched in networks involving various actors such as military officers, the 
police, GAM combatants, and local communities. This resulted in an uneven distribution 
of benefits from the REDD+ projects.
revenues is logical, there is a (re)distributive logic of investment in areas where needs are 
higher (Acosta and Yanguas 2014).
 
3.3. NEW ACTORS, NEW AGENDAS, NEW ACCOUNTABILITIES 
As opportunities for new benefits arise, new actors develop interests in forests, lured by the 
prospect of accessing emerging markets or gaining control over forest areas. These new actors 
have their own agendas and accountability structures that may conflict with actors engaged 
in forest landscapes. CCMIs involve new forms of governance and actor relations due to 
the introduction of (1) international and national objectives to the local levels, and (2) the 
involvement of new (public, private and civil society sector) actors (see Sikor et al. 2017). The 
imposition of new actors and agendas and emerging forms of governance affect peace/
conflict in a number of ways. 
 International oversight versus carbon colonialism 
Demand for climate mitigation is dominated by international voices and results in new 
interactions and power dynamics between sub/national and the international (Dwyer et 
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al. 2016; McEwan 2017; Mirumachi et al. 2020). On one hand, we see contestations between 
the global public good objectives of carbon emission reductions and local objectives related 
to livelihoods (Reed 2011; Dunlap and Fairhead 2014; Lyons and Westoby 2014a; Eilenberg 
2015; Work 2015; Asiyanbi 2016; Borras et al. 2018; Castro-Nuñez 2018; Scheidel and Work 
2018; Franco and Borras 2019). On the other hand, the public sector is increasingly involved 
in financing and providing technical inputs to mitigation activities, and increased numbers 
of civil society and non-state actors are involved in oversight, accountability and conflict 
resolution. This range of new hybrid assemblages (involving both public and private) can help 
bypass the state to further agendas on which nation-states might be lagging; for example, 
Indigenous peoples’ rights and wider human rights issues such as gender and diversity 
issues. Local interest groups are increasingly using international attention to further their 
own interests. Keck and Sikkink (1998) have used the term ‘boomerang effect’ to refer to this 
phenomenon of local advocacy groups channelling information about human rights violations 
to transnational actors to generate international support.
 
International attention can support local agendas, but it can also bring increased 
vulnerability and risk exposure for actors who raise international attention to challenge 
powerful interest groups. In some cases, this can lead to reprisals in the form of killings, 
criminalization, smear campaigns and threats against those who challenge powerful actors 
(Menton and Le Billon 2021; see also Box 6). Many international NGOs and UN initiatives 
argue for increasing the visibility of the threats against human rights defenders (Forst 2014). 
However, the Global North tendency towards individualization of ‘environmental heroes’ can 
undermine the safety of those ‘heroes’ and disarticulate collective movements (Verweijen 
et al. 2021). Some question the role of international NGOs in exacerbating local conflicts 
that leave their local allies at risk of reprisals (Grant and Le Billon 2021) or, in other cases, in 
engaging in partnerships with companies that enact violence upon local communities (Menton 
and Gilbert 2021). There is also a scaled dimension around activist groups succeeding in 
securing regulatory victories in land tenure recognition through REDD+ (Afiff 2016) that 
refract in the distribution of benefits for certain actors (van der Muur et al. 2019) and can lead 
to exclusions by certain individuals benefiting certain subjects in a community over others 
(Agrawal 2005; Astuti and McGregor 2016).
It has been argued that, by using a market-based mechanism, the concept of REDD+ has 
attempted to overcome neo-colonial dynamics inherent in preexisting internationally 
driven conservation initiatives by compensating those incurring costs of conservation. On 
the other hand, many argue that the mechanism failed to overcome these colonial power 
dynamics and, in many cases, has reinforced them. For example, the conditionalities of 
performance-based payments has led to these dynamics being termed ‘carbon colonialism’ 
and accusations of elite polluters finding new ways to ‘colonise’ (see also Bachram 2004; 
Bumpus and Liverman 2010; Lyons and Westoby 2014a). CCMIs are perceived to be following 
the same violent patterns as colonial logics, characterized by lack of recognition, inattention 
to history, and the development of systems that favour elites, all of which leads to instability 
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Box 6. Environmental defenders and CCMIs
In 2020, 227 environmental and land defenders were killed worldwide in retaliation for 
their efforts to protect land, forests, waters and other ecosystems (Global Witness 2021). 
This represents the worst year on record since monitoring began in 2012. For the second 
year in a row, Colombia saw the highest rates of killings (65 in 2020; 64 in 2019). The Global 
Witness report focuses on the links between the attacks on environmental defenders and 
the climate crisis—that defenders are “agents of climate conservation”, such that progress 
towards mitigating climate change requires prevention of violence against defenders 
(Global Witness 2021, page 16). Indeed, 70 percent of those killed in 2020 defended forests 
from deforestation and expansion of industrial development into forested areas. In this 
recent shift in the framing of climate activism and climate justice to include Indigenous 
peoples’ rights and land rights more broadly, more attention is being drawn to the role 
of Indigenous peoples and local communities as climate protectors. However, it is not 
so straightforward. As mentioned elsewhere in the report, contestations against REDD+ 
projects are one of the most ubiquitous of conflicts linked directly to CCMIs. Although very 
few killings can be linked directly to CCMIs, they are intricately linked to land conflicts 
and the fight against deforestation and the industries responsible for GHG emissions at 
a broader level. Weak recognition of tenure rights; failure to respect the principle of free, 
prior and informed consent; and growing demand for land have led to an increase in land 
conflicts and growing dangers for communities defending their land rights, including 
increased violence against forest defenders (NYDF Assessment Partners 2018; Streck 2020). 
Some CCMIs have led to changes in land-use dynamics linked to killings (e.g. Milne 2012 Apr 
30). Others have been linked to the intensification of land conflicts and the criminalization 
of Indigenous leaders. For example, in northeast Brazil, eucalyptus plantations encroached 
on lands located within Indigenous peoples’ territories and are linked to threats against 
local leaders. 
Actions aimed at combating deforestation and environmental crimes, be they NGO 
campaigns and investigations or government-sponsored enforcement of environmental 
laws, can increase conflict for environmental defenders as those responsible for those 
crimes seek retribution or to silence defenders. Many of the defenders who are killed 
are local leaders, grassroots activists and defenders of Indigenous peoples’ land rights. 
However, some are also NGO employers, government officials, and lawyers. In some 
countries, opposition parties face attacks for pro-environment stances. For example, in the 
Philippines, politicians, NGOs and community leaders face red-tagging (i.e. being labelled 
as communists) for speaking out against development projects that cause environmental 
damage (IUCN 2020 Dec 15). Yet, at the same time, the high-level visibility of these conflicts 
can sometimes serve as leverage to draw international attention to particular conflicts. 
44 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
and fragile governance structures. The commodification of nature is a specific imposition of 
Global North logics on forests on which the hopes of climate change mitigation have been 
pinned. In reality, forests are not vacuous ungoverned chunks of land but managed commons 
that have long histories of conflict and peace. There is a neo-colonial logic to placing the hopes 
of climate change mitigation on forests in the tropics. The burdens (e.g. loss of access, shifting 
governance toward elite preferences, and the introduction of new markets and actors) are 
shouldered by poor countries, while rich countries hope to purchase carbon credits that allow 
them to conduct business as usual. In addition, the perceived imposition of an international 
agenda at national and subnational levels can also have implications for democratic processes, 
ownership and sovereignty.This can lead to lack of national ownership or government buy-in 
to the climate change objective and disinterest in resolving emerging conflicts. 
 State centralization related to CCMIs: implications for peace/conflict  
At the same time as international actors are using mitigation to gain more influence over 
national and subnational forest-related activities, we also see some strengthening of the 
central state and of their function associated with CCMIs. Effective mitigation suggests the 
need for the centralization of some state functions to ensure coherence and coordination. This 
is particularly related to the need for legitimacy in the eyes of international markets and civil 
society, to bring coherence and coordination to MRV systems and to ensure that leakage does 
not occur. There is a need to address structural issues such as land tenure and institutional 
capacity which the project level is not able to address. This has led to the emergence of 
‘jurisdictional approaches’ which aim to move beyond the project level, increase the volume 
of financing and thus hope to tackle these structural issues (Sticker et al. 2018; Arts et al. 2019).
An increase in the level of state centralization and involvement can bring the benefits of 
subsidization and increased input of capacity but can also lead to conflict due to the undermining 
of local autonomy and community institutions. The scaling up and centralising of CCMIs can 
lead to a disconnection from local realities (Reed 2011; Kijazi 2015; Nel 2015a; Work et al. 2019; 
Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2019) and increased complexity of vertical power dynamics. 
The following literature suggests that the need for centralization can also be used as rationale 
and a means to strengthen state control and/or to impose other agendas. This is noted to 
be a source of conflict. In Indonesia, we see how the REDD+ process becomes embroiled in 
national-subnational government power play and creates tensions between national and 
sub-national governments. A case in Kapuas Hulu, Indonesia, highlights the issue of different 
interests over land between different levels of the state leading to conflict. Forest and Fauna 
International applied for an Ecosystem Restoration Concession permit in a conversion forest 
area, which meant that the land use was eligible to be converted from forest to agricultural 
or plantation use. The proposal was supported by the district government for the purpose 
of implementing a REDD+ project. However, the provincial government then designated the 
area protected forest, rendering void any deforestation arguments for the project. Local forest 
users and the district government were upset that the potential benefits of REDD+ would no 
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longer be available to them, and transnational grievance systems specifically for REDD+ had 
not been established or considered a priority due to the effective relationships established 
between the local communities, project proponents and district government (MacDonald and 
Ardhianto 2016).
In some of the cases, particularly with those in (post-)conflict contexts (such as DRC, Nigeria, 
and Myanmar), ‘militarization’ emerges as a theme. In Laos, Dwyer et al. (2016) showed that the 
military had considered the forest frontiers as insecure areas since the Cold War, which 
motivated the state’s interest in controlling forestlands (see also Peluso and Vandergeest 
2011b). The authors show how contestations over forestlands are therefore manifested locally 
but are entrenched in national and international peace/conflict dynamics. Nagel (2015) raises 
the concern that as CCMIs are increasingly militarized, the already strong domination of 
men in policy-making and decision-making roles will be further entrenched. Asiyanbi 
(2016) highlights the ways in which the state used REDD+ as a mechanism to reinforce its 
military presence around the Bakassi region and the Niger Delta in Cross River, Nigeria, as 
part of the counter-insurgency drives that resulted in intense conflict in these areas. Local 
communities were shown to be highly dependent on forest resources over which the state 
assumed de jure rights. The state identified the forest area as a base of the insurgents. The 
Anti-deforestation Task Force was therefore mobilized and was active in seizing equipment 
and timber. The REDD+ projects stimulated a state-wide ban on logging, the offence of 
which resulted in seizures of timber harvests and fines. This generated income for the state 
exceeding its REDD+ budgets, and this supported military actions in the area under the guise 
of REDD+ but also served to resource military action against insurgents. The recentralization 
of state powers has, in some cases, been shown to simultaneously empower corporate and 
elite interests (Barr and Sayer 2012; Asiyanbi 2016) resulting in contestations between larger 
scale players and communities (Böhm et al. 2012; Lyons and Westoby 2014a; Kane et al. 2018).
 
 Climate objectives legitimising wider political agendas 
Financing for CCMIs attracts actors with their own agendas. Across the case studies, we see 
the stated objective of climate change mitigation used to further certain non-environmental 
agendas that legitimize the negative impacts on some (usually marginalized or Indigenous) 
groups (Work 2015). This phenomenon has been termed the ‘legitimization framework’ 
(Scheidel and Work 2018) and plays on the way in which the moral economy of CCMIs brings 
legitimacy to actions (Franco and Borras 2019). Related to this, some observers suggest that 
certain actors use crisis language and perspectives. (Kijazi 2015) argues that the term ‘climate 
security’ has created sensationalism and a dramatization which has created a ‘market’ 
for mitigation (Dunlap and Fairhead 2014), which in itself has created more conflict by its 
association with military-type responses.
Kijazi (2015) used the term “climate emergency sensationalism”, which he considers paved 
the way for the fortress conservation approach in Mount Kilimanjaro, where previously there 
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had been efforts to devolve management to local people. He shows the way climate emergency 
is being used to justify such actions by attributing the dramatic melting of Mt. Kilimanjaro 
glaciers directly to local forest users who cause degradation in the forest in the area. Scheidel 
and Work (2018) describe how actions in the name of climate change mitigation are 
being used by political actors in Cambodia to gain power over large swathes of forest land. 
In the case of the Think Biotech reforestation project in Cambodia, where an industrial tree 
plantation was awarded a concession three times larger for a clean development mechanism 
project than it was allowed for economic concession, despite its development having a huge 
impact on livelihoods, land use and forest carbon.
A dominant theme in some of our cases is the way in which increased costs (and/or negative 
outcomes) occurring more in some areas or groups than others is legitimized by the noble 
greening aim of addressing the climate change crisis and deforestation. Green grabbing, 
which can be understood as a form of land grabbing, is defined as “appropriation of land 
and resources for environmental ends” (Fairhead et al. 2012). The literature around ‘green 
grabbing’ highlights the way in which this dispossesses local people and those benefits 
are captured by elite interests and agendas other than those of carbon emission reductions 
(Montefrio 2013; Dunlap and Fairhead 2014; Eilenberg 2015; Borras et al. 2018; Scheidel and 
Work 2018; Franco and Borras 2019).
In some cases, a framing of the drivers of deforestation is used to target marginalized and local 
actors and fails to identify the role of larger, more powerful players (see Rodríguez-de-Francisco 
et al. 2021). Examples of this include blaming shifting cultivation (Dunlap and Fairhead 2014) 
or village-level illegal logging (Kijazi 2015) for deforestation. This then allows responses in 
the name of mitigation to further agendas such as state territorialization, land grabbing and 
other forms of ‘violence’. In Cambodia, at the same time as customary forest users were being 
sanctioned for ‘illegal logging’, illicit logging activities were being conducted by companies 
connected with government officials on Indigenous peoples’ territory (Work 2015). 
3.4. CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION INITIATIVES AND PROSPECTS 
FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING
Shifts in land tenure, access, benefit distribution, and powers of actors in governance 
structures in forests inevitably result in tensions and conflicts, which we argue are sometimes 
constructive. These processes present opportunities for peacebuilding, and often require 
conflict resolution processes to become constructive. Several studies make specific reference 
to the lack of attention to conflict and effective conflict resolution mechanisms in CCMIs 
leading to greater conflict (Patel et al. 2013; Milne and Mahanty 2019). Brugnach et al. (2017) 
show how the inability to manage conflict exacerbates further conflict within CCMIs. Efforts to 
address conflict in CCMIs at the international, national and local levels can draw on lessons 
from the fields of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. These approaches 
range from attention to human rights and the rule of law to politics, governance and socio-
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economic interventions. However, there are some valuable distinctions (De Coning 2008; 
Matthew 2014) between these different approaches which have operational implications. 
Galtung (1976) distinguishes between (1) peacekeeping and peacemaking as a short-term 
action to reduce violence, and (2) peacebuilding as longer-term action to address the structural 
causes or drivers of conflict (also discussed in Goldwyn and Chigas 2013).
Approaches to peace have shifted from understanding the conditions that lead to conflict 
to focusing on the root causes of conflict and different responses to it (Castro-Nuñez 2018). 
Various conflict analysis and sensitivity tools have been developed for understanding these 
structural causes (Harwell 2011; Gustafsson 2016; see also Peters, Mayhew, et al. 2020). 
Examples of this include conflict-sensitive Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
(Sawas et al. 2018) and the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (Bush and Opp 1999), which 
can be used to assess the impact of development projects on peace and conflict. A shift from 
managing conflict to preventing it (Lund 2008) focuses more on the building of institutions 
and capacities to manage conflict (Galtung 1985), and delivering services, and enhancing 
social trust and legitimacy of governments. There has been increasing attention on designing 
climate-resilient peace-building and conflict-sensitive climate programming that not only 
reduces conflict potential but also plays a constructive role in peacebuilding (Dabelko et al. 
2013; Gustafsson 2016; Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020). Recent peacebuilding literature suggests 
new frameworks and opportunities for thinking about conflict and security around CCMIs, 
which focus less on repairing and more on delivering capacity (Matthew 2014). 
This framing of peacebuilding can also see conflict as an opportunity to transition into 
collaboration through conflict resolution mechanisms. Approaches to conflict resolution 
were increasingly critiqued as focussing on the endpoint rather than on addressing the 
elements that create conflict. In Indonesia, for example, the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry has established a conflict resolution body to address land tenure conflict (see Firdaus 
and Widawati 2014). This has sought to identify locations of conflict and to introduce dispute 
resolution to those sites. However, in doing so, the key role of prevention is not addressed. 
Matthew (2014) makes the explicit case for integrating conceptualizations of peacebuilding 
into climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives through programmatic and 
funding alignments. On the other hand, where there are imminent threats of violence, 
there has been scepticism over longer-term peacebuilding approaches and the viability of 
integrating climate and peacebuilding initiatives.
Some authors suggest that peacebuilding efforts have helped to create conditions 
favourable to the implementation of CCMIs in conflict-affected areas (Castro-Nuñez 
et al. 2016). However, the peacebuilding literature linked to CCMIs suggests that the range 
of activities classified as ‘peacebuilding’ refer to what would otherwise be termed as rural 
development programs (Galtung 1985; Castro-Nuñez, Mertz, and Sosa 2017), including 
support to the provision of livelihoods; strengthening governance institutions to ensure rights 
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Box 7. Conflict as a catalyst for transformation  
Conflict is often equated negatively with conditions of violence and conflict in which 
systems have broken down. However, some literature emphasises how conflict can 
be a catalyst for constructive transformation and social change in mitigation (Kane et 
al. 2018). Conflict is not always counterproductive as, conversely, cooperation is not 
always conducive to REDD+ effectiveness. For example, Yasmi et al. (2009) show that 
when rights that were previously taken away become challenged, actors can become 
empowered to challenge past injustices, and therefore conflict can be an indicator of 
empowerment (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2019; and as in Alusiola et al. 2021). This 
act of challenge can create pathways to participation for communities that previously 
did not exist. This is also discussed by Brockhaus et al. (2021), which shows that conflict 
highlights new constellations of access and contestations at play.
and access to land (Blom et al. 2010); conditional payments for the production of alternative 
crops and forest conservation; development and conservation programs; policy reforms and 
governance (Brockhaus et al. 2013); and forest conservation strategies (Brottem and Unruh 
2009). In so doing, ‘a peacebuilding’ approach is not specific enough to add much analytical 
value.
Attention on mitigating conflict has been operationalized through the development and 
implementation of ‘safeguards’. They are designed, implemented and enforced by different 
actors but particularly by major funders such as the World Bank and UN organizations, and 
part of other multi- and bilateral assistance programs. Box 8, below, shows the range of REDD+ 
safeguards, which have been applied to varying extents and with varying success (Jagger et 
al. 2014). Reflecting the distinction between conflict resolution and peacebuilding discussed 
above, safeguards can be categorized into those which aimed to (1) prevent harm, (2) 
mitigate harm, (3) ‘do good’, (4) enhance opportunities, and (5) transform perspectives, ideas, 
practices, and policies (Arhin 2014). Brockhaus et al. (2021) argue that the latter is required in 
order to bring lasting and equitable outcomes, and, by extension, greater security (see also 
Castro-Nuñez 2016). Safeguards have been a challenge to implement and monitor for REDD+ 
(Duchelle et al. 2017), and there have been calls for stricter accountability mechanisms to be 
put in place (Work 2015). These authors used household data collected from Brazil, Cameroon, 
Indonesia, Peru, Tanzania and Vietnam to examine the efficacy of social and environmental 
safeguards in REDD+ initiatives. They found that the implementation of ‘on paper’ safeguards 
was insufficient to avoid negative impacts on overall perceptions of well-being.
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Aside from considering how CCMIs can be designed in more conflict-sensitive ways using 
safeguards, some literature highlights how climate change mitigation can be used as a 
response to conflict or for peacebuilding. Castro-Nuñez (2018) and Conca (2002) suggest that 
the environment and natural resources can help to resolve conflicts and build sustainable 
peace. In a case in post-conflict Colombia, CCMIs that address transitions from cattle to low-
carbon land uses such as agri-silviculture and ecotourism are shown to contribute to peace 
(Graser et al. 2020). 
Some authors suggest that CCMIs could be used as a means to mobilize new financing and 
generate funds for peacebuilding and more generally for insecure areas (Tänzler 2013; 
Matthew 2014). Tänzler (2013) suggests that REDD+ can act as an impetus to address structural 
constraints such as institutional capacity (readiness) and provides incentives to governments 
to improve forest governance capacities to qualify for REDD+ project support. The two main 
peacebuilding outcomes we see in our review are tenure security associated with CCMIs, and 
the inclusion of a wider range of voices.
Related to the themes of collaboration and multi-stakeholder processes discussed above, 
stakeholder engagement, dialogue and increasing diversity of voices is put forward as 
a means of conflict resolution and important as a peacebuilding approach in the design 
of CCMIs (Yasmi et al. 2012; Dabelko et al. 2013; Patel et al. 2013; Work et al. 2019). MSPs 
developed around CCMIs can in themselves act as peacebuilding processes by including a 
multitude of voices. Policy analysts suggest that REDD+ had contributed to peacebuilding by 
fostering cooperation, learning and dialogue amongst a range of actors (Tänzler 2013; United 
Box 8. Social and environmental safeguards 
Perhaps the most widely applied, agreed-upon safeguard principles that were 
established at the UNFCCC COP 16 are summarized by Jagger et al. (Jagger et al. 2014: 
2139) as follows:
1.  Complement national forest programs and international conventions and 
agreements
2.  Maintain transparent governance
3.  Respect the knowledge and rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities
4.  Obtain effective participation of Indigenous peoples and local communities in the 
design and implementation of REDD+ 
5.  Avoid the conversion of natural forests and ensure that activities conserve forests, 
biodiversity, ecosystem services, and enhance other social benefits
6.  Address risks of reversals (i.e., seek to achieve permanence)
7. Reduce leakage 
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Nations and World Bank 2018). At a community level, Nepal’s use of forest-user groups as 
agents of peacebuilding shows some signs of success. In Indonesia, the large influx of civil 
society voices in REDD+ policy designs also led the way to state reforms and regulatory 
developments in the recognition of land tenure regimes (Afiff 2016). Chapagain and Sanio 
(2012) show that new forest management groups started after the conflict have some capacity 
to advance peacekeeping and CCMI objectives simultaneously, but caution that groups that 
existed during times of conflict were often perceived as partisan. 
Experience from wider environmental conflicts shows the efficacy of facilitated processes 
around adaptive collaborative management, or approaches such as multi-stakeholder 
fora, participatory action research and other forms of engaged scholarship, policymaking, 
and monitoring. Effective conflict management requires recognition of shared struggles 
and setting of clear goals for resolution (Colfer 2010). This process, therefore, requires broad 
stakeholder engagement and attention to inclusive processes to enable a broader range of 
voices to be heard in decision making, and also to ensure the initiative is better targeted and 
fosters and ensures accountability, all of which are linked to peace/conflict.
Several case studies documented engagement with communities in the implementation of 
CCMIss; cases from Nepal (Satyal et al. 2019) and Costa Rica (Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018) 
at the national level, and in Indonesia (MacDonald and Ardhianto 2016; Setyowati 2020) and 
Mexico (Otto 2014; Gay-Antaki 2016) at the local level. The use of multi-stakeholder processes 
is particularly recognized in the literature as opening access to a wider range of non-
state actors (Dorr et al. 2013; Satyal et al. 2019). 
Although stakeholder engagement is framed as a crucial social safeguard for CCMIs, the 
substance of the engagement, and thus the safeguarding outcomes, can vary considerably. 
Stakeholder engagement is frequently put forward as a mechanism for avoiding conflict 
resolution, but some of our cases suggest that it can lead to conflict or can further entrench 
inequality (Yasmi et al. 2012) if done in a way that is not considered legitimate, disingenuous 
or badly implemented. This is a longstanding theme in studies of public participation and 
citizen engagement (Arnstein 1969; Lowry et al. 1997). Several of our case studies highlight a 
lack of public participation in the CCMIs as leading to conflict and insecurity (Nel 2017; Satyal 
et al. 2019).
Indeed, many of the cases we reviewed involved poor quality, short-term, tokenistic, or 
manipulative participation as a key factor leading to conflict. The literature suggests 
degrees of inequity in participation at the national and local levels in which marginalized 
groups struggle to be included, and the opinions reflected by stakeholders are those of elites 
(Redpath et al. 2013; Otto 2014; Gay-Antaki 2016; MacDonald and Ardhianto 2016; Nel 2017; 
Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018; Satyal et al. 2019; Setyowati 2020). 
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A lack of meaningful engagement added to the burden of bureaucratic processes can 
also serve as its own form of violence by excluding marginalized groups (Lowry et al. 
1997; Dorr et al. 2013) and can undermine the legitimacy of CCMIs between state, private, and 
civil society actors (Indriatmoko et al. 2014). For example, several studies show an attempt by 
CCMI proponents to engage in FPIC processes in which local stakeholders consider the state or 
project implementer retained control of the process, and in which inputs from the communities 
did not affect implementation, or the information provided was incomplete, including lack of 
viable alternatives to the CCMI (Yasmi et al. 2012; Asiyanbi 2016; Myers et al. 2016; Sarmiento 
Barletti and Larson 2017; Kane et al. 2018; Satyal et al. 2019). In these contexts, ‘participation’ 
was often treated as an auditing or checkbox exercise that failed to reflect the local contexts 
(Nel 2015b). Another study showed that the focus of multi-stakeholder fora was on the outputs 
of decisions and plans rather than the processes of governance (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 
2019). These technocratic processes stem from patriarchal understandings of nature and the 
climate and reinforce patriarchal power dynamics (Boyd 2002; Nagel 2015).
The technicality of CCMIs excludes marginalized groups from meaningful participation. 
The technicality of the details involved in carbon accounting, MRV (De Sy et al. 2012; Gupta 
2012; Di Gregorio et al. 2017) and the complexities of the market and financing leads to the 
exclusion of small and marginalized actors from involvement in and gaining benefits from 
CCMIs. It has also created challenges in providing actors with full understanding and involving 
them in decision-making and oversight mechanics, and comes at the expense of considering 
greater power dynamics and politics in CCMI design and implementation (Myers et al. 2018). 
Several authors have highlighted that REDD+ proponents’ preoccupation with measurement, 
verification, and tokenistic participation creates an ‘audit culture’ that weakens local and 
customary logic and excludes some (especially marginalized) actors (see also Arnstein 1969; 
Corbera and Schroeder 2011; McElwee 2015; Asiyanbi 2016; Milne and Mahanty 2019). 
Other literature goes further to suggest that rather than just being implemented badly, 
participation itself is a ‘violent’ act intended as a way of imposing control and exploitative 
agendas. Some authors have framed participation as a ‘soft counterinsurgency’ technique 
to impose Fortress Conservation (see also Dunlap and Fairhead 2014; Tadajewski 2020: 
3)). For example, Sarmiento Barletti and Larson (2019) showed that the implementation of 
social safeguards used as part of ‘project law’ in CCMIs in the Amazon were both punitive and 
reinforced social inequalities.
 Implementing CCMIs in fragile states and (post-)conflict environments 
One theme emerging from the cases located in fragile or (post-)conflict contexts is how the 
design of CCMIs is, in many cases, inappropriate for (post-)conflict contexts. Brown’s (2017) 
review of four REDD+ projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo found that implementers 
made few provisions for the ways in which political instability might affect project outcomes. 
Implementation in these (post-)conflict contexts faces extra challenges and risks. Without 
acknowledging and addressing these in CCMI design, ‘additionality’ is unlikely to be achieved.
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Box 9. Technocratic aspects of CCMIs conflict with local notions of fair process
Technocratic approaches based on Western logics can conflict with local notions 
and processes. The technical approaches for CCMIs, which are used to ensure the 
accountability of implementers to other stakeholders, cause friction at local levels 
among those who perceive forests differently (Myers et al. 2020). Since, by definition, 
CCMIs embody a ‘global dimension’, CCMIs are susceptible to control by the state and/
or global actors and therefore transitions the logics of participants toward global 
citizenship (Arora-Jonsson et al. 2016). Social learning between stakeholders may not 
always be compatible with more target-oriented goals in CCMIs; e.g. around the distinct 
calculus for sequestering carbon. A case in Indonesia demonstrates how Indigenous 
peoples’ groups attempt to translate ‘global’ technical requirements of REDD+. The 
authors show the struggle that the Indigenous peoples’ groups had in preparing local 
communities for international investors. They detail the ‘intimate exclusions’ based on 
ethnicity and class that resulted from this process (Astuti and McGregor 2016). Some 
case studies show how CCMIs have used these technicalities as a means of wielding 
power and control (Nel 2017). Technical approaches to mitigation ignore “the local web 
of power relations in which it will need to be embedded, and which it will also certainly 
reshape” (Eilenberg 2015: 50). This reflects Li’s (2007) work on development practice 
and the phenomenon of ‘rendering technical’, where technical interventions are used 
to disregard the social history of the forest. Three dimensions of rendering technical 
can also be applied to CCMIs: (1) confirming who the trustees are (the people who 
understand carbon) and who the subjects are (the people who do not), (2) questions 
that are rendered technical are also rendered non-political, and (3) the programs are 
designed to avoid a challenge to the status quo (in this case, emission-rich countries). 
For example, efforts to enhance participation in CCMIs highlight the complexity of 
describing a resource (like carbon) that is intangible and difficult to conceptualize. 
Indeed, certain sites found the emergence of local terms such as ‘charcoal air’ (Kijazi 
2015) or ‘selling the wind’ in Indonesia (Setyowati 2020). Miles (2021) shows a respondent 
saying that ghosts are more real than the fantasy of a carbon market. Local communities, 
and even local governments, find much of the language and vocabulary of concepts 
intimidating (Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018). While the articulation of carbon as a 
commodity underpinning CCMIs, for example, has been compelling to private sector 
actors, in particular, the complex regulatory environment and the slowness by which 
local communities and other stakeholders have received benefits results in a distrust 
that undermines participation. All of these conditions are fertile ground for conflict and 
insecurity.
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As discussed in the introduction, different forms of fragile states result in different 
security issues and require different responses (see Table 4). On one hand, there are 
strong but predatory states (with high levels of corruption), and, on the other hand, there 
are those where state control is minimal and rogue private and non-state actors are likely to 
take advantage of the situation (Harwell 2011). Both present different challenges for market-
based approaches associated with CCMIs. As an example of the latter context, Kengoum et 
al. (2020) show the challenges of introducing ‘rule of law’ based initiatives in contexts 
where implementation of the law is weak. This raises the hazards of assuming law will be 
implemented in a fragile state context. They point out that the Democratic Republic of Congo 
may be in a position to sign international agreements and pass new national laws pertaining 
to CCMIs, but implementation of the laws will prove challenging in practice. Khan (2010) 
highlights that many developing countries have economies that are predominantly informally 
based and in which the significant sources of power are not based on formal institutions. Thus, 
institutions and policies tend to serve the interests of a core coalition of actors, and there are 
high levels of elite predation (Parks and Cole 2010). Early theories around New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) explained informality in developing countries (and blockages to reforms that 
were seen) as being due to low capabilities for enforcing formal institutions, or due to cultural 
values that increase the costs of enforcement. This led to interventions to enhance capacity 
to better enforce the rule of law based on the flawed assumption that agencies responsible 
for the enforcement of formal institutions have the power to enforce compliance. In contrast 
to NIE, it is argued that informal institutions likely to remain important as power-holders are 
not affected by changes in formal institutions (Khan 2010; Mohan and Asante 2015). Thus 
a technocratic focus on improving ‘good governance’ to enforce the rule of law or improve 
accountability and transparency may not be effective as it is unlikely to alter the underlying 
distribution of power (Khan 2010; Mohan and Asante 2015). 
Table 4. Implications for responses by security/fragility feature 
Security context Implications for responses
Armed conflict The importance of “do no harm” safeguards; the value of international oversight; 
hazards associated with large inflows of international finance; the need for non-
state accountability systems 
Predatory institutional 
contexts 
Focus on accountability systems and safeguards to address elite capture; 
political settlement approaches; some value in engaging international pressure 
and campaigns coupled with safeguard for defender; hazards around high levels 
of financial in-flows
Absent/weak state and 
institutional contexts 
Strengthen existing systems and capacity building; recognition of informal rights 
value in international finance; establish systems for absorbing finance (to avoid 
resource curse)
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REDD+ is based on the role of incentives and conditionalities. Much focus of the REDD+ 
debate is on the formal institutional design, operating on the assumption that national and 
subnational bureaucracies conform to a Weberian ideal (Purdon 2015). This reflects the 
normative ‘good governance’ agenda in development (Mohan and Asante 2015), whereby 
elites should be encouraged to move from deals-based systems (Pritchett and Werker 2012) 
to rules-based systems. But some commentators in the ‘fragile states’ literature suggest that 
such traditional ideas of development influence do not necessarily match real political 
contexts (Whaites 2015).
Kashwan (2015), in his review of REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanisms for REDD+ across Mexico, 
Tanzania, and India, shows it is more helpful to look at the checks and balances between different 
parts of the government and the history of the state and that the assumptions behind formal 
institutional analysis can be misleading around the rule of law and other aspects fundamental 
to the working of a REDD+ safeguards system. Designing safeguards for non-Weberian 
systems requires different recommendations. Similarly, a common recommendation within 
peacebuilding approaches is the need to develop the capacity to mobilize a broad range of 
stakeholders (Castro-Nuñez 2018). However, in predatory governance contexts, deliberation 
and engagement of actors and interest groups around an objective such as mitigation 
is especially challenging. Levy and Walton (2013) suggest that technocratic initiatives and 
improving stakeholder involvement is less likely to work in predatory political settlements 
unless there is a focus on a reform in which leadership has an interest. In these contexts, they 
suggest progress is best made through external stakeholder mobilization.
3.5. CGIAR CONTRIBUTIONS AND GAPS
In this section, we analyse CGIAR’s contribution to the literature we reviewed, and identify 
some gaps, or ways in which CGIAR could orient its work to contribute more to the body of 
literature addressing CCMIs and peace/conflict in forests. We have depended on the wide range 
of literature produced by CGIAR on conflicts in forest areas to frame this study and elucidate 
the main issues pertaining to conflicts and forests. Commensurate with the broader literature, 
however, only a few works have been published by CGIAR or its affiliates that relate directly to 
issues of peace/conflict and CCMIs in forest areas. 
A body of work produced by Sarmiento Barletti and Larson of CIFOR focuses on the Amazon, 
investigating issues of conflict, peace, and multi-stakeholder fora (Sarmiento Barletti and 
Larson 2017; Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2019). This work follows Larson’s (2011) earlier 
work and shows that although land rights are important, there are many obstacles for local 
communities after rights have been won. These challenges comprise a gap between statutory 
rights and the ability to benefit from land and forest resources. In their most recent paper 
(2020), the authors show that successful multi-stakeholder fora are part of a “wider process 
that seeks to transform practices at multiple levels” (p.1). They suggest that CCMIs must be 
based on history and context in order to be effective and that obstacles and risks should be 
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identified in the early stages. They follow up to say that to mobilize political will and adaptive 
learning, consensus and commitment must come from multiple levels and a wide range of 
actors. 
Castro-Nuñez (Bioversity CIAT Alliance) provides insights into the convergence of CCMIs 
and peacebuilding. He demonstrated that rural communities in and near forests tended to 
conserve forests during times of conflict (Castro-Nuñez et al. 2016). He then published an 
investigation of the correlation of priority areas for forest carbon storage and peacebuilding 
programs, in which he demonstrated the geographic overlaps of these two imperatives (Castro-
Nuñez, Mertz, and Sosa 2017). A related paper shows associations between armed conflicts 
and land-related grievances, and shows that forest commons provided dual objectives of 
sequestering carbon and meeting basic needs of communities during conflict (Castro-Nuñez, 
Mertz, Buritica, et al. 2017). Subsequent work focuses on post-conflict Colombia, showing that 
peacebuilding and CCMIs can function together effectively to benefit from climate finance for 
conserving forests and peacebuilding, but need to be carefully planned with local contexts in 
mind (Castro-Nuñez 2018).
Much of the work from CGIAR on CCMIs and peace/conflict is related to large-scale land 
acquisitions, land rights and REDD+. Carter et al. (2017) (including Carter and Verchot from 
CIFOR and Verchot from the Bioversity CIAT Alliance) conducted a synthesis of conflicts and 
opportunities. In their quantitative study, they found that countries with high levels of political 
instability were targeted for large-scale land acquisitions and cautioned that countries with 
high levels of agricultural-driven deforestation should develop REDD+ strategies that prevent 
direct and indirect forest loss from green grabbing. Corbera et al. (2011) (including Pacheco from 
CIFOR) demonstrate the complexity of rights in forest areas and their implications for REDD+ 
design and implementation. They show how REDD+ initiatives share procedural challenges 
to address land-use conflicts and carbon rights. Larson et al. (2013) (featuring a CIFOR team) 
show that while REDD+ has presented some opportunities for improving land tenure, but that 
project-level attempts to address tenure fail to address land-tenure security in the broader 
context and have proven ineffective. Ngendakumana et al. (2013) (World Agroforestry Centre) 
studied REDD+ conflicts in Cameroon and concluded that successful implementation of 
REDD+ would be unlikely without recognition and enforcement of customary tenure, which 
was identified by respondents as a leading cause of conflict in villages.
Dwyer et al. (2016) (CIFOR) studies forest governance dynamics in Lao PDR. They identify the 
‘security exception’ that serves to justify state enforcement of forest protection as a matter 
of state sovereignty. However, the authors find that to understand the nature of the conflict, 
it must be understood in the context of economic insecurity and inequity. This analysis is 
helpful to understand that although global dynamics affect local security, they are embedded 
within long-standing historical struggles.Andersson et al. (2018) (a CIFOR team) used survey 
data from REDD+ sites in six countries to find that higher wealth inequality correlated with 
lower tenure security and uneven opportunities for forest income. They also identified elite 
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capture of benefits from forests leading to tensions among community members. The authors 
emphasize the importance of addressing inequality in REDD+ projects in order to minimize 
conflict and maximize opportunities for success. Le et al. (2016) examined a Payment for 
Ecosystem Services project in forest areas in Viet Nam. They highlighted conflicts that arose 
from a lack of transparency and accountability around the benefit-sharing mechanisms. The 
authors conclude that, for local communities, benefit sharing is often a foreign concept, the 
terms and conditions of which are not always well understood. A CIFOR team, Sunderlin et al. 
(2014), conducted interviews with local community members in REDD+ sites in five countries. 
They found that one of the major barriers for the initiatives to address land tenure security 
adequately was the lack of capacity to develop effective mechanisms for conflict resolution.
CGIAR has therefore contributed significantly to the climate security CCMI nexus, although 
not always intentionally in the frame of ‘climate security’. As with the broader literature, 
there is very little that explicitly investigates ‘climate security’ and ‘CCMIs’. However, there 
are considerable works that identify conflicts, tensions and grievances, especially stemming 
from CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on REDD+. Some of the works discussed above from 
CGIAR are leading-edge for understanding multi-stakeholder fora, Indigenous peoples’ rights 
and CCMIs, and (post-)conflict opportunities for peacebuilding and climate change mitigation. 
However, this research is conducted by only a small number of researchers in a small number 
of organizations within the CGIAR. Because this review focused on CCMIs in forests, it is 
hardly surprising that CIFOR was the most cited CGIAR organization, and that the Bioversity 
CIAT Alliance and World Agroforestry Center were also identified as making contributions to 
the literature. An expanded review that includes low-emissions development in agricultural 
initiatives or marine and coastal areas would likely identify a greater range of contributions. 
Future directions to enhance CGIAR’s contribution to the climate security-CCMI nexus could 
focus on some of the under-represented CCMIs in this study that are of increasing interest 
to policy-makers and implementers. Zero Deforestation Commitments was one area that 
we found underrepresented in the CCMI-security nexus. As the interest in REDD+ starts to 
shift towards other forms of CCMIs, especially under the banner of NbS, there are significant 
opportunities to learn from REDD+ and security. One of the dominant themes of our findings 
and analysis is the range of ways in which CCMIs fail to address some of the underlying sources 
of conflict. CGIAR is well placed to explore and present some genuine alternatives to market-
based solutions to climate change to help overcome neo-colonial relationships. Addressing 
some of the fundamental security issues related to climate change mitigation could help 
elucidate more conflict-sensitive approaches to climate change for policy-makers and 
implementers. 
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4.  RECOMMENDATIONS
In this concluding section we discuss recommendations for enhancing security in the arena 
of forest-related climate change mitigation in LMICs. We approach this by synthesizing the 
recommendations made in the literature to address peace/conflict and security in CCMIs for 
policymakers, funders, investors, implementers. Then we analyse those recommendations 
against our findings. Finally, we provide recommendations to researchers in general, and 
then specifically show how CGIAR has contributed to the literature so far and where the 
opportunities might be for continued research to inform policy.
We positioned this study as learning about climate security through conflict and peace. While 
many of our findings were directly related to peace and conflict, we suggest that they have 
implications for conflict and address them specifically as such in this section. 
4.1. A SYNTHESIS OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOUND IN THE 
LITERATURE FOR ENHANCING SECURITY IN CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION INITIATIVES
The following recommendations are synthesized from the literature we reviewed. All of these 
recommendations could apply to different stages of CCMI development and for actors at 
different levels. Ideally, they would be considered in design stages, but could also be used to 
modify implementation and evaluation of CCMIs toward addressing issues of security. Security 
practitioners, policy-makers and scholars could also consider them in relation to climate 
change. These recommendations apply to a range of actors, including funders, investors, 
implementers, and policy-makers. The main recommendations are listed here and elaborated 












1. Integrate a conflict-sensitive approach into CCMIs
2. Design CCMIs for the local context 
3. Design CCMIs to be pro-poor, inclusive and promote the key role of Indigenous peoples
4. Integrate land tenure, access and management rights for marginalized and Indigenous 
peoples into CCMIs
5. Strengthen existing effective, legitimate, and accountable institutions to better address 
conflict and build peace
6. Enhance governance systems and benefit-sharing schemata toward greater equity, and 
strengthen transparency and accountability of CCMIs
7. Explicitly integrate gender equity into CCMIs to reduce inequality gaps leading to instability 
through differential power relations
8. Propose alternatives to neoliberal climate change mitigation solutions
There are several recommendations to integrate peace and conflict concerns, and CCMIs, 
especially in fragile states, recognizing that all interventions have the potential to exacerbate 
or alleviate existing tensions. Design climate-resilient peace-building and conflict-sensitive 
climate programming that not only reduces conflict potential but also plays a constructive 
role in peacebuilding (Dabelko et al. 2013; Gustafsson 2016; Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020). Authors 
recommend integrating social, economic, environmental, governance, political, security, and 
truth and reconciliation into CCMIs (Matthew 2014) and to provide more intentional processes 
of understanding the contexts and histories of peace/conflict in CCMIs (Harwell 2011; Patel et 
al. 2013; Gustafsson 2016; Sawas et al. 2018; see also Peters, Mayhew, et al. 2020). There are 
also several recommendations to ensure timely engagement by external parties in the early 
stages of conflict to mitigate risks or more serious future conflicts and re-build cooperation 
over actors with an influence of natural resources (Koning et al. 2007; see also Herbert 2019). 
Authors argue that these processes must be inclusive and deliberative about including 
different views, interests and politics (Leach and Scoones 2015) and bring governance and 
participation issues at a more centre stage to make interventions to help achieve wider 
benefits for rural livelihoods (Dabelko et al. 2013; Tänzler 2013; Leach and Scoones 2015). This 
might involve following procedural approaches such as ensuring the consistent participation 
of Indigenous men and women throughout REDD+, following FPIC guidelines and capacity 
building effort (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2017), as well as addressing supply-side and 
enhancing the capacity for FPIC amongst national and sub-national government staff, as well 
as staff of companies and NGOs (Kane et al. 2018). These authors stress the need to engage 
in robust and meaningful participatory processes with a diverse range of actors from local 
communities on investments and actions affecting forests (Stevens et al. 2014; Wallbott and 
Florian-Rivero 2018) allowing the forming of collaborative and equal relationships among 
them (Patel et al. 2013). To do this CCMIs need to better address power structures, broaden 
inclusion, accountability and transparency (Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020).
Other approaches stress the need to include policies that address the intersectionality and 
structural constraints that limit access by women (and other excluded groups ) to access 
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control and ownership over resources (Gay-Antaki 2016). This might include mainstreaming 
the UN Voluntary Guidelines on the Governance of Tenure in forest landscape policies and 
CCMIs (Kane et al. 2018). A key issue within the resource rights debate is the need to reframe 
CCMIs and safeguards to recognize the rights and key roles of Indigenous peoples in climate 
change initiatives and protecting forests (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2017). Some 
recommend formal approaches such as connecting CCMIs with formal legal frameworks for 
the implementation of principles in the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous peoples 
(UNDRIP) (Reed 2011). 
As part of this many authors place an emphasis on the need to address the under-recognition 
of women as resource managers and core actors in climate mitigation and pay attention 
to gender equity into CCMIs to reduce inequity gaps leading to instability through differential 
power relations (Gay-Antaki 2016; Lau et al. 2021). Specific recommendations include the use 
of robust measures of gender equity in policy and practice (Lau et al. 2021). There is also a 
need to question and ‘disrupt’ the deeper, intangible barriers to gender equity that reinforce 
assumptions in funding structures, projects and institutions (Lau et al. 2021). Edmunds 
and Wollenberg (2001: 232) suggest (based on feminist structuralist approaches) to “build 
alliances, gather information, and test ideas strategically, with the explicit goals of increasing 
the decision making power of disadvantaged groups. They continue to suggest that “the 
emphasis should be on building strategic, self-avowedly contingent and reflexive alliances 
among disadvantaged groups and those sympathetic to their claims in order to achieve justice 
for those groups” (2001: 237).
A fundamental factor leading to conflict is related to unclear and insecure land and access rights, 
especially for marginalized groups, Indigenous peoples, and women. Recommendations on 
this issue highlight the need to integrate land tenure security into CCMIs in order to avoid 
agitating existing conflicts. Mechanisms to do so include ensuring the clarity of resource 
tenure - the systems of rights, rules, institutions and processes regulating the ownership, 
access and use-in legal and policy frameworks as well as in implementation (Harwell 2011; 
Dabelko et al. 2013; Patel et al. 2013). A range of authors stress the importance of addressing 
inequities in the legal recognition of customary and women's land rights through land reforms 
(Harwell 2011) and accounting for traditional land tenure arrangement and recognize rights 
of resource users without legal titles (Tänzler 2013; Stevens et al. 2014). This might include 
providing legal protection towards the community's forest rights by for example mapping 
boundaries, protecting against illegal loggers and not granting commercial concessions in 
community forests (Stevens et al. 2014). 
A key part of developing inclusive processes is strengthening existing effective, legitimate, 
and accountable institutions (Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020). This entails identifying the obstacles 
and possible incentives for cross-sectoral coordination to improve integration and coordination 
across actors and agencies (Harwell 2011) and improving inter-institutional coordination 
between national bureaucracies to ensure the practice covers the issue of Indigenous People's 
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rights (Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018). Authors suggest establishing reliable, transparent, 
and efficient governance structures for CCMIs projects (Dabelko et al. 2013) and using donor's 
influence to support forest sector reform by encouraging the appointment of reform-minded 
forestry officials, implement training programmes on good governance and sanctioning 
corrupt officials (Koning et al. 2007). This strengthening will require improving the capability 
of local institutions in identifying and dealing with drivers or deforestation effectively (Dabelko 
et al. 2013; Tänzler 2013) and providing information flow from the national level to the local 
and vice versa (Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018). Much emphasis is put on the importance 
of supporting communities with technical assistance and training (Stevens et al. 2014) and 
prioritizing local participation (Dabelko et al. 2013).
Another stream of recommendations focuses on greater openness and transparency 
in forest resource management to reduce corruption, and reduce the potential for 
conflict (Harwell 2011; Dabelko et al. 2013; Tänzler 2013; Sawas et al. 2018). These range 
from improving auditing processes within CCMIs, to ensuring they evaluate social claims 
and consider livelihood impacts for communities as well as the access and use rights of local 
people (Lyons et al. 2014). Specific measures could include anti-corruption mechanisms to 
ensure transparency and accountability in bidding, chain-of-custody and revenue tracking 
(Harwell 2011) as well as independent monitoring and reporting of compliance by media, 
civil society organizations and local communities (Koning et al. 2007). This could also involve 
connecting Indigenous communities with outside allies through new social media to empower 
them (Herbert 2019). There is also a need for information sharing activities especially to poor 
forest-dependent and marginalized communities (Patel et al. 2013) and vice versa (Wallbott 
and Florian-Rivero 2018). 
Finally, there are calls to seriously explore alternatives to neoliberal climate change 
mitigation solutions. Although there are proposals to address climate change through 
mechanisms other than market relations by, for example, dispelling the notions that economic 
growth can be decoupled from natural resources and moving toward degrowth especially in 
high-income countries (Hickel and Kallis 2019; Krause 2020; Hickel 2021), contemporary CCMIs 
are almost exclusively market-based and neo-colonial (Fletcher 2012; Ciplet and Roberts 
2017; Howson 2020). Rights-based alternatives are proposed by environmental justice and 
Indigenous scholars among others, but have failed to influence policy and practice significantly. 
These recommendations suggest reducing the reliance on offset initiatives in reducing global 
greenhouse gas emission by expanding options in renewable energy (Lyons et al. 2014) and 
addressing climate change mitigation in places other than forests (Leach and Scoones 2015). 
4.2. ANALYSIS OF RECOMMENDATIONS: acknowledging the 
divergent perspectives
Our analysis suggests a range of types of recommendations – those pitched different scales of 
intervention and those emanating from different perspectives and ideological positions. 
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Some recommendations are specifically targeted at those working at the project level and 
address the technicalities and implications of implementing safeguards with the assumption 
that wider institutional capacity is in place. However, there is an increasing recognition that 
very few of the more fundamental causes of conflict can be addressed at the project scale. 
Debates about REDD+ are increasingly emphasising the need to address structural issues such 
as land tenure and institutional capacity. This has led to the emergence of recommendations 
for structural reforms such as attention to land reform and institution building at jurisdictional 
levels. 
Across the evidence we have presented, we make a distinction between the perspectives used 
(a) to capture the way in which some analysis views CCMIs as providing a transformative 
solution for forest communities and the Global South, and (b) as a ‘greenwashing’ 
process that gives elites control over forest and excludes forest communities from their 
rights to forests (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2019). The different perspectives lead to very 
different practical recommendations for policy design and practical implementation. Several 
authors working within the most critical perspectives suggest that mitigation might be better 
focused on other sectors as CCMIs in forest areas due to the inherent contradiction around 
the concept of mitigation, the associated motivations to engage in green grabbing and the 
exploitative outcomes to which CCMIs lead (Dunlap and Fairhead 2014; Lyons and Westoby 
2014a; Nielsen 2014; Leach and Scoones 2015; see No REDD in Africa Network as an example 
of some of these perspectives). Some literature tends to view problems associated with CCMIs 
as solvable with attention to safeguards. Those taking a more critical approach suggest that 
technical solutions do not work in the politicized context of forest governance, and stress how 
power dynamics need to be addressed. 
Many of the structural reforms (particularly around issues such as land reform or 
inclusive processes) require significant transformation, and to achieve this involves 
significant attention to political settlement (see discussion on a political settlement in the 
previous section). More critical perspectives also frame conflict responses and safeguards, 
such as trying to address resource rights and enhancing stakeholder engagement for 
marginalized groups with the intention of ensuring access to the process for the dominant 
political elite and their neo-colonial or political agendas and suggest that safeguards such as 
participation are themselves ‘weapons’ of exploitation. Leach and Scoones (2013) suggest that 
carbon forestry will not be able to overcome its obstacles and that climate change mitigation 
would be better focussed on areas with less fragile governance structures, citing that all of the 
solutions involving forests and carbon are too complex and political to operationalize within 
the timeframe that climate change targets must be met. They suggest using the momentum 
of interest in climate change mitigation to explore non-forest areas for implementation, 
and to apply climate change mitigation funds to improving the governance of forest 
areas, and improving the quality of participation in governance processes.
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Lessons that can be gleaned from this approach include the need to address head-on the 
politics of marketization and financialization allowing a more nuanced exploration of 
the complexities of market-based solutions (Dunlap and Fairhead 2014; Lyons and Westoby 
2014a; Nielsen 2014; Leach and Scoones 2015; Whyte 2017; see also No REDD in Africa Network 
as an example of some of these perspectives). Taking a political ecology approach to CCMIs 
means recognizing the historical and power contexts in which they are set (Ribot 2014; Borras 
et al. 2018) and a need to address the divergent agendas and interest groups. Framing conflicts 
as technical rather than political also suggest the need to move away from technical solutions 
(McCulloch and Piron 2019) to embrace more solutions that embrace systemic inequalities 
and imbalances of power (Fleischman et al. 2021) There is a distinction between some of 
the more political, complex, and messy (see Myers et al. 2018) issues related to the nexus of 
climate security and CCMIs and the technical recommendations often found in the policy-
orientated literature. Approaches to address this may include (a) understanding the context 
and the political dynamics, which in the case of fragile states are even more important, and 
(b) exploring overt techniques to deal with inequality and power imbalances rather than 
politically agnostic technical recommendations.
Understanding more about the complexity of the interest groups involved can lead to 
a questioning of the theory of change behind PES and other market-based CCMIs. There 
is the tendency within CCMIs (and international policy in general) to assume that financial 
incentives can fully compensate communities and other stakeholders for what are often non-
financial ‘costs’ and/or to ‘throw money at the problem. Indeed, some authors have argued 
that finance is the most important ‘missing piece’ for REDD+ success (e.g. Seymour and Busch 
2016) an approach that can act to downplay the entrenched power differentials that influence 
outcomes ’ (McDermott 2017). Khan (2010) suggests it is naïve to assume that political 
opponents to reform can be compensated for the costs they will suffer as a result of a change 
by suggesting “the transfer of significant benefits from those who directly benefit from an 
institution to those who are losing out may itself be costly in terms of incentives and a promise 
to make these transfers. [...] More significantly, compensations may not be arithmetically 
feasible if there are multiple unconnected claimants who believe they deserve a share of the 
net value added by an institution” (Khan 2010: 23). This complexity lies at the crux of many 
benefit-sharing dilemmas in CCMIs such as REDD+. Our review suggests that the complexity of 
the relationship between financial rewards and technical solutions which, in many cases, do 
not directly address the underlying drivers and power dynamics that create conflict and drive 
many of the conflicts analysed in this report. 
4.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
Researchers play an important role in identifying what works and what does not and for 
providing ideas for alternative ways of addressing climate change mitigation and peace/
conflict concerns. Here, we make recommendations both directly derived from the literature 
and based on our findings. 
1. Further exploration of the relationships between CCMIs and peace. The literature 
on CCMIs and peace relate to (post-)conflict contexts for the most part, and much of it is 
normative rather than empirical. There are many questions left to be answered in terms 
of how CCMIs could contribute to peace more effectively. In our review, we can see that 
CCMIs have both contributed to, worked against peacebuilding efforts. Our review did not 
reveal any literature that empirically linked the extent to which different types of peace or 
conflict led to different results for CCMIs. We saw evidence of contexts of conflicts leading 
to poor outcomes for CCMIs, CCMIs creating or agitating conflict, and CCMIs contributing to 
peacebuilding. However, we could not see, perhaps due to the design of our study, how the 
results were different from a similar implementation in a context of peace/conflict. There 
is very little literature on CCMIs maintaining peace or the specific ways in which CCMIs 
avoided conflict in their implementation. Similarly, there is little on the ways in which 
CCMIs achieve positive results for the climate and communities in conditions of conflict. 
2. Identify what works. Most of the literature on CCMIs and conflict is about how CCMIs 
accentuate conflict in some way. In other words, it is about what does not work. We have 
noted exceptions in our findings, but see that there is more room to highlight what the 
dynamics are to favourable results. 
3. Broaden research on security risks to regions that are under-studied, including not only 
conflict and (post-)conflict countries, but also those that are fragile and in which tensions 
have not manifested in armed conflict (Sawas et al. 2018).
4. Use comparative case studies to generate contextual understanding and design effective 
interventions of CCMIs in different kinds of conflicts. These studies would involve similar 
data sets and methods applied in different contexts to better understand the links between 
security and CCMIs. Similarly studies could include retrospective assessments to better 
evaluate the effectiveness of policies and projects over time (Gilmore et al. 2018).
5. Use mixed-method quantitative and qualitative studies to investigate the CCMI-security 
relationship (see Gilmore et al. 2018).
6. Develop more frameworks and innovative methods to transform conflicts into more 
cooperative scenarios (Work 2015) and to assist designers and implementers to position 
CCMIs to act as accountability mechanisms and safeguards (Work et al. 2019).
7. Demonstrate how to conduct conflict-sensitive low carbon development and research. 
These frameworks need to explore ways to understand contexts, vulnerabilities, risks, and 
context-specific ways to engage local actors (Gustafsson 2016; Sawas et al. 2018). 
8. Conduct, critique and communicate gender- and sex-disaggregated research (Lau et 
al. 2021).
64 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Abbott KW. 2012. The transnational regime complex for climate change. Environment and Planning C: Government 
and Policy. 30(4):571–590.
Acosta AMJ, Yanguas JA. 2014. Extractive industries, revenue allocation and local politics. WP 2014-4. [accessed 2021 
Sep 10]. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/extractive-industries-revenue-allocation-and-local-
politics(62e61387-82e1-4032-a383-425ff199e058).html.
Adger WN, Pulhin JM, Barnett J, Dabelko GD, Hovelsrud GK, M. Levy Ú, Spring O, Vogel CH. 2014. Human Security. In: 
Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, Mach KJ, Mastrandrea MD, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, 
et al., editors. Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 755–791.
Afiff SA. 2016. 5. REDD, land management and the politics of forest and land tenure reform with special reference to 
the case of Central Kalimantan province. In: Land and Development in Indonesia. ISEAS Publishing. p. 113–140.
Agrawal A. 2005. Environmentality: technologies of government and the making of subjects. Duke University Press 
Durham, NC.
Agrawal A, Chhatre A, Hardin R. 2008. Changing governance of the world’s forests. Science. 320(5882):1460–1462.
Agrawal A, Wollenberg E, Persha L. 2014. Governing agriculture-forest landscapes to achieve climate change 
mitigation. Glob Environ Change. 29:270–280.
Alusiola RA, Schilling J, Klär P. 2021. REDD+ conflict: Understanding the pathways between forest projects and social 
conflict. For Trees Livelihoods. 12(6):748.
Andersson KP, Smith SM, Alston LJ, Duchelle AE, Mwangi E, Larson AM, de Sassi C, Sills EO, Sunderlin WD, Wong 
GY. 2018. Wealth and the distribution of benefits from tropical forests: Implications for REDD+. Land use policy. 
72:510–522.
Angelsen A, Brockhaus M, Sunderlin WD, Verchot LV. 2012. Analysing REDD+: challenges and choices. Bogor: CIFOR.
Angelsen A, McNeil D. 2012. The evolution of REDD+. In: Angelsen A, Brockhaus M, Sunderlin WD, Verchot LV, editors. 
Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. Bogor: CIFOR. p. 59–78.
Arhin AA. 2014. Safeguards and dangerguards: a framework for unpacking the black box of safeguards for REDD+. 
Forest Policy and Economics. 45:24–31.
Arnstein SR. 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners. 35(4):216–224.
Arora-Jonsson S, Westholm L, Temu BJ, Petitt A. 2016. Carbon and cash in climate assemblages: the making of a new 
global citizenship. Antipode. 48(1):74–96.
Arts B, Ingram V, Brockhaus M. 2019. The Performance of REDD+: From Global Governance to Local Practices. For Trees 
Livelihoods. 10(10):837.
Asiyanbi A, Lund JF. 2020. Policy persistence: REDD+ between stabilization and contestation. J Polit Ecol. 27(1). 
doi:10.2458/v27i1.23493. [accessed 2021 Jul 14]. https://journals.librarypublishing.arizona.edu/jpe/article/id/2238/.
Asiyanbi AP. 2016. A political ecology of REDD+: Property rights, militarised protectionism, and carbonised exclusion in 
Cross River. Geoforum. 77:146–156.
Astuti R, McGregor A. 2016. Indigenous land claims or green grabs? Inclusions and exclusions within forest carbon 
politics in Indonesia. J Peasant Stud. 0(0):1–22.
Auty RM. 1995. Economic Development and the Resource Curse Thesis. In: Morrissey O, Stewart F, editors. Economic 
and political reform in developing countries. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. p. 58–80.
Bachram H. 2004. Climate fraud and carbon colonialism: the new trade in greenhouse gases. Capitalism Nature 
Socialism. 15(4):5–20.
Bäckstrand K, Lövbrand E. 2006. Planting trees to mitigate climate change: Contested discourses of ecological 
modernization, green governmentality and civic environmentalism. Glob Environ Polit. 6(1):50–75.
Badampudi D, Wohlin C, Petersen K. 2015. Experiences from using snowballing and database searches in systematic 
literature studies. In: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Evaluation and Assessment in Software 
Engineering. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. (EASE ’15). p. 1–10.
Barnett J. 2003. Security and climate change. Glob Environ Change. 13(1):7–17.
REFERENCES
65Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Barr CM, Sayer JA. 2012. The political economy of reforestation and forest restoration in Asia–Pacific: Critical issues for 
REDD+. Biol Conserv. 154:9–19.
Baumann M, Kuemmerle T. 2016. The impacts of warfare and armed conflict on land systems. Journal of Land Use 
Science. 11(6):672–688.
Bebbington AJ, Humphreys Bebbington D, Sauls LA, Rogan J, Agrawal S, Gamboa C, Imhof A, Johnson K, Rosa H, Royo 
A, et al. 2018. Resource extraction and infrastructure threaten forest cover and community rights. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 115(52):13164–13173.
Beevers MD. 2015. Peace resources? Governing Liberia’s forests in the aftermath of conflict. International 
Peacekeeping. 22(1):26–42.
Beevers MD. 2016. Securing forests for peace and development in postconflict Liberia. African Conflict and 
Peacebuilding Review. 6(1):1–24.
Beymer-Farris BA, Bassett TJ. 2012. The REDD menace: Resurgent protectionism in Tanzania’s mangrove forests. Glob 
Environ Change. 22(2):332–341.
Bingham G. 1987. Resolving environmental disputes: A decade of experience. Environmental impact assessment 
review. 7(3):253–255.
Birrell K, Godden L, Tehan M. 2012. Climate change and REDD+: Property as a prism for conceiving Indigenous peoples’ 
engagement. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment. 3:196–216.
Blair H. 2007. Rebuilding and reforming civil services in post-conflict societies. In: Brinkerhoff D, editor. Governance in 
Post-Conflict Societies. London: Routledge. p. 181–204.
Blom B, Sunderland T, Murdiyarso D. 2010. Getting REDD to work locally: lessons learned from integrated conservation 
and development projects. Environ Sci Policy. 13:164–172.
Bluwstein J. 2018. From colonial fortresses to neoliberal landscapes in Northern Tanzania: a biopolitical ecology of 
wildlife conservation. J Polit Ecol. 25(1):144–168.
Böhm S, Misoczky MC, Moog S. 2012. Greening capitalism? A marxist critique of carbon markets. Organization Studies. 
33(11):1617–1638.
Borras SM, Franco JC, Gómez S, Kay C, Spoor M. 2012. Land grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean. J Peasant 
Stud. 39(3-4):845–872.
Borras SM Jr, Franco JC, Ngwe S, Zin T, Myint YL, Park C, Barbesgaard M, Sekine Y. 2018. The twin challenge of agrarian 
and climate justice: connections and contradictions between climate change mitigation politics, land grabbing 
and conflict in Myanmar. Transnational Institute (TNI) Working Paper. 25. https://www.tni.org/files/publication-
downloads/borras_et_al_tanintharyi_twin_challenges_of_agrarian_and_climate_justice.pdf.
Boyd E. 2002. The Noel Kempff project in Bolivia: Gender, power, and decision-making in climate mitigation. Gender & 
Development. 10(2):70–77.
Boyle A, Kuhl L. 2021. Nature-based solutions are job and livelihood solutions. Nature-based Solutions Policy Briefs. 
[accessed 2021 Sep 8]. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3843420.
Brechin SR, West PC. 1990. Protected areas, resident peoples, and sustainable conservation: The need to link top-
down with bottom-up. Society & Natural Resources. 3(1):77–79.
Brison SJ. 2013. Justice and gender-based violence. Rev Int Philos. n° 265(3):259–275.
Brockhaus M, Di Gregorio M, Djoudi H, Moeliono M, Pham TT, Wong GY. 2021. The forest frontier in the Global South: 
Climate change policies and the promise of development and equity. Ambio. doi:10.1007/s13280-021-01602-1. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13280-021-01602-1.
Brockhaus M, Di Gregorio M, Mardiah S. 2013. Governing the design of national REDD+: An analysis of the power of 
agency. For Policy Econ. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2013.07.003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.07.003.
Brockington D. 2002. Fortress conservation: The preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania. Oxford: James 
Currey.
Brockington D, Duffy R, Igoe J. 2008. Nature unbound: conservation, capitalism and the future of protected areas. 
London: Earthscan/James & James.
Brock S, Alex B, Barrett O-L, Femia F, Fetzek S, Goodman S, Loomis D, Middendorp T, Rademaker M, van Schaik 
L, et al. 2020. The world climate and security report 2020. Femia F, Werrell C, editors. Washington DC: Expert 
Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security. https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/02/world-climate-security-report-2020_2_13.pdf.
Broegaard RB, Vongvisouk T, Mertz O. 2017. Contradictory land use plans and policies in Laos: tenure security and the 
threat of exclusion. World Development. 89:170–183.
66 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Brottem L, Unruh J. 2009. Territorial tensions: rainforest conservation, postconflict recovery, and land tenure in Liberia. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers Association of American Geographers. 99(5):995–1002.
Brown HCP. 2017. Implementing REDD+ in a conflict-affected country: a case study of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Environments. 4(3):61.
Brugnach M, Craps M, Dewulf A. 2017. Including indigenous peoples in climate change mitigation: addressing issues of 
scale, knowledge and power. Clim Change. 140(1):19–32.
Bufacchi V. 2005. Two concepts of violence. Political Studies Review. 3(2):193–204.
Bumpus AG, Liverman DM. 2010. Carbon colonialism? Offsets, greenhouse gas reductions, and sustainable 
development. In: Peet R, Robbins P, Watts M, editors. Global Political Ecology. London: Routledge.
Burke M, Hsiang SM, Miguel E. 2015. Climate and conflict. doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115430. [accessed 
2021 Mar 10]. https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115430.
Busby JW. 2021. Beyond internal conflict: The emergent practice of climate security. J Peace Res. 58(1):186–194.
Bush KD, Opp RJ. 1999. Peace and conflict impact assessment. In: Daniel B, editor. Cultivating peace: Conflict and 
collaboration in natural resource management. IDRC, Ottawa, ON, CA. p. 185.
Cabello J, Gilbertson T. 2012. A colonial mechanism to enclose lands: A critical review of two REDD+-focused special 
issues. Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization. 12(1/2):162–180.
Call CT, Cousens EM. 2008. Ending wars and building peace: International responses to war-torn societies. 
International studies perspectives. 9(1):1–21.
Campbell GA. 2020. The cobalt market revisited. Mineral Economics. 33(1):21–28.
Campbell KM, Gulledge J, McNeill JR, Podesta J, Ogden P, Fuerth L, Woolsey RJ, Lennon AT, Smith J, Weitz R. 2007. 
The age of consequences: The foreign policy and national security implications of global climate change. CSIS and 
CNAS. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep06366.pdf.
Canadell JG, Raupach MR. 2008. Managing forests for climate change mitigation. Science. 320:1456–1457.
Carter S, Manceur AM, Seppelt R, Hermans-Neumann K, Herold M, Verchot L. 2017. Large scale land acquisitions and 
REDD+: a synthesis of conflicts and opportunities. Environmental research letters. 12(3):035010.
Cary M, Bekun FV. 2021. Democracy and deforestation: The role of spillover effects. For Policy Econ. 125:102398.
Castro-Nuñez A. 2018. Responding to climate change in tropical countries emerging from armed Conflicts: Harnessing 
climate finance, peacebuilding, and sustainable food. Forests, Trees and Livelihoods. 9(10):621.
Castro-Nuñez AC. 2016. Forest carbon-storage as a peacebuilding strategy: Evidence from Colombia [PhD]. Mertz O, 




Castro-Nuñez A, Mertz O, Buritica A, Sosa CC, Lee ST. 2017. Land related grievances shape tropical forest-cover in areas 
affected by armed-conflict. Appl Geogr. 85:39–50.
Castro-Nuñez A, Mertz O, Quintero M. 2016. Propensity of farmers to conserve forest within REDD+ projects in areas 
affected by armed-conflict. For Policy Econ. 66:22–30.
Castro-Nuñez A, Mertz O, Sosa CC. 2017. Geographic overlaps between priority areas for forest carbon-storage efforts 
and those for delivering peacebuilding programs: implications for policy design. Environmental Research Letters. 
12(5). doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa6f20. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa6f20/meta.
Cavanagh C, Benjaminsen TA. 2014. Virtual nature, violent accumulation: The “spectacular failure” of carbon offsetting 
at a Ugandan National Park. Geoforum. 56:55–65.
Chapagain B, Sanio T. 2012. Forest user groups and peacebuilding in Nepal. High-Value Natural Resources and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding.:561–578.
Chazdon RL, Brancalion PHS, Laestadius L, Bennett-Curry A, Buckingham K, Kumar C, Moll-Rocek J, Vieira ICG, Wilson 
SJ. 2016. When is a forest a forest? Forest concepts and definitions in the era of forest and landscape restoration. 
Ambio. doi:10.1007/s13280-016-0772-y. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13280-016-0772-y.
Chomba S, Kariuki J, Lund JF, Sinclair F. 2016. Roots of inequity: How the implementation of REDD+ reinforces past 
injustices. Land use policy. 50:202–213.
Ciplet D, Roberts JT. 2017. Climate change and the transition to neoliberal environmental governance. Glob Environ 
Change. 46:148–156.
67Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Clerici N, Armenteras D, Kareiva P, Botero R, Ramírez-Delgado JP, Forero-Medina G, Ochoa J, Pedraza C, Schneider 
L, Lora C, et al. 2020. Deforestation in Colombian protected areas increased during post-conflict periods. Sci Rep. 
10(1):4971.
Cohen-Shacham E, G Walters CJ, Maginnis S, editors. 2016. Nature-based Solutions to address global societal 
challenges. Gland: IUCN.
Colchester M. 2006. Justice in the forest: Rural livelihoods and forest law enforcement. CIFOR.
Colfer C, editor. 2010. The complex forest: communities, uncertainty, and adaptive collaborative management. 
London: Routledge.
Colfer CJP, Prabhu R, Larson AM. 2022. Adaptive collaborative management: Experiential and theoretical forebearers. 
In: Prabh R, Larson AM, editors. Adaptive collaborative management in forest landscapes (forthcoming). London: 
Earthscan.
Collier P, Hoeffler A. 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxf Econ Pap. 56(4):563–595.
Collins YA. 2019. Colonial residue: REDD+, territorialisation and the racialized subject in Guyana and Suriname. 
Geoforum. 106:38–47.
Conca K. 2002. The case for environmental peacemaking. In: Conca K, Dabelko GD, editors. Environmental 
peacemaking. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Conca K. 2019. Is there a role for the UN security council on climate change? Environment. 61(1):4–15.
Conca K, Thwaites J, Lee G. 2017. Climate change and the UN Security Council: bully pulpit or bull in a china shop? 
Global Environmental Politics. https://direct.mit.edu/glep/article-abstract/17/2/1/14894.
Corbera E, Estrada M, May P, Navarro G, Pacheco P. 2011. Rights to Land, Forests and Carbon in REDD+: Insights from 
Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica. Forests, Trees and Livelihoods. 2(1):301–342.
Corbera E, Friedli C. 2012. Planting trees through the Clean Development Mechanism: A critical assessment. Ephemera 
Theory & Politics in Organization. 12(1/2):206–241.
Corbera E, Hunsberger C, Vaddhanaphuti C. 2017. Climate change policies, land grabbing and conflict: perspectives 
from Southeast Asia. Rev Can Etudes Dev. 38(3):297–304.
Corbera E, Schroeder H. 2011. Governing and implementing REDD+. Environmental science & policy. 14(2):89–99.
Cousins JJ. 2021. Justice in nature-based solutions: Research and pathways. Ecol Econ. 180:106874.
Cronkleton P, Larson A. 2015. Formalization and collective appropriation of space on forest frontiers: comparing 
communal and individual property systems in the Peruvian and Ecuadoran Amazon. Society & natural resources. 
28(5):496–512.
Dabelko GD, Herzer L, Null S, Parker M, Sticklor R. 2013. Backdraft: The conflict potential of climate change adaptation 
and mitigation. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/
files/media/documents/publication/ECSP_REPORT_14_2_BACKDRAFT.pdf.
Dabelko G, Lonergan S, Matthew R. 1999. State-of-the-art review on environment, security and development co-
operation. IUCN. https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/11633.
Daioglou V, Doelman JC, Wicke B, Faaij A, van Vuuren DP. 2019. Integrated assessment of biomass supply and demand 
in climate change mitigation scenarios. Glob Environ Change. 54:88–101.
Dalby S. 2013. Climate change: New dimensions of environmental security. The RUSI Journal. 158(3):34–43.
Dankelman I. 2010. Climate change, human security and gender. In: Dankelman I, editor. Gender and climate change. 
Routledge London. p. 23.
Darbyshire E. 2021 Apr 22. Deforestation in conflict areas in 2020. Conflict and Environment Observatory. [accessed 
2021 Aug 18]. https://ceobs.org/assessment-of-recent-forest-loss-in-conflict-areas/.
Dasgupta P. 2021. The economics of biodiversity: The Dasgupta review. London: HM Treasury.
Datawrapper. 2021. Datawrapper. Datawrapper. https://www.datawrapper.de/.
Dávalos LM. 2001. The San Lucas mountain range in Colombia: how much conservation is owed to the violence? 
Biodiversity & Conservation. 10(1):69–78.
De Coning C. 2008. Peacekeeping in Africa: The next decade. Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt.
Dellmuth LM, Gustafsson M-T, Bremberg N, Mobjörk M. 2018. Intergovernmental organizations and climate security: 
advancing the research agenda. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Clim Change. 9(1):e496.
De Sy V, Herold M, Achard F, Asner GP, Held A, Kellndorfer J, Verbesselt J. 2012. Synergies of multiple remote sensing 
data sources for REDD+ monitoring. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability. 4(6):696–706.
68 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Deudney D. 1990. The case against linking environmental degradation and national security. Millennium. 19(3):461–
476.
Devine JA, Baca JA. 2020. The political forest in the era of green neoliberalism. Antipode. 52(4):911–927.
DFID. 2010. Building peaceful states and societies: a DFID practice paper. DFID. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67694/Building-peaceful-states-and-societies.pdf.
Di Gregorio M, Gallemore CT, Brockhaus M, Fatorelli L, Muharrom E. 2017. How institutions and beliefs affect 
environmental discourse: Evidence from an eight-country survey on REDD+. Glob Environ Change. 45:133–150.
Domínguez L, Luoma C. 2020. Decolonising conservation policy: How colonial land and conservation ideologies 
persist and perpetuate indigenous injustices at the expense of the environment. Land. 9(3):65.
Donovan D, de Jong W, Abe K-I. 2007. Tropical forests and extreme conflict. In: Jong WD, Donovan D, Abe K-I, editors. 
Extreme conflict and tropical forests. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. p. 1–15.
Dorr TF, Heskamp AB, Madison IB, Reichel KD. 2013. Missing the poorest for the trees? LSE. [accessed 2021 May 5]. 
https://www.international-alert.org/publications/missing-poorest-trees.
Dresse A, Fischhendler I, Nielsen JØ, Zikos D. 2019. Environmental peacebuilding: Towards a theoretical framework. 
Coop Confl. 54(1):99–119.
Duchelle AE, De Sassi C, Jagger P, Cromberg M, Larson AM, Sunderlin WD, Atmadja SS, Resosudarmo IAP, Pratama CD. 
2017. Balancing carrots and sticks in REDD+ implications for social safeguards. Ecology and Society. 22(3). https://
www.jstor.org/stable/26270145.
Duffy R. 2001. Peace parks: The paradox of globalisation. Geopolitics. 6(2):1–26.
Dunlap A, Arce MC. 2021. “Murderous energy” in Oaxaca, Mexico: wind factories, territorial struggle and social warfare. 
J Peasant Stud.:1–26.
Dunlap A, Fairhead J. 2014. The militarisation and marketisation of nature: An alternative lens to “climate-conflict.” 
Geopolitics. 19(4):937–961.
Dwyer MB, Ingalls ML, Baird IG. 2016. The security exception: Development and militarization in Laos’s protected areas. 
Geoforum. 69:207–217.
Edmunds D, Wollenberg E. 2001. A strategic approach to multistakeholder negotiations. Development and change. 
32(2):231–253.
Eilenberg M. 2015. Shades of green and REDD: Local and global contestations over the value of forest versus plantation 
development on the Indonesian forest frontier. Asia Pac Viewp. 56(1):48–61.
Elmhirst R. 2011. Migrant pathways to resource access in Lampung’s political forest: gender, citizenship and creative 
conjugality. Geoforum. 42(2):173–183.
Emerson K, Nabatchi T. 2014. Adaptation in collaborative governance regimes. Georgetown University Press.
Enloe C. 2004. The curious feminist: Searching for women in a new age of empire. University of California Press.
Fairhead J, Leach M, Scoones I. 2012. Green Grabbing: a new appropriation of nature? J Peasant Stud. 39:237–261.
Firdaus AY, Widawati E. 2014. Using RaTA – AGATA – HuMA-WIN – and Gender Analysis Tools for Rapid Assessments of 
Tenurial Conflicts in Forest Areas. Bogor: Working Group on Forest-Land Tenure.
Fisher MR, van der Muur W. 2020. Misleading icons of communal lands in Indonesia: Implications of adat forest 
recognition from a model site in Kajang, Sulawesi. The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology. 21(1):55–76.
Fisher M, Sablan T. 2018. Evaluating environmental conflict resolution: Practitioners, projects, and the movement. 
Conflict Resolution Quarterly. 36(1):7–19.
Fleischman F, Basant S, Fischer H, Gupta D, Garcia Lopez G, Kashwan P, Powers JS, Ramprasad V, Rana P, Rastogi 
A, et al. 2021. How politics shapes the outcomes of forest carbon finance. Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability. 51:7–14.
Fletcher R. 2012. Capitalizing on chaos: Climate change and disaster capitalism. Ephemera. 12(1/2):97–112.
Fletcher R, Dressler W, Büscher B, Anderson ZR. 2016. Questioning REDD+ and the future of market-based 
conservation. Conserv Biol. 30(3):673–675.
Floyd R. 2008. The environmental security debate and its significance for climate change. Int Spect. 43(3):51–65.
Forst M. 2014. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders. https://tandis.odihr.pl/
handle/20.500.12389/22037.
Franco JC, Borras SM. 2019. Grey areas in green grabbing: subtle and indirect interconnections between climate 
change politics and land grabs and their implications for research. Land use policy. 84:192–199.
69Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Froese R, Schilling J. 2019. The nexus of climate change, land Use, and conflicts. Current Climate Change Reports. 
5(1):24–35.
Fund for Peace. 2017. Fragile states index methodology and cast framework. Washington: Fund for Peace. https://
fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FSI-Methodology.pdf.
Galtung J. 1969. Violence, peace, and peace research. J Peace Res. 6(3):167–191.
Galtung J. 1976. Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Impact Sci Soc. 
26(1-2):103–115.
Galtung J. 1985. Twenty-five years of peace research: Ten challenges and some responses. J Peace Res. 22(2):141–158.
Galtung J. 1990. Cultural violence. J Peace Res. 27(3):291–305.
Galtung J. 2009. Theories of conflict. Definitions, dimensions, negations, formations Oslo. https://www.transcend.org/
files/Galtung_Book_Theories_Of_Conflict_single.pdf.
Gay-Antaki M. 2016. “now we have equality”: A feminist political ecology analysis of carbon markets in Oaxaca, Mexico. 
J Lat Am Geogr. 15(3):49–66.
Gielen D, Boshell F, Saygin D, Bazilian MD, Wagner N, Gorini R. 2019. The role of renewable energy in the global energy 
transformation. Energy Strategy Reviews. 24:38–50.
Gilbert E. 2012. The militarization of climate change. ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies. 11(1):1–
14.
Gilmore EA, Buhaug H. 2021. Climate mitigation policies and the potential pathways to conflict: Outlining a research 
agenda. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Clim Change. 12(5). doi:10.1002/wcc.722. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/
wcc.722.
Gilmore EA, Herzer Risi L, Tennant E, Buhaug H. 2018. Bridging research and policy on climate change and conflict. 
Current climate change reports. 4(4):313–319.
Global Witness. 2021. Last line of defence: The industries causing the climate crisis and attacks against defenders. 
Global Witness. [accessed 2021 Sep 15]. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/last-
line-defence/.
Glocal forest and REDD+ governance: win–win or lose–lose? 2012. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability. 
4(6):620–627.
Goldwyn R, Chigas D. 2013. Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity: Methodological challenges and practical 
solutions. DFID. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/304611/Mon-eval-conflict-sensitivity-challenges-practical-solutions.pdf.
Gómez-Baggethun E, Ruiz-Pérez M. 2011. Economic valuation and the commodification of ecosystem services. Prog 
Phys Geogr. 35(5):613–628.
Gomez F, Hiemstra W, Verschuuren B. 2010. A law on sacred sites in Guatemala. Policy Matters. https://library.wur.nl/
WebQuery/wurpubs/fulltext/518419.
Grant H, Le Billon P. 2021. Unrooted responses: Addressing violence against environmental and land defenders. 
Environ Plan C Politics Space. 39(1):132–151.
Graser M, Bonatti M, Eufemia L, Morales H, Lana M, Löhr K, Sieber S. 2020. Peacebuilding in rural Colombia—A 
collective perception of the Integrated Rural Reform (IRR) in the Department of Caquetá (Amazon). Land. 9(2):36.
Grima N, Singh SJ. 2019. How the end of armed conflicts influence forest cover and subsequently ecosystem services 
provision? An analysis of four case studies in biodiversity hotspots. Land use policy. 81:267–275.
Gritten D, Mola-Yudego B, Delgado-Matas C, Kortelainen J. 2013. A quantitative review of the representation of forest 
conflicts across the world: Resource periphery and emerging patterns. Forest Policy and Economics. 33:11–20.
Gupta AC. 2012. Conservation’s complexities: A study of livelihoods and people-park relations around Chobe National 
Park, Botswana [Ph.D]. Fortmann Louise Pbrashares Justin, editor. UC Berkeley .
Gupta S. 2021 Aug 7. Kachchh villagers on vigil to save Sangnara forest from a windmill project. Gaon Connection. 
[accessed 2021 Aug 19]. https://web.archive.org/web/20210807134502/https://en.gaonconnection.com/kachchh-
gujarat-sangnara-forest-windmill-project-renewable-energy-deforestation-protest-trees-livelihood-environment/.
Gustafsson M-T. 2016. How do development organisations integrate climate and conflict risks. Stockholm University. 
https://www.statsvet.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.302838.1476781096!/menu/standard/file/Gustafsson%20160511%20hela.
pdf.
Hall D, Hirsch P, Li TM. 2011. Introduction to powers of exclusion: land dilemmas in Southeast Asia. In: Hall D, Hirsch P, 
Li TM, editors. Powers of Exclusion. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
70 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Hanks J. 1997. Protected areas during and after conflict: the objectives and activities of the Peace Parks Foundation. 
Parks & Recreation. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/228981810.pdf#page=13.
Harwell E. 2011. Forests in fragile and conflict-affected states. World Bank. [accessed 2021 Apr 6]. https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9108/WDR2011_0027.pdf.
Harwell E, Farah D, Blundell AG. 2011. Forests, fragility and conflict: Overview and case studies. World Bank. https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13067.
Herbert S. 2019. Lessons from environmental peacebuilding programming. University of Birmingham. https://
opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14659.
Hickel J. 2021. The anti-colonial politics of degrowth. Polit Geogr.(102404):102404.
Hickel J, Kallis G. 2019. Is green growth possible? New Political Economy.:1–18.
Hoang C, Satyal P, Corbera E. 2019. “This is my garden”: justice claims and struggles over forests in Vietnam’s REDD+. 
Clim Policy. 19(sup1):S23–S35.
Howell S. 2014. “no RIGHTS–no REDD”: Some implications of a turn towards co-benefits. Forum for development 
studies. 41(2):253–272.
Howson P. 2017. Intimate exclusions from the REDD+ forests of Sungai Lamandau, Indonesia. Conservation & Society. 
15(1). [accessed 2017 May 29]. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26393280http://www.jstor.org/stable/26393280https://
www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26393280.pdf.
Howson P. 2018. Slippery violence in the REDD+ forests of Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. Conservation and Society. 
16(2):136–146.
Howson P. 2020. Climate crises and crypto-colonialism: conjuring value on the blockchain frontiers of the Global 
South. Frontiers in Blockchain. 3. doi:10.3389/fbloc.2020.00022. [accessed 2021 Mar 2]. http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/
eprint/39723/.
Hulme D, Murphree M. 1999. Communities, wildlife and the “new conservation”in Africa. J Int Dev. 11(2):277.
Hunsberger C, Corbera E, Borras SM, Franco JC, Woods K, Work C, de la Rosa R, Eang V, Herre R, Kham SS, et al. 2017. 
Climate change mitigation, land grabbing and conflict: Towards a landscape-based and collaborative action 
research agenda. Revue canadienne d’etudes du developpement. 38(3):305–324.
Ide T. 2017. Research methods for exploring the links between climate change and conflict. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Clim 
Change. 8(3):e456.
Ide T. 2020. The dark side of environmental peacebuilding. World Dev. 127:104777.
Ide T, Kristensen A, Bartusevičius H. 2021. First comes the river, then comes the conflict? A qualitative comparative 
analysis of flood-related political unrest. Journal of peace research. 58(1):83–97.
Indriatmoko Y, Atmadja S, Utomo NA, Ekaputri AD, Komarudin H. 2014. Katingan peatland restoration and 
conservation project, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. In: REDD+ on the ground: A casebook of subnational initiatives 
across the globe. Bogor: CIFOR.
IPCC. 2007. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007. IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar4/.
IUCN. 2020 Dec 15. Dangerous red-tagging of environmental defenders in the Philippines | IUCN NL. IUCN. [accessed 
2021 Sep 15]. https://web.archive.org/web/20210915081023/https://www.iucn.nl/en/news/dangerous-red-tagging-
of-environmental-defenders-in-the-philippines/.
Jagger P, Brockhaus M, Duchelle AE, Gebara MF, Lawlor K, Resosudarmo IAP, Sunderlin WD. 2014. Multi-level policy 
dialogues, processes, and actions: Challenges and opportunities for national REDD+ safeguards measurement, 
reporting, and verification (MRV). Forests, Trees and Livelihoods. 5(9):2136–2162.
Kane S, Dhiaulhaq A, Sapkota LM, Gritten D. 2018. Transforming forest landscape conflicts: the promises and perils of 
global forest management initiatives such as REDD+. Fem Stud. 2(1):1–17.
Karsenty A, Ongolo S. 2012. Can “fragile states” decide to reduce their deforestation? The inappropriate use of the 
theory of incentives with respect to the REDD mechanism. Forest Policy and Economics. 18:38–45.
Karsenty A, Vogel A, Castell F. 2014. “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. Environ Sci 
Policy. 35:20–29.
Kashwan P. 2015. Forest policy, institutions, and REDD+ in India, Tanzania, and Mexico. Global environmental politics. 
15(3):95–117.
Keck ME, Sikkink K. 1998. Transnational advocacy networks in the movement society. The social movement society: 
Contentious politics for a new century. 221. https://scholar.harvard.edu/ksikkink/publications/author/496802/
Margaret%20Keck.
71Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Kengoum F, Pham TT, Moeliono M, Dwisatrio B, Sonwa DJ. 2020. The context of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo: Drivers, agents and institutions. 2nd ed. CIFOR Occasional Paper Report No.: 207.
Khan M. 2010. Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions. http://eprints.soas.
ac.uk/9968/1/Political_Settlements_internet.pdf.
Kijazi M. 2015. Climate emergency, carbon capture and coercive conservation on Mt. Kilimanjaro. Carbon conflicts and 
forest landscapes in Africa.:78–98.
Koning R de, Capistrano D, Yasmi Y, Cerutti P, Others. 2007. Forest-related conflict: impacts, links and measures to 
mitigate. Rights and Resources Initiative.
Krause T. 2020. Reducing deforestation in Colombia while building peace and pursuing business as usual extractivism? 
J Polit Ecol. 27(1):401–418.
Kravchenko S. 2007. Right to carbon or right to life: human rights approaches to climate change. Vt J Envtl L. 9:513.
Ladan SI. 2014. Forests and forest reserves as security threats in northern Nigeria. European Scientific Journal. 10(35). 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.969.9953&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
Lamb V, Dao N. 2017. Perceptions and practices of investment: China’s hydropower investments in Vietnam and 
Myanmar. Rev Can Etudes Dev. 38(3):395–413.
Landholm DM, Pradhan P, Kropp JP. 2019. Diverging forest land use dynamics induced by armed conflict across the 
tropics. Glob Environ Change. 56:86–94.
Lang C. 2020 Oct 28. Nature-based madness: A US$1.2 trillion carbon market by 2050? REDD monitor. [accessed 2020 
Oct 29]. https://web.archive.org/save/https://redd-monitor.org/2020/10/28/nature-based-madness-a-us1-2-trillion-
carbon-market-by-2050/.
Larson AM. 2011. Forest tenure reform in the age of climate change: Lessons for REDD+. Global environmental change. 
21(2):540–549.
Larson AM, Brockhaus M, Sunderlin WD, Duchelle A, Babon A, Dokken T, Pham TT, Resosudarmo I, Selaya G, Awono A, 
et al. 2013. Land tenure and REDD+: The good, the bad and the ugly. Global environmental change. 23:678–689.
Larson AM, Cronkleton P, Barry D, Pacheco P. 2008. Tenure rights and beyond: Community access to forest resources in 
Latin America. CIFOR. https://www.cifor.org/knowledge/publication/2631/.
Lau JD, Kleiber D, Lawless S, Cohen PJ. 2021. Gender equality in climate policy and practice hindered by assumptions. 
Nature climate change. 11(3):186–192.
Leach M, Scoones I. 2013. Carbon forestry in West Africa: The politics of models, measures and verification processes. 
Glob Environ Change. 23(5):957–967.
Leach M, Scoones I. 2015. Political ecologies of carbon in Africa. Routledge.
Le Billon P. 2000. The political ecology of transition in Cambodia 1989-1999: War, peace and forest exploitation. Dev 
Change. 31(4):785–805.
Le Billon P. 2001. The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts. Polit Geogr. 20(5):561–584.
Le Billon P. 2002. Logging in Muddy Waters: The Politics of Forest Exploitation in Cambodia. Crit Asian Stud. 34(4):563–
586.
Le ND, Loft L, Tjajadi JS, Pham TT, Wong GY, Others. 2016. Being equitable is not always fair: an assessment of 
PFES implementation in Dien Bien, Vietnam. CIFOR Working Paper.(205). https://www.cabdirect.org/cabdirect/
abstract/20173049260.
Levy B, Walton M. 2013. Institutions, incentives and service provision: bringing politics back in. doi:10.2139/
ssrn.2386655. [accessed 2021 Sep 13]. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2386655.
Lewis SL, Wheeler CE, Mitchard ETA, Koch A. 2019. Restoring natural forests is the best way to remove atmospheric 
carbon. Nature. 568(7750):25–28.
Liévano-Latorre LF, Brum FT, Loyola R. 2021. How effective have been guerrilla occupation and protected areas in 
avoiding deforestation in Colombia? Biol Conserv. 253:108916.
Li TM. 2007. The will to improve. Durham: Duke University Press.
Li TM. 2011. Rendering society technical: government through community and the ethnographic turn at the World 
Bank in Indonesia. In: Mosse D, editor. Adventures in Aidland: the anthropology of professionals in international 
development. Oxford: Berghahn.
Loft L, Pham TT, Wong GY, Brockhaus M, Le DN, Tjajadi JS, Luttrell C. 2017. Risks to REDD+: potential pitfalls for policy 
design and implementation. Environ Conserv. 44(1):44–55.
72 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Loft L, Ravikumar A, Gebara MF, Pham TT, Resosudarmo IAP, Assembe S, Tovar JG, Mwangi E, Andersson K. 2015. 
Taking stock of carbon rights in REDD+ candidate countries: Concept meets reality. Forests, Trees and Livelihoods. 
6(4):1031–1060.
Lowry K, Adler P, Milner N. 1997. Participating the public: Group process, politics, and planning. Journal of Planning 
Education and Research. 16(3):177–187.
Lund C. 2021. Nine-tenths of the law: Enduring dispossession in Indonesia. Yale University Press.
Lund JF, Sungusia E, Mabele MB, Scheba A. 2017. Promising change, delivering continuity: REDD+ as conservation fad. 
World Dev. 89:124–139.
Lund MS. 2008. Conflict prevention: Theory in pursuit of policy and practice. In: Bercovitch VK, Zartman W, editors. The 
SAGE handbook of conflict resolution. London: Sage Publications.
Luttrell C, Betteridge B. 2017. Lessons for multi-level REDD+ benefit- sharing from revenue distribution in extractive 
resource sectors (oil, gas and mining). CIFOR. [accessed 2021 Aug 15]. https://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/
OccPapers/OP-166.pdf.
Luttrell C, Resosudarmo IAP, Muharrom E, Brockhaus M, Seymour F. 2014. The political context of REDD+ in Indonesia: 
Constituencies for change. Environmental science & policy. 35:67–75.
Lyons K, Richards C, Westoby P. 2014. The darker side of green: Plantation forestry and carbon violence in Uganda. 
eprints.qut.edu.au.
Lyons K, Westoby P. 2014a. Carbon colonialism and the new land grab: Plantation forestry in Uganda and its livelihood 
impacts. J Rural Stud. 36:13–21.
Lyons K, Westoby P. 2014b. Carbon markets and the new “Carbon Violence”: A Ugandan study. International Journal of 
African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity. 9(2):77–94.
MacDonald K, Ardhianto I. 2016. The Siawan Belida REDD+ project in Indonesia. Non-Judicial Redress Mechanisms 
Report Series. 7(4). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880047.
Mach KJ, Adger WN, Buhaug H, Burke M, Fearon JD, Field CB, Hendrix CS, Kraan CM, Maystadt J-F, O’Loughlin J, et al. 
2020. Directions for research on climate and conflict. Earths Future. 8(7):e2020EF001532.
Maertens L. 2019. From Blue to Green? Environmentalization and Securitization in UN Peacekeeping Practices. Int 
Peacekeep. 26(3):302–326.
Mahanty S, Suich H, Tacconi L. 2013. Access and benefits in payments for environmental services and implications for 
REDD+: Lessons from seven PES schemes. Land use policy. 31:38–47.
Martin A, Myers R, Dawson N. 2018. The park is ruining our livelihoods. We support the park! Unravelling the paradox of 
attitudes to protected areas. Human ecology. 46:93–105.
Martínez-Alier J. 2002. Ecological debt and property rights on carbon sinks and reservoirs. Capitalism Nature 
Socialism. 13(1):115–119.
Massarella K, Nygren A, Fletcher R, Büscher B, Kiwango WA, Komi S, Krauss JE, Mabele MB, McInturff A, Sandroni LT, et 
al. 2021. Transformation beyond conservation: how critical social science can contribute to a radical new agenda in 
biodiversity conservation. Curr Opin Environ Sustain. 49:79–87.
Matthew R. 2014. Integrating climate change into peacebuilding. Clim Change. 123(1):83–93.
McCulloch N, Piron L-H. 2019. Thinking and working politically: Learning from practice. Overview to special issue. 
Development policy review.(dpr.12439). doi:10.1111/dpr.12439. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
dpr.12439.
McDermott CL. 2017. Whose forests, whose gain? Nature climate change. 7(6):386–387.
McDermott CL, Acheampong E, Arora-Jonsson S, Asare R, de Jong W, Hirons M, Khatun K, Menton M, Nunan F, Poudyal 
M, et al. 2019. SDG 16: peace, justice and strong institutions – a political ecology perspective. In: Katila P, Pierce 
Colfer CJ, de Jong W, Galloway G, Pacheco P, Winkel G, editors. Sustainable Development Goals: Their Impacts on 
Forests and People. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 617.
McDermott CL, Levin K, Cashore B. 2011. Building the Forest-climate bandwagon: REDD+ and the logic of problem 
amelioration. Glob Environ Polit. 11(3):85–103.
McDonald M. 2013. Discourses of climate security. Polit Geogr. 33:42–51.
McDonald M. 2018. Climate change and security: towards ecological security? International Theory. 10(2):153–180.
McElwee P. 2015. From conservation and development to climate: Anthropological engagements with REDD+ in 
Vietnam. In: Barnes J, Dove MR, editors. Climate Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives on Climate Change. London: 
Yale University Press.
73Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
McEwan C. 2017. Spatial processes and politics of renewable energy transition: Land, zones and frictions in South 
Africa. Political geography. 56:1–12.
McNeely JA. 2003a. Biodiversity, war, and tropical forests. J Sustainable For. 16(3-4):1–20.
McNeely JA. 2003b. Conserving forest biodiversity in times of violent conflict. Oryx. 37(2):142–152.
Mejía Acosta A. 2015. The Governance of Natural Resource Wealth: Some Political Economy Considerations on 
Enhancing Social Investment. In: Haddad L, Kato H, Meisel N, editors. Growth is Dead, Long Live Growth :The Quality 
of Economic Growth and Why it Matters. Tokyo: JICA Research Institute.
Mendoza JP. 2020. Colombia’s transition to peace is enhancing coca-driven deforestation. Environ Res Lett. 
15(10):104071.
Menton M, Gilbert PR. 2021. NGO complicity in atmospheres of violence and the possibilities for decolonial solidarity 
with defenders. Environmental Defenders: Deadly Struggles for Life and Territory.:71.
Menton M, Le Billon P. 2021. Environmental Defenders: Deadly Struggles for Life and Territory. Routledge.
Menton M, Navas G, Le P Billon. 2021. Atmospheres of violence: On defenders’ intersecting experiences of violence. 
London: Routledge.
Metcalf GE, Weisbach D. 2009. The design of a carbon tax. Harv Envtl L Rev. 33:499.
Mickels-Kokwe G, Kokwe M. 2015. Carbon projects and communities. In: Leach M, Scoones I, editors. Carbon conflicts 
and forest landscapes in Africa. London: Routledge. p. 124–141.
Miles WB. 2021. The invisible commodity: Local experiences with forest carbon offsetting in Indonesia. Environment 
and Planning E: Nature and Space. 4(2):499–524.
Millar CI, Stephenson NL, Stephens SL. 2007. Climate change and forests of the future: managing in the face of 
uncertainty. Ecol Appl. 17(8):2145–2151.
Milne S. 2012. Grounding forest carbon: property relations and avoided deforestation in Cambodia. Human ecology. 
40:693–706.
Milne S. 2012 Apr 30. Chut Wutty: Tragic casualty of Cambodia’s dirty war to save forests. New Mandala. [accessed 2021 
Aug 10]. https://web.archive.org/web/20210810062537/https://www.newmandala.org/chut-wutty-tragic-casualty-
of-cambodia%E2%80%99s-dirty-war-to-save-forests/.
Milne S. 2013. Under the leopard’s skin: Land commodification and the dilemmas of Indigenous communal title in 
upland Cambodia. Asia Pac Viewp. 54(3):323–339.
Milne S, Mahanty S. 2019. Value and bureaucratic violence in the green economy. Geoforum. 98:133–143.
Mirumachi N, Sawas A, Workman M. 2020. Unveiling the security concerns of low carbon development: climate 
security analysis of the undesirable and unintended effects of mitigation and adaptation. Climate and 
Development. 12(2):97–109.
Mohan G, Asante K. 2015. Transnational capital and the political settlement of Ghana’s oil economy. [accessed 2021 
Sep 13]. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2597189.
Montefrio MJF. 2013. The green economy and land conflict. Peace Review. 25(4):502–509.
Müller F. 2020. Can the subaltern protect forests? REDD+ compliance, depoliticization and Indigenous subjectivities. 
University of Arizona.
van der Muur W, Vel J, Fisher MR, Robinson K. 2019. Changing indigeneity politics in Indonesia: From revival to projects. 
The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology. 20(5):379–396.
Myers R, Larson AM, Kowler L, Yang A, Trench T. 2018. Messiness of forest governance: How technical approaches 
suppress politics in REDD+ and conservation projects. Global Environmental Change. 50:314–324.
Myers R, Luttrell C, Fisher M, Menton M. 2021. Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons 
for climate security detailed design document.
Myers R, Maryudi A, McDermott CL, Rutt R, Acheampong E, Cầm H. 2020. Imposing legality: the hegemonic notions of 
forest governance in the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT). Journal of Political Ecology. 
27.
Myers R, Muhajir M. 2015. Searching for justice: rights vs “benefits” in Bukit Baka Bukit Raya National Park, Indonesia. 
Conservation & Society. 13(4):370–381.
Myers R, Sanders A, Larson A, Ravikumar A, H RDP. 2016. Analyzing multilevel governance in Indonesia: lessons for 
REDD+ through land use change and benefit sharing in Central and West Kalimantan, Indonesia. Bogor: CIFOR 
Report No.: 202.
Nagel J. 2015. Gender, conflict, and the militarization of climate change policy. Peace Review. 27(2):202–208.
74 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Nature-Based Solutions (NBS) Facilitation Team of the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit. 2019. Compendium of 
contributions Nature-Based Solutions-Climate Action Summit 2019. UN Secretary General Climate Action Summit. 
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/29988/Compendium_NBS.pdf.
Naughton-Treves L, Wendland K. 2014. Land tenure and tropical forest carbon management. World Dev. 55:1–6.
Navas G, Mingorria S, Aguilar-González B. 2018. Violence in environmental conflicts: the need for a multidimensional 
approach. Sustainability Sci. 13(3):649–660.
Negret PJ, Sonter L, Watson JEM, Possingham HP, Jones KR, Suarez C, Ochoa-Quintero JM, Maron M. 2019. Emerging 
evidence that armed conflict and coca cultivation influence deforestation patterns. Biol Conserv. 239:108176.
Neimark BD, Wilson B. 2015. Re-mining the collections: From bioprospecting to biodiversity offsetting in Madagascar. 
Geoforum. 66:1–10.




Nel A. 2015b. Zones of awkward engagement in Ugandan carbon forestry. Carbon conflicts and forest landscapes in 
Africa.:94–107.
Nel A. 2017. Contested carbon: Carbon forestry as a speculatively virtual, falteringly material and disputed territorial 
assemblage. Geoforum. 81:144–152.
Neumann R. 1998. Imposing wilderness: struggles over livelihood and nature preservation in Africa. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Neuman WL. 2011. Social science research methods. 7th ed. London: Pearson.
Newell P, Paterson M. 2010. Climate capitalism: Global warming and the transformation of the global economy. 
Cambridge University Press.
Ngendakumana S, Bachange EG, Van Damme P, Speelman S, Foundjem-Tita D, Tchoundjeu Z, Kalinganire A, Bandiaky 
SB. 2013. Rethinking rights and interests of local communities in REDD+ designs: Lessons Learnt from current forest 
tenure systems in Cameroon. ISRN Forestry. 2013. doi:10.1155/2013/830902. [accessed 2021 May 17]. https://www.
hindawi.com/journals/isrn/2013/830902/.
Nielsen KS, Stern PC, Dietz T, Gilligan JM, van Vuuren DP, Figueroa MJ, Folke C, Gwozdz W, Ivanova D, Reisch LA, et al. 
2020. Improving Climate Change Mitigation Analysis: A Framework for Examining Feasibility. One Earth. 3(3):325–
336.
Nielsen TD. 2014. The role of discourses in governing forests to combat climate change. International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. 14(3):265–280.
Nightingale AJ. 2017. Power and politics in climate change adaptation efforts: Struggles over authority and recognition 
in the context of political instability. Geoforum. 84:11–20.
No REDD in Africa Network. The Worst REDD-type projects in Africa: Continent Grab for Carbon Colonialism. http://no-
redd.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Worst-REDD-type-projects-in-Africa-FINAL-Corrected.pdf.
NYDF Assessment Partners. 2018. Improving governance to protect forests: Empowering people and communities, 
strengthening laws and institutions — New York Declaration on Forests Goal 10 Assessment Report. [accessed 2021 
Sep 12]. https://www.climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/NYDF%20report%202018_0.pdf.
Obydenkova A, Nazarov Z, Salahodjaev R. 2016. The process of deforestation in weak democracies and the role of 
Intelligence. Environ Res. 148:484–490.
OECD. 2007. Principles for good international engagement in fragile states & situations. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/
dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/38368714.pdf.
OECD. 2016. States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence. Paris: OECD.
OECD. 2019. Better criteria for better evaluation revised evaluation criteria definitions and principles for use. OECD. 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/revised-evaluation-criteria-dec-2019.pdf.
OECD. 2020. Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-18. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. 2021. Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries Aggregate trends updated with 2019 
data. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Ordway EM. 2015. Political shifts and changing forests: Effects of armed conflict on forest conservation in Rwanda. 
Global Ecology and Conservation. 3:448–460.
Ospina C. 2018. Reducing carbon emissions through indigenous land. Climate Institute. http://climate.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Reducing-Carbon-Emissions-through-Indigenous-Land-Titles-1.pdf.
75Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Otto J. 2014. Carbon forestry: Pursuing climate change mitigation and poverty alleviation through market-based forest 
carbon schemes in Chiapas, Mexico [Doctor of Philosophy]. Mutersbaugh T, editor. University of Kentucky. https://
climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/UNDP-Typology-and-Analysis-of-Climate-Related-Security-Risks-
First-Round-of-NDC.pdf.
Parks T, Cole W. 2010. Political settlements: Implications for international development policy and practice. The 
Asia Foundation Occasional Paper. 2. https://gsdrc.org/document-library/political-settlements-implications-for-
international-development-policy-and-practice/.
Pascual U, Phelps J, Garmendia E, Brown K, Corbera E, Martin A, Gomez-Baggethun E, Muradian R. 2014. Social 
equity matters in payments for ecosystem services. Bioscience. doi:10.1093/biosci/biu146. http://bioscience.
oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/09/29/biosci.biu146.abstract.
Patel T, Dhiaulhaq A, Gritten D, Yasmi Y, De Bruyn T, Paudel NS, Luintel H, Khatri DB, Silori C, Suzuki R. 2013. Predicting 
future conflict under REDD+ implementation. For Trees Livelihoods. 4(2):343–363.
Peluso NL, Lund C. 2011. New frontiers of land control: Introduction. J Peasant Stud. 38(4):667–681.
Peluso NL, Vandergeest P. 2001. Genealogies of the Political Forest and Customary Rights in Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. J Asian Stud. 60(3):761–812.
Peluso NL, Vandergeest P. 2011a. Taking the jungle out of the forest: counter-insurgency and the making of national 
natures. In: Peet R, Robbins P, Watts MJ, editors. Global political ecology. London: Routledge. p. 254–284.
Peluso NL, Vandergeest P. 2011b. Political ecologies of war and forests: Counterinsurgencies and the making of 
national natures. Ann Assoc Am Geogr. 101(3):587–608.
Perino A, Pereira HM, Navarro LM, Fernández N, Bullock JM, Ceaușu S, Cortés-Avizanda A, van Klink R, Kuemmerle T, 
Lomba A, et al. 2019. Rewilding complex ecosystems. Science. 364(6438). doi:10.1126/science.aav5570. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1126/science.aav5570.
Peters K, Dupar M, Opitz-Stapleton S, Lovell E, Budimir M, Brown S, Cao Y. 2020. Climate change, conflict and fragility: 
An evidence review and recommendations for research and action. London: ODI. [accessed 2021 Mar 3]. https://
www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/odi_climate_change_conflict_and_fragility.pdf.
Peters K, Mayhew L, Borodyna O, Measures H, Petrova K, Nicoson C, Nordqvist P, Peters LER. 2020. Climate 
change, conflict and security scan: December 2018–March 2019. ODI. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/
diva2:1516464/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
Poudyal M, Ramamonjisoa BS, Hockley N, Rakotonarivo OS, Gibbons JM, Mandimbiniaina R, Rasoamanana A, Jones 
JPG. 2016. Can REDD+ social safeguards reach the “right” people? Lessons from Madagascar. Glob Environ Change. 
37:31–42.
Prem M, Saavedra S, Vargas JF. 2020. End-of-conflict deforestation: Evidence from Colombia’s peace agreement. World 
Dev. 129(104852):104852.
Pritchett L, Werker E. 2012. Developing the guts of a GUT (Grand Unified Theory): Elite commitment and inclusive 
growth. Effective States and Inclusive Development. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2386617. [accessed 2021 Sep 13]. https://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2386617.
Purdon M. 2015. Opening the black box of carbon finance “additionality”: The political economy of carbon finance 
effectiveness across Tanzania, Uganda, and Moldova. World development. 74:462–478.
Ramcilovik-Suominen S. 2019. REDD+ as a tool for state territorialization: managing forests and people in Laos. J Polit 
Ecol. 26(1):263.
Ramos-Castillo A, Castellanos EJ, Galloway McLean K. 2017. Indigenous peoples, local communities and climate 
change mitigation. Clim Change. 140(1):1–4.
Redpath SM, Young J, Evely A, Adams WM, Sutherland WJ, Whitehouse A, Amar A, Lambert RA, Linnell JDC, Watt A, et al. 
2013. Understanding and managing conservation conflicts. Trends Ecol Evol. 28(2):100–109.
Reed P. 2011. REDD+ and the indigenous question: A case study from Ecuador. For Trees Livelihoods. 2(2):525–549.
Repetto R. 2001. The Clean Development Mechanism: Institutional breakthrough or institutional nightmare. Policy Sci. 
34(3):303–327.
Ribot J. 2014. Cause and response: vulnerability and climate in the Anthropocene. Journal of peasant studies. 
41(5):667–705.
Rodríguez de Francisco JC, Budds J, Boelens R. 2013. Payment for Environmental Services and Unequal Resource 
Control in Pimampiro, Ecuador. Soc Nat Resour. 26(10):1217–1233.
Rodríguez-de-Francisco JC, del Cairo C, Ortiz-Gallego D, Velez-Triana JS, Vergara-Gutiérrez T, Hein J. 2021. Post-
conflict transition and REDD+ in Colombia: Challenges to reducing deforestation in the Amazon. For Policy Econ. 
127:102450.
76 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Ross M. 2003. The natural resource curse: How wealth can make you poor. In: Bannon I, Collier P, editors. Natural 
Resources and violent conflicts. Washington DC: World Bank. p. 17–42.
Ross ML. 1999. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World Polit. 51(2):297–322.
Rustad SCA, Rød JK, Larsen W, Gleditsch NP. 2008. Foliage and fighting: Forest resources and the onset, duration, and 
location of civil war. Polit Geogr. 27(7):761–782.
Rüttinger L, Smith D, Stang G, Tänzler D, Vivekananda J, Brown O, Carius A, Dabelko G, De Souza R-M, Mitra S, et al. 
2015. A new climate for peace: taking action on climate and fragility risks. Climate Diplomacy. https://climate-
diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/new-climate-peace.
Rutt R, Myers R, McDermott CL, Ramcilovik-Suominen S. 2018. FLEGT: Another forestry fad? Environmental science & 
policy. 89:266–272.
Saito-Jensen M, Sikor T, Kurniawan Y, Eilenberg M, Setyawan EP, Kustini SJ. 2015. Policy options for effective REDD+ 
implementation in Indonesia: The significance of forest tenure reform. Int For Rev. 17(1):86–97.
Sarmiento Barletti JP, Larson AM. 2017. Rights abuse allegations in the context of REDD+ readiness and 
implementation: A preliminary review and proposal for moving forward. CIFOR InfoBrief. 190. https://play.google.
com/store/books/details?id=7xVQDwAAQBAJ.
Sarmiento Barletti JP, Larson AM. 2019. Environmental justice in the REDD frontier: Experiences from the Amazon and 
Beyond. Landscapes of Inequity: The Quest for …. https://www.cifor.org/knowledge/publication/7756.
Sarmiento Barletti JP, Larson AM, Hewlett C, Delgado D. 2020. Designing for engagement: A Realist Synthesis Review 
of how context affects the outcomes of multi-stakeholder forums on land use and/or land-use change. World Dev. 
127:104753.
Satyal P, Corbera E, Dawson N, Dhungana H, Maskey G. 2019. Representation and participation in formulating Nepal’s 
REDD+ approach. Clim Policy. 19(sup1):S8–S22.
Sawas DRA, Workman DRM, Mirumachi DRN. 2018. Climate change, low-carbon transitions and security. Imperial 
College London Report No.: Briefing paper No. 25. [accessed 2021 Sep 10]. https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/
imperial-college/grantham-institute/public/publications/briefing-papers/Climate-change,-low-carbon-transitions-
and-security-WEB.pdf.
Scheba A. 2014. Commodifying forest carbon: How local power, politics and livelihood practices shape REDD+ in Lindi 
Region, Tanzania [Doctor of Philosophy]. University of Manchester. https://search.proquest.com/openview/fc59125a
ad931c82b408cbf9368096ee/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=51922.
Scheffran J, Brzoska M, Brauch HG, Link PM, Schilling J. 2012. Climate change, human security and violent conflict: 
challenges for societal stability. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Scheidel A, Work C. 2018. Forest plantations and climate change discourses: New powers of “green” grabbing in 
Cambodia. Land use policy. 77:9–18.
Schilling J, Hertig E, Tramblay Y, Scheffran J. 2020. Climate change vulnerability, water resources and social 
implications in North Africa. Regional Environmental Change. 20(1). doi:10.1007/s10113-020-01597-7. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s10113-020-01597-7.
Schmidt T, Buchert M, Schebek L. 2016. Investigation of the primary production routes of nickel and cobalt products 
used for Li-ion batteries. Resour Conserv Recycl. 112:107–122.
Sconfienza UM. 2017. What can environmental narratives tell us about forestry conflicts? The case of REDD. 
International Forestry Review. 19(1):98–112.
Scott JC. 1987. Weapons of the weak : everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Searchinger TD, Beringer T, Holtsmark B, Kammen DM, Lambin EF, Lucht W, Raven P, van Ypersele J-P. 2018. Europe’s 
renewable energy directive poised to harm global forests. Nat Commun. 9(1):3741.
Security Council Report. 2021. The UN Security Council and Climate Change. Security Council Report Report No.: 
2. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/climate_
security_2021.pdf.
Seddon N, Sengupta S, García-Espinosa M, Others. 2019. Nature-based Solutions in Nationally Determined 
Contributions. Gland and Oxford: IUCN and Oxford.
Seddon N, Smith A, Smith P, Key I, Chausson A, Girardin C, House J, Srivastava S, Turner B. 2021. Getting the message 
right on nature-based solutions to climate change. Glob Chang Biol. 27(8):1518–1546.
Selby J, Hoffmann C. 2014. Rethinking climate change, conflict and security. Geopolitics. 19(4):747–756.
Sen A, Dabi N. 2021. Tightening the Net: Net zero climate targets–implications for land and food equity. Oxfam. https://
oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/handle/10546/621205.
77Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Setyowati AB. 2020. Governing the ungovernable: contesting and reworking REDD+ in Indonesia. J Polit Ecol. 
doi:10.2458/v27i1.23185. http://dx.doi.org/10.2458/v27i1.23185.
Seymour F, Busch J. 2016. Why forests? Why now?: The science, economics, and politics of tropical forests and climate 
change. Brookings Institution Press.
Sikor T, He J, Lestrelin G. 2017. Property rights regimes and natural resources: A conceptual analysis revisited. World 
development. 93:337–349.
Siurua H. 2006. Nature above People: Rolston and “Fortress” Conservation in the South. Ethics Environ. 11(1):71–96.
Sovacool BK. 2019. The precarious political economy of cobalt: Balancing prosperity, poverty, and brutality in artisanal 
and industrial mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Extractive Industries and Society. 6(3):915–939.
Standage T. 2021 Aug 3. The lost history of the electric car – and what it tells us about the future of transport. The 
Guardian. [accessed 2021 Aug 5]. https://web.archive.org/web/20210803100925/https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2021/aug/03/lost-history-electric-car-future-transport.
Stark C, Thompson M, The Climate Change Committee. 2019. Net Zero The UK’s contribution to stopping global 
warming. [accessed 2021 Sep 15]. https://www.h2knowledgecentre.com/content/government125.
Stevens C, Winterbottom R, Springer J, Reytar K. 2014. Securing rights, combating climate change. WRI.
Sticker C, Duchelle AE, Nepstad D, Ardila JP. 2018. Subnational jurisdictional approaches: policy innovation and 
partnerships for change. In: Angelsen A, Martius C, de Sy V, Duchelle AE, Larson AM, Pham TT, editors. Transforming 
REDD+: Lessons and new directions. Bogor: CIFOR.
Streck C. 2020. Who owns REDD+? Carbon markets, carbon Rights and entitlements to REDD+ finance. Forests, Trees 
and Livelihoods. 11(9):959.
Sunderlin WD, Larson AM, Cronkleton P. 2009. Forest tenure rights and REDD. Realising REDD.:139.
Sunderlin WD, Larson AM, Duchelle AE, Resosudarmo IAP, Huynh TB, Awono A, Dokken T. 2014. How are REDD+ 
proponents addressing tenure problems? Evidence from Brazil, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam. 
World development. 55:37–52.
Sunderlin WD, Larson AM, Sarmiento Barletti JP. 2018. Land and carbon tenure: Some–but insufficient–progress. 
https://www.cifor.org/knowledge/publication/7068/.
Susskind L, Cruikshank J. 1987. Breaking the impasse: consensual approaches to resolving public disputes. New York 
Basic Books.
Tadajewski M. 2020. Marketization: Exploring the geographic expansion of market ideology. In: Roy Chaudhuri H, Belk 
RW, editors. Marketization theory and evidence from emerging economies. Singapore: Springer. p. 3–20.
Tänzler D. 2013. Forests and conflict: The relevance of REDD+. Adelphi. https://www.adelphi.de/en/system/files/
mediathek/bilder/forest_and_conflict-the_relevance_of_redd.pdf.
Tar UA, Safana YI. 2021. Forests, ungoverned spaces and the challenge of small arms and light weapons proliferation 
in Africa. In: Tar UA, Onwurah CP, editors. The palgrave handbook of small arms and conflicts in Africa. London: 
Springer Nature. p. 223.
Turner T. 2007. The Congo wars: Conflict, myth and reality. London: Zed Books.
UNEP. 2017 Sep 14. Mitigation. UNEP. [accessed 2021 Aug 5]. https://web.archive.org/web/20210802133518/https://
www.unep.org/explore-topics/climate-action/what-we-do/mitigation.
UNFCCC. What is REDD+? [accessed 2021 Oct 20]. https://unfccc.int/topics/land-use/workstreams/redd/what-is-redd.
United Nations, World Bank. 2018. Pathways for peace. Washington, DC: World Bank.
UN-REDD. 2017. 9th Consolidated Annual Progress Report of The Un-Redd Programme Fund.
Unruh J. 2010. Land rights and peacebuilding: Challenges and responses for the international community. 
International Journal of Peace Studies. 15(2):89–125.
Van Dexter K, Visseren-Hamakers I. 2020. Forests in the time of peace. Journal of land use science. 15(2-3):327–342.
Verweijen J, Lambrick F, Le Billon P, Milanez F, Manneh A, Venegas MM. 2021. “Environmental defenders”: The power/
disempowerment of a loaded term. In: Menton M, Le Billon P, editors. Environmental and Land Defenders: Deadly 
Struggles for Life and Territory. London: Routledge. p. 37–50.
Vivid Economics. 2020a. An investor guide to negative emission technologies and the importance of land use. Vivid 
Economics.
Vivid Economics. 2020b. The inevitable forest finance response: investor opportunities. Vivid Economics. https://www.
unpri.org/download?ac=11981.
Wallbott L, Florian-Rivero EM. 2018. Forests, rights and development in Costa Rica: a political ecology perspective on 
indigenous peoples’ engagement in REDD+. Conflict, Security & Development. 18(6):493–519.
78 Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
Welden EA, Chausson A, Melanidis MS. 2021. Leveraging Nature-based Solutions for transformation: Reconnecting 
people and nature. People and Nature.(pan3.10212). doi:10.1002/pan3.10212. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1002/pan3.10212.
Whaites A. 2015. Political settlements: people and the landscapes of power. DLP. [accessed 2021 Sep 13]. https://www.
dlprog.org/opinions/political-settlements-people-and-the-landscapes-of-power.
Whittemore R, Knafl K. 2005. The integrative review: updated methodology. J Adv Nurs. 52(5):546–553.
WHO. 2014. Global status report on violence prevention 2014. WHO. [accessed 2021 Mar 29]. https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/9789241564793.
Whyte K. 2017. Indigenous climate change studies : Indigenizing futures, decolonizing the anthropocene. Engl Lang 
Notes. 55(1):153–162.
Woods K. 2015. Intersections of land grabs and climate change mitigation strategies in Myanmar as a (post-) war state 
of conflict. MOSAIC Working Paper Series. 3. https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/CMCP_74-Woods.pdf.
Woods KM, Naimark J. 2020. Conservation as counterinsurgency: A case of ceasefire in a rebel forest in southeast 
Myanmar. Polit Geogr. 83:102251.
Work C. 2015. Intersections of climate change mitigation policies, land grabbing and conflict in a fragile state: Insights 
from Cambodia. MOSAIC Working Paper Series.(2). https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/CMCP_73-Work.pdf.
Work C, Rong V, Song D, Scheidel A. 2019. Maladaptation and development as usual? Investigating climate change 
mitigation and adaptation projects in Cambodia. Clim Policy. 19(sup1):S47–S62.
WRI. 2020. Global Forest Watch. Global Forest Watch. [accessed 2020 Aug 28]. https://www.globalforestwatch.org/.
Yasmi Y, Guernier J, Colfer CJP. 2009. Positive and negative aspects of forestry conflict: lessons from a decentralized 
forest management in Indonesia. Int For Rev. 11(1):98–110.
Yasmi Y, Kelley L, Murdiyarso D, Patel T. 2012. The struggle over Asia’s forests: an overview of forest conflict and 
potential implications for REDD+. International Forestry Review. 14(1):99–109.
Zeitoun M, Warner J. 2006. Hydro-hegemony--a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts. Water Policy. 
8(5):435–460.
Zimmerer J. 2014. Climate change, environmental violence and genocide. International Journal of Human Rights. 
18(3):265–280.
Zoellick RB. 2008. Fragile states: Securing development. Survival. 50(6):67–84.
79Climate change mitigation in forests: Conflict, peacebuilding, and lessons for climate security
ANNEX 1:
Methodological challenges and limitations
1. Although the design of the study was to address security, we found that the literature on 
security specifically pertaining to CCMis in forests in LMICs was too limited. We therefore 
focused on concepts of peace and conflict from which lessons for security could be drawn. 
Because in the literature conflict is more easily observed than peace, our search terms 
included more strings related to conflict and violence than peace. Also,when looking for 
case studies of insecurity, we intentionally focused on visible expressions of conflict and 
violence. This means that while this review is useful for deriving lessons on the dynamics 
around the types of security found in the specific case studies, we cannot make overall 
judgements such as whether or not CCMIs lead to security. 
2. We relied on academic literature and grey literature that was publicly available and 
searchable using the online search tools. While some project promotional documents were 
available online, many evaluations of projects were not available. Those that were often 
did not discuss conditions of conflict or peace. 
3. We did not assume that all conservation efforts were CCMIs. We observe that conservation 
initiatives, for example, could have been undertaken for different reasons than climate 
change mitigation such as biodiversity conservation, and may or may not have shifted 
their justifications toward climate change mitigation over time. Further, protected areas 
created prior to the development of the concept of carbon capture lack the additionality 
that is required of a CCMI even though the existence of a standing forest contributes to 
carbon sequestration. The extent to which an initiative could be considered climate change 
mitigation was not always explicit in the literature and may have changed over time. To 
address this distinction, we rely on the extent to which an initiative has been explicitly 
aligned with climate change mitigation in the literature.
4. We faced the challenge of attributing outcomes to CCMI rather than pre-existing conflict in 
that forest area or other intervention of which the CCMI was part. We were strict in requiring 
there to be a direct reference to a CCMI rather than another type of intervention. Although 
we have taken a targeted and integrative review of the literature, much of the complexity 
of the case studies present mere snapshots rooted in particular local contexts. Many of 
the cases we examined involved interventions other than for climate change mitigation 
such as conservation, which may have transformed into a CCMI later. In these cases, the 
historical conflict may have been about the ways in which conservation was executed, but 
were not necessarily about the CCMI itself. We found the descriptions for conflict in CCMIs 
often failed to clarify the origins of the land-use change and conflict and had to use our 
interpretation in order to relate the security context to the CCMI. 
5. The exact nature of insecurity, conflict or violence was not always clear in the literature we 
reviewed. While cases studied tended to elaborate more on what the sources of conflicts 
were and who the actors were, some of the theoretical and/or synthesis publications were 
less explicit.
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6. A significant portion of the literature reviewed focused on REDD+. Of the 42 works rated as 
having five-star intensity, 19 explicitly concern REDD+. The text searches were limited to the 
last 10 years and therefore there is a high representation of REDD+ as a dominant mode of 
climate change mitigation. While the authors expected that REDD+ would likely dominate 
the literature, this could have as much to do with the funding and academic attractiveness 
of studying REDD+ rather than being representative of all of the cases in the world.
7. We analysed security and insecurity in relation to CCMIs. However, counterfactuals are 
outside the scope of this review. Therefore, if a CCMI has been shown in the literature to 
lead to conflict, this review does not assume that another type of land-use change would 
have led to more or less conflict. By design, CCMIs in forest areas occur in forests that are 
at a high risk of deforestation or degradation, in order to capture the additionality of the 
initiative (Naughton-Treves and Wendland 2014). We therefore can only say in this review 
that in the case of CCMI, there are certain patterns of results but we cannot claim that CCMIs 
are better or worse than other approaches and/or land-use changes. For example, policy 
mechanisms are underrepresented in our review, and may or may not be a more effective 
approach than CCMIs.
8. Although the original intent of our study was to include literature published in English, 
French, Spanish, and Indonesian, the complexity of our design and volume of literature 
within the resource constraints we had, meant that the structured text searches were 
only in English and other publications in other languages were only reviewed through 
snowballing.
9. CCMIs are relatively new phenomena, for which we have also relied on the authors’ collective 
experiences in forest, environment, and development themes, as well as the literature in the 
forest sector and conservation initiatives, particularly their impacts on local populations 
(see Brechin and West 1990). In this light, we see the potential for understanding pathways 
and influencing trajectories in the way CCMIs and climate security take shape.
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ANNEX 2:  
Summary of structured text results
Source n %
Google Scholar 684 59.63
Gardian 131 11.42
CGIAR Climate Security Explorer 63 5.49














Table A. Summary of literature selections by method
Table B. Summary of include/exclude assessment 
Table C. Summary of intensity ratings for included 
items 
Data sorting 
A total of 1147 publications 
were imported into a custom 
database from all matched 
literature items from 
snowballing and structured 
text searches. They were 
then assessed for inclusion 
using the basic criteria that 
each publication made one 
or more links between peace/
conflict and CCMIs. Included 
items (n=153).
Data coding 
An intensity rating was 
applied to the included 
literature items from a scale 
low to high and assigned 
values 1–5 (see Myers et al. 
2021 for full descriptions of 
each rating). 
Data analysis 
Granular codes were used for in-depth analysis of the included papers that were ranked 5 in 
the database (n=42). The granular coding used the variables from the framework (see Tables 1 
and 2) as codes in Dedoose, a qualitative data analysis software package (see Myers et al. 2021 
for details). Annotations were made in Dedoose both to excerpts of text and on the overall 
document in which reviewers will document overall impressions and key aspects of each 
literature item.
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ANNEX 3: Summary of main cases
Main case studies





Lyons et al. 2014 Bukaleba Forest Reserve, 
Mayuge District, Kachung 
Forest Reserve, Dokolo 
District, Uganda
PES in industrial 
tree plantation 
(ITP)
Forced relocation of homes, agriculture, 
grazing, and other livelihood activities for 
the establishment and expansion of forestry 
plantations. ITP planted on top of the 
community's crops, or chemicals were sprayed, 
causing plants and animals to die. Animals 
grazing on company land is confiscated. Company 
continue to expand their plantation despite 
villagers experience acute land shortage to grow 
food
Nel 2015 Nawmasa Central Forest 
Reserve, Mubende District, 
Kikonda Central Forest 
Reserve, Kiboga District, 
Uganda
PES in industrial 
tree plantation 
(ITP)
Evictions and tightening of access to forest use 
for cattle grazing and watering holes. Evictions 
involved violence.
Kijazi 2015 Mt. Kilimanjaro, Tanzania Protected area, 
logging ban
Fortress conservation approach that restricts 
access of forest use for local people and 
criminalization of the activities. There’s brutal 
hostilities and coercion by park rangers, including 
cases of bribery and physical and sexual violence.
Beymer-Farris and 
Basset 2012
Rufiji Delta, Tanzania PES intended Local resource users are depicted negatively as 
forest destroyers. Meanwhile the local people have 
a history of strong agency of resisting injustice. 
Therefore there is a huge conflict potential in the 
implementation of the project.
Asiyanbi 2016 Mbe-Afi River Forest Reserve, 
Ekuri-Iko Esai cluster, 




Militarized protection of forest in the Cross River 
State. Logging ban expanded to include NTFP 
which are the community’s livelihood source. 
Community resisted by defying the ban and 
continued to access NTFP despite being arrested 
and persecuted.
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Americas
Gay-Antaki 2016 Oaxaca, Mexico PES, tree 
planting, clean 
energy
Reforestation work was done by women and 
therefore women’s labor is subsidizing the carbon 
project. The monetary compensation is not on par 
with the labor and it adds burden to their already 
heavy daily burden but the women cannot reject 
the opportunity for extra income. Women are also 
excluded in decision making.
Otto 2014 Scolel’ Te, Mexico PES Social relations were undermined by pushing 
risk on participant labor and encouraging 
the establishment of disenfranchising labor 
arrangements. The participatory methods in 
carbon forestry undermine the social relations 




Costa Rica PES intended, 
national 
preparation 
with focus on 
Talamanca 
Region
The vocabulary and concepts that are dominant 
at the national and global levels are a challenge 
for the local level actors and therefore the role of 
mediator is crucial. Local actor’s belief in regards 
to human relationship with nature is not suitable 
with the concept of PES as nature needs to be 
taken care of without any monetary reward.
Reed 2011 Ecuador PES intended Indigenous peoples’ opposition to REDD+ 
represents a considerable obstacle in the creation 
of a national strategy since more than 60% 
of the country‘s remaining forest cover is on 
Indigenous peoples’ land or under Indigenous 
peoples’ occupation. Many Indigenous groups 
view REDD+, with its possible emphasis on 
international markets and neoliberal mechanisms, 
as a continuation of the type of policies that have 




Guaviare, Colombia PES intended In a post-conflict state there’s a power vacuum 
leading to higher rate of deforestation.The carbon 
project design focuses on farmers and Indigenous 
peoples’ communities and not the main drivers 
of deforestation which are large state owners/
powerful cattle ranchers and other land grabbers.
Castro-Nunez et al. 
2017, Castro-Nunez 
2018
Colombia PES intended Risks of deforestation are lower in areas with 
armed conflict as forests act as venues for battles, 
hideouts and natural resources to finance war. 
Peacebuilding can be linked with carbon financing 
initiatives.





Kapuas Hulu potential REDD+ 
program, West Kalimantan, 
Indonesia
Potential PES via 
REDD+ benefits
Inclusion/exclusion to the potential benefit 
causes tension in the community because of the 
history of exclusion in the area. There are new and 
sometimes illegitimate land claims made by the 
community as they struggle to be included in the 
benefit.
Howson 2017, 2018 Sungai Lamandau REDD+ 





Inclusion/exclusion to benefit causes tension 
in the community and heightened social 
differentiation. Restriction of access to forest 
caused community members to lose their 
livelihood. Continued illegal access to forest by the 
excluded members of the community.




Community engagement process tends to exclude 
most marginalized members. There's a history 
of land dispossession with previous projects 
that creates distrust and complexity during 
participatory mapping. Community learns about 
carbon projects from various sources not only 
from project proponents.
Work 2015, Work 
et al 2019, Scheidel 
and Work 2018









and ITP in the 
landscape
Villagers are evicted from their homes, rice fields, 
orchards, grazing land and community forest 
with small compensation by ITP and biofuel 
companies. Military forces are used to intimidate 
villagers. There is resistance in the form of road 
blockage and lawsuits. In the protected forest 
there is a tightening of access to forest. Villagers 
cannot do shifting agriculture and are banned 
from cutting trees. They are also asked to patrol 
the forest from illegal logging done by elites.
Woods 2015, Woods 
and Naimark 2020
Thanintaryi Region, Myanmar PES intended, 
flex crop, clean 
energy
Land grabbing from the privatization of land, 
agriculture and natural resource extraction. 
Exclusion of community from access and use rights 
of forest reserves.Post-war landscape targeted for 
REDD+ area. Militarization for protecting forest 
areas. Displacement of ethnic rebel groups via 
conservation as a soft counterinsurgency method.




Government invoke national security exception 
that shuts down bilateral effort to implement 
REDD+
Satyal et al 2019 Nepal PES intended, 
national level 
preparation
Participation has been dominated by government 
actors and prominent civil society organizations, 
while marginalized groups even though present 
are not able to influence the process.
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Main multi-case studies
Reference Cases Issues of Peace/conflict
Alusiola et al. 2021 Ethiopia: Central Ethiopia 
(Kemerink-Seyoum et al 2018)  
Uganda: Mount Elgon 
National Park (Cavanagh and 
Benjaminsen 2014),  
Western Uganda (Blum 2020)  
Tanzania: Kilosa and Rungwe 
(Massarella et al., 2018), 
Southeastern Tanzania 
(Scheba and Rakotonarivo 
2016) 
Vietnam: Central Highlands 
(Hoang et al 2018) 
Indonesia: Tanjung Jabung 
Barat, Jambi (Galudra et al 
2013)  
Panama: Embera, Eastern 
Panama (Holmes et al 2017)
(1) injustices and restrictions over (full) access and control of forest 
resources; (2) creation of new forest governance structures that 
change relationships between stakeholders and the forest; (3) 
exclusion of community members from comprehensive project 
participation; (4) high project expectations that are not met; (5) 
changes in land tenure policy due to migrants, and (6) the aggravation 
of historic land tenure conflicts.
Barletti and Larson 
2019
The Amazons (Ecuador, Peru, 
Brazil)
Most Indigenouse people do not have legal ownership of land. Their 
territories also overlap with extraction concessions and protected 
natural areas. Land titling and formalization process does not address 
the issue of conflict with private interests. Titling also does not 
automatically provide use rights and carbon rights.
Women have fewer chances to participate and have different 
preferences in benefits. They are also given less information and 
access to decision making.
Free prior informed consent process has not been implemented 
effectively.
Dorr et al. 2013 Indonesia: KFCP Kapuas 
District, Ulu Masen, Aceh 
Province, Harapan Rainforest, 
Jambi District
Uganda: Nawmasa Central 
Forest Reserve Brazil: Juma 
Sustainable Development 
Reserve
Pre-existing land tenure conflicts are a major challenge in 
implementing REDD+. There is a potential for negative impact on 
livelihood from displacement and increased restrictions resulting from 
its implementation.
Kane et al. 2018 Cambodia: Kao Seima 
Protection Forest 
Myanmar: Hkamti District, 
Pyapon District, Taungoo 
District  
Nepal: Chitwan District, 
Gorkha District, Dolakha 
District  
Vietnam: Di Linh District, Lam 
Ha District
In some sites, the REDD+ projects were sources of impairment 
for forest communities by restricting access to forest resources. 
However, the research also identified REDD+ projects that enabled the 
participation of traditionally marginalized groups and built local forest 
management capacities, leading to strengthened tenure for some 
forest communities. Similarly, in some countries REDD+ has served 
as a mechanism to pilot Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), 
which will likely have significant impacts in mitigating conflicts by 
addressing the sources at local to national levels.
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ANNEX 4: 
Detailed recommendations from literature
1 Integrate a conflict-sensitive approach into CCMIs, especially in fragile states, recognizing 
that all interventions have the potential to exacerbate or alleviate existing tensions. Design 
climate-resilient peace-building and conflict-sensitive climate programming that not only 
reduces conflict potential but also plays a constructive role in peacebuilding (Dabelko et 
al. 2013; Gustafsson 2016; Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020).
1a Integrate social, economic, environmental, governance, political, security, and truth and 
reconciliation into CCMIs (Matthew 2014).
1b Integrate the following into CCMIs:
● Conflict analysis and sensitivity
● Monitoring of conflict dynamics and how program might affect security dynamics
● Conflict resolution and mitigation planning
● Specialized institutional mechanisms to mediate conflicts
● Analytical tools and activities for disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and 
mitigation and development and conflict.
(Harwell 2011; Gustafsson 2016; see also Peters, Mayhew, et al. 2020).
1c Identify pre-existing sources of impairment to determine the types of actions that can 
minimize negative impacts of conflict and enhance the positive ones (Patel et al. 2013). 
Conduct conflict-sensitive Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (Sawas et al. 
2018).
1d Ensure timely engagement by external parties in the early stages of conflict to mitigate 
risks or more serious future conflicts (Koning et al. 2007).
1e Use frameworks to critically assess forest and REDD+ policies and regulations that might 
lead to conflict and clarify and detail safeguards for the rights of Indigenous and local 
communities (Patel et al. 2013).
1f Focus on rebuilding and restoring cooperation over natural resources and environment 
(Herbert 2019).
2 Design CCMIs for the local context 
2a Customize CCMIs within a broader reconstruction framework that is unique to each 
peacebuilding country (Matthew 2014). Present different environmental peacebuilding 
opportunities for engagement according to the local context in ways that could have a 
transformative effect on conflict and community relationships (Herbert 2019).
2b Make compensation context-specific and agreed upon using robust participatory processes 
that explicitly ensure that no community members are increasingly marginalized by the 
form of compensation.
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2c Identify the context of specific changes required for strengthening peaceful and inclusive 
development, risks to development cooperation, and project impact in design and 
implementation stages (Gustafsson 2016).
2d Improve translation and implementation of social safeguards for REDD+ to local contexts 
(Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018; Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2019)
3 Design CCMIs to be pro-poor, inclusive, and promote the key role of Indigenous 
peoples (Dabelko et al. 2013; Tänzler 2013; Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2017). Be 
inclusive and deliberative about including different views, interest and politics (Leach and 
Scoones 2015). Bring governance and participation issues at a more centre stage to make 
interventions resulting in wider benefits for rural livelihoods (Leach and Scoones 2015). 
CCMIs need to better address power structures, broaden inclusion, accountability and 
transparency (Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020).
3a Engage in robust and meaningful participatory processes with a diverse range of actors 
from local communities on investments and actions affecting forest (Stevens et al. 2014; 
Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018).
3b Use CCMI revenues to advance socio-economic development (Dabelko et al. 2013; Tänzler 
2013). 
 Formalize informal sector livelihoods, and if not, provide an alternative (Harwell 2011).
3c Pursue CCMIs within Indigenous peoples’ territories where existing local institutions can 
govern the use and distribution of forest resources, ensure security of tenure and provide 
mechanisms of enforcement and conflict resolution through cultural sanctions (Reed 
2011; see also Peters, Mayhew, et al. 2020).
3d Reframe CCMIs and safeguards to recognize the rights and key roles of Indigenous peoples 
in climate change initiatives and protecting forest (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2017).
3e Critically evaluate the additionality requirement in REDD+ to ensure equality in practice 
(Reed 2011). 
3f Critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the carbon market audit mechanism to evaluate 
its environmental and social claims (Lyons et al. 2014).
3g Connect Indigenous communities with outside allies through new social media to empower 
them (Herbert 2019).
3h Connect CCMIs with formal legal frameworks for the implementation of principles in the 
UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous peoples (UNDRIP) (Reed 2011).
3i Ensure consistent participation of Indigenous men and women throughout REDD+, 
following FPIC guidelines and capacity building effort (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 
2017).
3j Widen the scope of auditing in carbon certification beyond carbon calculation to consider 
livelihood impacts for communities as well as access and use rights of local people (Lyons 
et al. 2014).
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3k Adaptive and collaborative management to provide conducive environment to address 
different interests and values of actors, allowing the forming of collaborative and equal 
relationships among them (Patel et al. 2013).
3l Improve communication and collaboration across communities and disciplines (Dabelko 
et al. 2013).
3mCo-production of knowledge and capacity with local actors (Hunsberger et al. 2017) 
Conduct collaborative research between academics and local land users to co-produce 
knowledge that are socially relevant and locally grounded (Patel et al. 2013).
3n Apply a security lens to evaluations of CCMIs. The evaluations of CCMis we reviewed were 
mostly technical and did not address issues of conflict or insecurity associated with the 
project. Evaluations based on the OECD DAC evaluation criteria– relevance, effectiveness, 
efficiency, impact and sustainability, and coherence (OECD 2019), for example, do not 
automatically consider conflict or political dynamics unless they are explicitly included in 
the project’s design.
4 Integrate land tenure security into CCMIs in order to avoid agitating existing conflicts 
and to alleviate conflict through participatory processes of assessing claims.
4a Address inequities in legal recognition of customary and women's land rights through land 
reforms (Harwell 2011).
4b Integrate land recovery plans and conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve land disputes 
(Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018).
4c Ensure the clarity of resource tenure-the systems of rights, rules, institutions and 
processes regulating ownership, access and use-in legal and policy frameworks as well as 
in implementation (Harwell 2011; Dabelko et al. 2013; Patel et al. 2013).
4d Secure land tenure and conduct FPIC (Patel et al. 2013). Mainstream the UN Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Governance of Tenure in forest landscape policies and CCMIs (Kane et al. 
2018).
4e Account for traditional land tenure arrangement and recognize rights of resource users 
without legal titles even though it's complicated (Tänzler 2013; Stevens et al. 2014).
4f Provide legal protection towards community's forest rights by for example mapping 
boundaries, protection against illegal loggers and not granting commercial concessions in 
community forest (Stevens et al. 2014).
4g Analysis of land-cover changes that include tenure rights, citizenship and human rights 
(Bebbington et al. 2018).
4h Create peace parks to improve forest management through cooperation, compromise to 
diffuse competing land claims (Harwell 2011).
5 Strengthen existing effective, legitimate, and accountable institutions to better 
address conflict and contribute to peace (Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020).
5a Identify the obstacles and possible incentives for cross sectoral coordination to improve 
integration and coordination across actors and agencies (Harwell 2011). 
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5b Improve inter-institutional coordination between national bureaucracies to ensure the 
practice covers the issue of indegenous people's rights (Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018).
5c Establish reliable transparent and efficient governance structures for REDD+ projects 
(Dabelko et al. 2013).
5d Use donor's leverage to support forest sector reform by encouraging the appointment of 
reform-minded forestry officials, implement training programmes on good governance 
and sanctioning corrupt officials (Koning et al. 2007).
5e Improve the capability of local institutions in identifying and dealing with drivers or 
deforestation effectively (Dabelko et al. 2013; Tänzler 2013). Provide information flow from 
the national level to the local and vice versa (Wallbott and Florian-Rivero 2018). Support 
communities with technical assistance and training (Stevens et al. 2014). Support capacity 
building and prioritize local participation (Dabelko et al. 2013).
5f Capacity building through multilateral process for the government on the relationship 
between climate and security (Sawas et al. 2018)
5g Create an inventory of practical tools for the reconstruction and capacity building on 
peacebuilding (Matthew 2014).
5h Further improvement of capacity building and information sharing activities especially to 
poor forest dependent and marginalized communities (Patel et al. 2013) Create capacity 
development program in FPIC for national and sub-national government staff, as well as 
staff of companies and NGOs (Kane et al. 2018) Capacity building for local population to 
enhance participation (Tänzler 2013). Empowerment of community forest management 
institutions through capacity building and protections (Harwell 2011).
6 Enhance governance systems and benefit-sharing schemata toward greater equity, 
and strengthen transparency and accountability of CCMIs
6a Strengthened forest governance monitoring systems, allowing it to be accessible to local 
communities and harmonized data (Kane et al. 2018). 
6b Concentrating forest law enforcement on the largest violators (Koning et al. 2007).
6c Transparency initiatives to support citizen's access to legislative measures (Sawas et al. 
2018).
6d Plan out benefit-sharing such that it has widespread benefits and reduces illicit economies 
(Peters, Dupar, et al. 2020).
6e Greater openness and transparency in forest resource management to increase legitimacy 
of REDD Programming, reduce corruption, avoid conflicts of interest, secure equitable 
benefits for local populations, and reduce conflict potentials (Harwell 2011; Dabelko et al. 
2013; Tänzler 2013).
6f Prepare an anti corruption mechanism to ensure transparency and accountability in 
bidding, chain-of-custody and revenue tracking (Harwell 2011).
6g Independent monitoring and reporting of compliance by media, civil society organizations 
and local communities (Koning et al. 2007).
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6h  Investigate abuse allegations, enable access to justice, and develop grievance mechanisms 
within REDD+ processes (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2017).
6i Include broader actor perspective and actors such as financial and regulatory institutions 
in the fight against illegal logging and associated corruption (Koning et al. 2007).
6j Call upon investor accountability to ensure there are no forced evictions and ensure the 
ongoing protection of local communities (Lyons et al. 2014).
7 Explicitly integrate gender equality into CCMIs to reduce inequality gaps leading to 
instability through differential power relations (Gay-Antaki 2016; Lau et al. 2021).
7a Question and disrupt the deeper, intangible barriers to gender equality that reinforce 
assumptions in funding structures, projects and institutions (Lau et al. 2021). Answer 
questions around how more gender equitable CCMIs would lead to increased security. 
While there are direct links between exclusion and violence at household levels, we did not 
find any studies that linked gender based inclusion or exclusion to (in)stability or security. 
Understand and use robust measures of gender equality in policy and practice (Lau et al. 
2021).
7b Improve the under-recognition of women as resource managers and core actors in climate 
mitigation and adaptation (Gay-Antaki 2016).
7c Include policies that address the intersectionality and structural constraints that limit 
women's access to control and ownershiop over resources (Gay-Antaki 2016).
7d Improve tacking and measurement of differential security impacts of CCMIs on women 
and men (Lau et al. 2021).
8. Propose alternatives to neoliberal climate change mitigation solutions. Although 
there are proposals to address climate change through mechanisms other than markets 
relations by, for example, dispelling the notions that economic growth can be decoupled 
from natural resources and moving toward degrowth especially in high-income countries 
(Hickel and Kallis 2019; Krause 2020; Hickel 2021), contemporary CCMIs are almost 
exclusively market based and neo-colonial (Fletcher 2012; Ciplet and Roberts 2017; Howson 
2020), which come bundles with tensions, conflict, violence and insecurity. Alternatives 
are coming from Indigenous scholars, but have failed to influence policy and practice.
8a Reduce the reliance towards offset initiatives in reducing global greenhouse gas emission 
by expanding options in renewable energy (Lyons et al. 2014)
8b Address climate change mitigation in places other than forest (Leach and Scoones 2015)
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